Public Experiences of the UK Counter-Terrorism System

FULL REPORT

NOVEMBER 2020

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KEY POINTS

Perceptions of the UK counter-terrorism system have been widely studied. Existing research largely supports the view that the public is broadly unopposed to current counter-terrorism measures. However, there is evidence that a significant minority remain concerned about their potential effects.

Studies that explore direct experiences, as opposed to perceptions, of the counter-terrorism system are rare. For some areas of the counter-terrorism system, studies are entirely absent. However, the impacts of more indirect experiences, or the knowledge of others' experiences of counter-terrorism measures, have been widely studied, and are known to have similar effects to direct familiarity with such measures.

This report examines public perceptions of counter-terrorism measures in the UK and overseas, and also brings together evidence on how members of the public directly and indirectly experience five specific areas of counter-terrorism policy:

- Schedule 7 and airport security

- Police stop-and-search powers

- Prevent and the Prevent Duty

- Public communications campaigns

- Protective security measures.

It provides examples drawn from the research base which relate to these five policy areas and which are relevant to those working on these issues.

This report also points to important evidence gaps that would benefit from future research, including:

- robust studies that compare experiences across different protected characteristics

- experiences of individuals supported through Prevent and Channel interventions

- direct experiences of police counter-terrorism powers such as those who are suspected of an offence, or who have been stopped under Section 43

- the longer-term impacts that public communications campaigns have on behaviour

- the impact that such campaigns and protective security measures have on feelings of security and/ or fear.

Much of the literature remains theoretical, and most empirical research is based on small, qualitative studies. However, qualitative studies provide valuable evidence of how members of the public directly experience the counter-terrorism system. For some measures – particularly airport security and the Prevent Duty – this qualitative evidence is robust. For other areas, such as public communications campaigns and protective security measures, it is weaker and more exploratory.

Qualitative research, alongside a smaller number of quantitative studies, indicates that direct and indirect experiences of the counter-terrorism system can have short- and long-term impacts on members of the public. This includes the impact of perceived experiences, such as contact with the authorities which is not explicitly counter-terrorism-related but which is perceived in that way by those affected. A number of conclusions can be drawn from the existing literature.

1. *Some communities have disproportionately more contact with the counter-terrorism system.* Qualitative studies suggest that British Muslims and Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) communities have disproportionately more contact with the counter-terrorism system and are more concerned about its actual and perceived impacts. While quantitative research suggests that the majority of the British public are unopposed to current counter-terrorism measures, it still estimates that up to one-third of British Muslims distrust the counter-terrorism system.

2. Both *direct experiences and indirect experiences, or a broader awareness of incidents where friends, family members or members of one's community have had actual or perceived contact with the counter-terrorism system, can have similar impacts*. This 'shadow of the collective story' can exacerbate perceptions of personal victimisation and can reinforce the view that counter-terrorism measures discriminate against one's community as a whole.[1]

3. The *effects of having contact with or engaging with the counter-terrorism system extend beyond the individual involved*, with studies finding that families and communities can also be affected.

4. *Official statistics give an incomplete picture of how many people see themselves as having direct contact with the counter-terrorism system.* Qualitative research has found that experiences, such as being asked additional screening questions at airports, are often perceived as being related to the counter-terrorism system. Perceived and actual experiences can both contribute to a lack of trust in counter-terrorism policies and to perceptions of victimisation.

5. There appears to be *a high level of willingness to engage in both formal and informal counter-terrorism* efforts under the right circumstances. However, there are still barriers; a lack of trust in the authorities and concerns about discrimination reduce people's willingness to engage.

6. There are *challenges with ensuring that built environment designers, builders and operators take protective counter-terrorism measures seriously*, although more research is needed to explore how these professionals – including those working in the private sector who design and build structures, and those who work in or manage crowded places – engage with counter-terrorism policy.

7. More *overt counter-terrorism measures can increase feelings of security and safety*, but only when the authorities are trusted and perceptions of procedural justice are high.

8. *The counter-terrorism system does not operate in isolation.* Concerns about broader discrimination in society, and perceptions that the government is discriminatory, shape perceptions of counter-terrorism policy. Other policy areas that promote equality and social inclusion are therefore crucial for increasing trust in the government and in the counter-terrorism system.

9. *Maintaining and ensuring high levels of procedural justice is crucial for maintaining the legitimacy of the counter-terrorism system*, and for mitigating unintended consequences. In order to build trust in the counter-terrorism system it is important that it is viewed as neutral, treats people fairly and with respect, and provides the opportunity for people to voice concerns.

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1   The reference to the 'shadow of the collective story' is from *Blackwood et al. (2013)*.

INTRODUCTION

UNDERSTANDING THE UK COUNTER-TERRORISM SYSTEM

The UK counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, consists of four work strands – Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. Each strand is delivered through a diverse range of counter-terrorism measures. These are supported by counter-terrorism legislation, such as the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, that confer overt powers to a range of authorities.

This guide brings together insights into how members of the public perceive of, and experience, the counter-terrorism system based on academic and grey literature produced from 2017 onwards. Where relevant, it draws on several larger-scale studies produced outside of this period, and work from comparable fields such as criminology. While the majority of research focuses on the UK, the guide draws on studies from other countries in Europe, and from North America and Australia. As well as research on general perceptions of counter-terrorism measures, the guide examines five policy areas of the counter-terrorism system on which there was the greatest research. Given the lack of research into other areas of counter-terrorism policy, it does not provide a definitive review of every feature of the UK counter-terrorism system.

This report draws on studies that have been assessed by the authors to have robust methodologies. However, where necessary, this guide is explicit about the limitations of the data drawn from specific studies.

Research area	Overview of the evidence base
General perceptions of counter-terrorism measures	Based on 13 studies exploring perceptions of counter-terrorism measures.
Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000	Based on 15 UK and non-UK studies, including research on broader experiences of airport security; direct experiences of border security; and relevant evidence from broader studies of counter-terrorism measures. This section also draws on one statistical analysis of official data; and one official report.
Counter-Terrorism Police Powers	Based on 17 studies drawn from criminological literature on stop-and-search; studies specifically focused on counter-terrorism policing in the UK and overseas; and relevant evidence from studies of perceptions and experiences of counter-terrorism measures.
Prevent and the Prevent Duty	Based on 33 studies that cover broader perceptions of Prevent; the experiences of Prevent and Channel practitioners; the enactment of the Prevent Duty; and relevant evidence from broader studies.
Protective Security Measures	Based on 10 studies that explore the perceptions of those designing, building or managing built environment structures, and the general public.
Public Communications Campaigns	Based on seven studies exploring the experiences of campaign designers or impacts of campaigns on intended behaviour.

GENERAL PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES

KEY POINTS

1. There are many different ways that the public can experience the counter-terrorism system, which makes it difficult to generalise about broader experiences.

2. Muslim and/or BAME communities often have more direct and indirect experiences of the counter-terrorism system and appear to be more concerned about its potential effects.

3. The counter-terrorism system can have a range of short and long term psychological, emotional and behavioural effects on those who have more direct experience of, and indirect engagement with, it. Examples of such effects include feelings of fear, the embarrassment of victimisation when travelling, or a desire to modify one's behaviour and/or appearance to avoid similar experiences in the future.

4. Both personal experiences, as well as knowledge of others' experiences, can have similar impacts.

It is difficult to generalise about how the public experiences the counter-terrorism system due to the number of ways that the public might engage with counter-terrorism measures:

- **Participants:** Members of the public who deliver counter-terrorism as part of their role, including police officers and those working in the 'specified authorities' of the Prevent Duty.

- **Unaffected**: Those with little to no experience with the counter-terrorism system. [2]

- **Directly Affected**: Those with some personal (perceived or actual) experience with the counter-terrorism system, including those who have referred friends or family to Prevent.

- **Indirectly Affected:** Those who know somebody personally affected by counter-terrorism measures, or who perceive that their community as a whole is disproportionately affected by these measures based on their broader knowledge of counter-terrorism incidents.

It is not possible to estimate how many people fall into each of these categories based on the available evidence. However, it is possible to explore how different experiences might shape perceptions.

COMPARISONS ACROSS PROTECTED CHARACTERISTICS AND DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS [3]

Two older comparative qualitative studies – one published in 2013 (based on interviews with 81 individuals from different ethnic groups), and one in 2011 (based on interviews with 96 individuals from Muslim and non-Muslim backgrounds) – found that individuals from Muslim and/or BAME communities were more concerned about the detrimental impacts of counter-terrorism measures, and were more likely to *perceive* that these measures disproportionately target their communities. While it is important not to conflate religion and ethnicity, qualitative studies highlight how members of ethnic minority communities might be mistaken as being Muslim in public and might be targeted by counter-terrorism measures.

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2   See *Jarvis and Lister (2017)* for their discussion of the profile of the 'unaffected'. While it is likely that a significant number of people see themselves as falling into this category, in almost every qualitative study of perceptions (i.e. those not explicitly focused on experiences) at least one respondent can recount an experience where they, or somebody they know, had a perceived or actual engagement with the counter-terrorism system.

3   The older studies that have compared experiences across ethnic and religious groups were conducted by *Jarvis and Lister (2013)* and *Choudhury and Fenwick (2011)* respectively, and the discussion of the conflation between ethnicity and religion, and its perceived association with counter-terrorism measures, is found in *Hopkins et al. (2017)*. The French study was based on a survey conducted by *Ragazzi et al. (2019)*. For a discussion of gendered differences in perceptions, see qualitative research conducted by Jarvis and Lister *(2017)* and *Tara-Chand (2019)*.

Those self-identified as Muslim felt singled out by contemporary counter-terrorism powers because they were Muslim. This perception of targeting, however, was far from limited to those individuals, with a number of participants in our research identifying as black expressing similar concerns.

(Jarvis and Lister, 2017)

Quantitative research from France (n=927) found that levels of contact with the counter-terrorism system were similar between Muslims and non-Muslims. However, two-thirds of Muslim respondents, and almost three-quarters of non-Muslim respondents, felt that counter-terrorism measures target specific communities based on 'origin', religion, or their neighbourhood. Muslim respondents were significantly less likely to agree that this approach was justified than non-Muslims. Overall, this study reported that concerns about counter-terrorism measures had similar behavioural effects on Muslims and non-Muslims. For example, while 30 per cent of Muslims said they 'avoid saying what they think' about controversial topics, this was not significantly different to the proportion of non-Muslims who said the same (26%).

A growing body of literature examines how experiences of the counter-terrorism system differ based on gender, although only two qualitative studies specifically explore female experiences and perceptions of UK counter-terrorism measures. One focused on the experiences of women from South Asian communities who self-identified as Muslim, while the other interviewed women from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Both studies illustrate that the relationship between gender and the counter-terrorism system is complex. While some respondents felt that they were not directly affected by measures, such as stop-and-search, because they do not fit the common stereotype of a terrorist, those who identified as Muslim often felt gendered signifiers of their religion might make them more visible, and thus more vulnerable.

TRUST IN THE COUNTER-TERRORISM SYSTEM [4]

Qualitative and quantitative research suggests a significant number of British Muslims are distrusting of the counter-terrorism system or see it as discriminatory. While two larger quantitative studies (combined n=2,742) dispute the assumption that counter-terrorism measures have alienated the majority of British Muslims, they still find that around one-third of British Muslims are dissatisfied with or distrust counter-terrorism measures. One of these surveys (n=1,000) also finds that one-in-five British Muslims strongly agree that the police unfairly target Muslims because they are seen as a terrorism risk.

According to Hamida, "everybody knows somebody" who has been affected [by counter-terrorism measures], meaning many "just live in fear"

(Abbas, 2019)

While most British Muslims do not appear to be alienated, a significant number may still be. A sense of personal victimisation, as well as concern that one's community, as a whole, is being victimised, can contribute to alienation. Evidence suggests that individuals from Muslim and/or BAME communities are likely to perceive that they have been treated unfairly when they have been stopped by the police or at airports, including when they have had contact with the counter-terrorism system.

Counter-terrorism laws and practices are not experienced in isolation but do contribute to a wider sense among Muslims who participated in this study of being treated as a 'suspect community'.

(Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011)

The counter-terrorism system does not operate in

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4   Quantitative surveys conducted by *Shanaah (2019)* and *Clements et al. (2020)* find higher levels of positivity than negativity towards the counter-terrorism system but still report distrust among a significant number of British Muslims. The former study finds one-third of their sample of British Muslims to be distrusting of the counter-terrorism system. The latter study finds one-in-five members of its sample of British Muslims believe that the police unfairly target Muslims, and also identifies widespread concerns about Islamophobia in society. While both studies identify a willingness to engage in formal or informal counter-terrorism efforts, the former study reports that lower levels of trust lead to a lower intention to engage, whilst Ragazzi et al. (2019) report that experiences of discrimination reduce levels of trust in public institutions in France. The potential tensions or dilemmas of engaging with the counter-terrorism system, including reporting, are discussed in *Abbas (2019)*, *Awan and Guru (2017)* and *Richards (2019)*, although larger-scale research from *Thomas et al. (2017)* also finds people willing to report. Perceived experiences of indirect and direct victimisation are discussed in qualitative studies such as *Mythen et al. (2009)* and *Jarvis and Lister (2017)*.

isolation. Qualitative studies have found that public perceptions of counter-terrorism measures are often interwoven with broader concerns about Islamophobia within British society. Quantitative research in France has also shown that broader experiences of discrimination reduced Muslim respondents' trust in public institutions. Given that one survey (n=1,000) found that 71 per cent of British Muslims see Islamophobia as a large (30%) or a fair problem (41%) in the UK, this effect should not be underestimated.

Quantitative research shows that a lack of trust in counter-terrorism policies can reduce the willingness to engage with the authorities. Even within small samples, there can be significant differences of opinion about the validity and utility of engagement, and several qualitative studies point to the dilemmas individuals might face when deciding whether to engage with the counter-terrorism system, or when to report. However, these studies do not claim to be generalisable to the population as a whole.

DIRECT AND INDIRECT IMPACTS OF THE COUNTER-TERRORISM SYSTEM

Overall, the literature highlights that counter-terrorism measures can have short- and long-term impacts:

	Direct impacts	Indirect impacts
Short-term	**Psychological impacts** such as anxiety or fear experienced when stopped and/or questioned by officials or when having to make a Prevent referral. These effects are heightened for those with prior experiences of direct contact, or those who personally know of others who have had direct contact with the counter-terrorism system. **Physical impacts** such as being detained or being unable to travel.	Others' experiences with the counter-terrorism system and broader concerns about one's community being discriminated against by counter-terrorism measures can elicit similar **psychological impacts** at the individual level, such as anxiety and stress when travelling, and can elicit similar behaviours to avoid suspicion. It might also lead some individuals to engage in positive forms of activism. Indirect experiences can also lead to feelings of frustration, anger and victimisation at the broader community level. There can be a **cumulative effect**, as perception/ broader awareness of discrimination can influence experiences in the event that the individual does come into direct contact with the counter-terrorism system at some point. The experiences of friends and family members can have **emotional effects** such as concern about their well-being or being viewed with suspicion because of 'guilt-by-association'.[*]
Long-term	**Psychological impacts** such as anxiety or stress when travelling, or feelings of being surveilled. **Behavioural impacts** such as modifying behaviour and appearance to avoid repeat experiences, or a reassertion of religious identity or desire to become politically active. **Community or relational** impacts resulting from the stigma of past experiences, including alienation based on community concerns about being viewed as 'guilty-by-association', or an inability to travel to see family based on actual or perceived limits on movement.	

[*] Concerns about 'guilt by association' are discussed by *Abbas (2019)* and *Thomas et al. (2017)*.

SCHEDULE 7 OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2000

KEY POINTS

- Individuals from Muslim and/or BAME communities are more likely to be subjected to Schedule 7 stops.

- Individuals may perceive themselves as having had contact with the counter-terrorism system beyond official counter-terrorism stops, with other forms of surveillance and screening also having significant impacts on individuals.

- For Muslim and BAME travellers, personal experiences of being stopped and knowledge of others' experiences may perpetuate a belief that airport security practices – including, but not limited to counter-terrorism stops – discriminate against their communities, which can amplify their unintended effects.

- Maintaining procedural justice can mitigate some of the negative effects of perceptions and experiences of Schedule 7 stops.

The UK's Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation reported in 2020 that there was an 80% decrease in the number of Schedule 7 stops between 2012 and 2018, but that BAME passengers remain significantly more likely to be stopped than other passengers. As a result, while the same report estimates that 'less than one hundredth of 1% of the travelling public are subject to a Schedule 7 examination', Schedule 7 is one of the more controversial aspects of the UK counter-terrorism system.

Other ways that people might come into contact with the counter-terrorism system when travelling have been studied, including travellers' experiences of being stopped or surveilled at the border. While the specific reasons for being stopped and/or questioned are not

> Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 'allows an examining officer to stop and question and, when necessary, detain and search, individuals travelling through ports, airports, international rail stations or the border area to determine whether that person appears to be someone who is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.'
>
> (Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 2020).

always explicit in these studies, the reported effects of actual and perceived experiences with counter-terrorism stops are remarkably similar.

Two quantitative analyses found that BAME and Muslim passengers are disproportionately more likely to be stopped under Schedule 7. However, more research is needed to compare the likelihood of groups with different protected characteristics being selected for counter-terrorism stops, as methodological differences mean that these studies are not directly comparable. Qualitative research from the UK, North America, Europe and Australia also suggests that Muslim and BAME travellers routinely experience additional screening at airports. Many of these individuals, particularly those who see themselves as 'visibly Muslim', have spoken of being selected for additional screening on multiple occasions. [5]

> *If experiences of being accused directly of terrorism by [the security services] are at the top of the pyramid of suspicion, and public controls in the subway are a couple of steps below in the pyramid, then experiences at airports account for much of the base.*
>
> *(Schclarek Mulinari, 2019)*

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5   This section is based on 15 studies which have interviewed individuals experiencing border security measures (including Schedule 7) in the UK and other European countries, North America and Australia; one experimental analysis; and one official report. Incidence rate is based on *Hall (2020)*. Race disproportionality is drawn from an experimental analysis by *Hurrell (2013)* and religious disproportionality from a randomised control trial conducted by *Langley et al. (2014)* which reported that over 80 per cent of their 393 respondents who had been subject to a Schedule 7 stop were Muslim. Qualitative studies that have explored experiences at airports, including of individuals who are 'visibly Muslim' such as those wearing the hijab, include *Choudhury and Fenwick (2011)*, *Blackwood et al. (2015)*, *Nagra and Maurutto (2016)*, *Schclarek Mulinari (2019)* and *Bull and Rane (2019)*.

Both personal experiences of being stopped while travelling, as well as knowledge of others being subjected to similar experiences, can contribute to a sense of discrimination and victimisation. For example, one Canadian study found that all but one of the 50 young Muslims interviewed believed that racial profiling of Muslims was pervasive at borders; 30 respondents felt they had been unfairly scrutinised because of their Muslim identity; and 39 could recall a family member or friend being racially profiled at an airport or a land crossing, often on more than one occasion. While it is not easily possible for these individuals to know for sure that their friends or family members had been profiled, *perceptions* of racial profiling can still contribute to a sense of personal or community victimisation. [6]

"I know so many people who have been going through airports and automatically being picked up or phones being taken away and not given back, searching through laptops, things like that. It's obvious it's the target to the Muslim community, it's not a broad perspective."

(Respondent in Bull and Rane, 2019)

Because respondents in this Canadian study felt that Caucasians were far less likely to be stopped than Muslims or non-Muslims of 'Middle Eastern or Asian descent', they believed claims that stops were random were an attempt to hide discrimination. Perceptions that airport security staff discriminate against travellers based on perceived or actual religious identity are identified in a number of other qualitative studies.

Research has not yet determined the level of support among the general population for counter-terrorism security measures at UK airports. The largest survey identified, which is based on a sample of 711 students enrolled at one English university, found that both white and non-white respondents were overwhelmingly supportive of security measures at airports. This related to counter-terrorism measures and general airport security. The study concluded that 'a minority of non-white passengers have concerns in the way they are treated at airports in the UK' as they

'perceived that some elements of the security process were discriminatory to ethnic minorities and could be interpreted as evidence for racial profiling'. However, these findings cannot be considered representative of the general population.

In one study, 393 people stopped under Schedule 7 were randomly assigned to different treatments. One group was interviewed using a 'procedural justice checklist' (discussed in more detail overleaf), and the other received some form of non-monetary compensation (such as a fast-track airport security lane voucher for future use). Across both groups, opinions of their treatment were positive. However, some respondents retained concerns. This study gave specific measures a score out of 100 based on levels of agreement with different statements. While this study does not quantify scores for the sample as a whole, it is possible to approximate overall scores:

- Most respondents felt officers had been 'fair in making the decision to stop me' (approximate score of 70) and that they had been treated with dignity and respect (approximate score of 85).

- Overall satisfaction with the stop was also high, with an approximate score of 80.

- Respondents were less likely to say that they felt humiliated or intimidated by the stop, or that the stop asked intrusive questions (approximate score of 50). Agreement with the statement 'I intend to make a complaint about the stop' was also low (approximate score of 35).

- However, the study reports significant variations in feelings of intimidation and humiliation. Levels of agreement in response to the statement 'stopping people in the airport causes social tensions in the UK', also varied considerably, although overall agreement was low (approximate score of 55).

- As this study did not use a control group, it is unclear whether passengers would have been as positive about their experiences under non-treatment conditions. A further limitation in this study is that it does not quantify how many people agreed with each statement. However, it can be inferred that some passengers were unhappy with

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[6] Canadian figures are drawn from *Nagra and Maurutto (2016)*. Perceived discrimination at borders is also discussed by *Nagra and Maurutto (2020)* in their exploration of no-fly lists; *Blackwood et al. (2015)* in their exploration of experiences at UK airports; and *Brouwer et al. (2018)* in their discussion of road borders in the Netherlands.

their stop, even when treatments were applied that might be expected to improve their perceptions.

The way in which stops are carried out remains important. Research in the UK found that non-white airport passengers were more likely to feel they were treated unprofessionally when stopped. Similarly, a survey of 505 US airport passengers found non-white respondents were more likely to feel embarrassed when selected for screening. Poor treatment can also have more serious impacts, with one study highlighting that being treated with hostility increased feelings of victimisation. Research further suggests that BAME passengers are more likely to be subject to additional screening once stopped, which might also increase perceived victimisation. [7]

The qualitative literature points to a number of impacts that direct (personal) and indirect (others') experiences with border security measures can have on individuals and communities. These include:

- **Psychological impacts** including the sense of belonging people feel in the country they live in, and on perceptions of their own citizenship, or increased anxiety when travelling.

- **Behavioural changes** such as modifying appearance to appear less 'visibly' religious when travelling or limiting engagement with other people at the airport.

- **Wider, non-travel related impacts** were found in research among seven British Muslims who had their passports removed at airports, including on their ability to travel to see relatives overseas; employment and housing prospects (with one respondent failing a DBS check because they couldn't provide a passport); and mental health. As this is a small sample size, more research is required to explore experiences of this aspect of the counter-terrorism system.

Quantitative studies demonstrate that procedural

justice, or a sense of being treated fairly, can mitigate some of the unintended consequences of airport security. One study in a 'European democracy' conducted a randomised control trial of a 'procedural justice checklist' to inform how counter-terrorism police officers in port settings interviewed suspected terrorists. This checklist was organised around four themes:

- Voice/ Participation: giving suspects a chance to share their views or experience of the interview

- Neutrality: providing clarity on legal rights, and of the officer's neutrality in decision-making

- Dignity and respect: treating the suspect with respect

- Trustworthiness: showing care for the suspect's well-being.

Procedural Justice checklists offer a simple, scalable means of improving how state agents interact with terrorism suspects. The police can use what is evidently a cost-effective tool to enhance legitimacy and cooperation with the police, even in a counterterrorism environment.

(Langley et al., 2020).

While suspects did not know that it was being used, post-interview surveys with 1,418 suspects found that the checklist significantly improved suspects' willingness to cooperate with the police. Similar effects were noted in the aforementioned UK study of a procedural justice checklist which was conducted by the same research team with 393 individuals subject to a Schedule 7 stop at Birmingham Airport over six months in 2014. [8]

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7   *Wood and Gardiner (2019)* explore levels of support for airport security measures and the comparative perceptions of white and non-white passengers in the UK. Overall perceptions of Schedule 7 stops are discussed in *Langley (2014)*. This should be considered alongside analysis from *Hurrell (2013)* which found BAME passengers were more likely to be questioned for longer than one hour and to be detained, and comparable research from the USA which found that non-white passengers were, on average, subjected to more additional procedures after being stopped than white passengers, and were more embarrassed (*Lum et al., 2013*). For a discussion of the impact of hostile interviewing in Canada and the UK, see *Nagra and Maurutto (2016)* and *Minhas et al. (2017)*.

8   Belonging and citizenship are discussed in *Jarvis and Lister (2013)*; *Blackwood et al. (2015)*; and *Schclarek Mulinari (2019)*. The desire to appear less visibly religious is discussed by authors including *Nagra and Maurutto (2016)*, who find that even those who have reasserted their religious identity in recent years may still modify their appearance at airports. Broader non-travel related impacts are discussed by *Kapoor and Narkowicz (2019)* in their interviews with individuals who had their passports removed. *Langley et al. (2020)* and *Langley (2014)* illustrate how procedural justice can mitigate these impacts, as well as lower-level irritation provoked by not receiving an explanation for a stop (see also *Brouwer et al. 2018*). This frustration may be higher for non-white passengers, who may be less likely to receive an explanation (*Lum et al., 2013*).

COUNTER-TERRORISM STOP-AND-SEARCH POWERS

KEY POINTS

1. While there has been less research into experiences of stop-and-search outside of airports, qualitative research suggests experiences and effects mirror those relating to Schedule 7.

2. Although religion and ethnicity are predictors of being stopped-and-searched, neither in isolation is a sufficient predictor. Nevertheless, perceptions of being targeted based on religious identity and ethnicity can be just as damaging as more overt forms of discrimination.

3. Maintaining procedural justice is a crucial way of mitigating these effects. However, perceptions of personal or community-wide victimisation can undermine feelings of procedural justice, and support for police counter-terrorism powers.

Beyond the research on stop-and-search procedures at airports, few studies have been carried out on the impact of counter-terrorism stop-and-search powers since 2017. Anecdotal evidence from older qualitative studies suggest that many Muslims felt unfairly targeted by the now-repealed Section 44 and some more recent qualitative research has discussed anecdotal evidence of being stopped by police.

However, experiences with this area of the counter-terrorism system remain poorly understood, with no studies identified that explicitly explore experiences of Section 43 stops. [9] As a result, this section predominantly draws on the criminological literature on broader police stop-and-search practices. While these studies are not explicitly related to Section 43, the findings are relevant

> The Terrorism Act 2000 conferred a number of stop-and-search powers onto the police. The most widely used of these powers today is Section 43, which is 'a power to stop and search a person reasonably suspected to be a terrorist to discover whether he has in his possession anything which may constitute evidence that he is a terrorist.'.
>
> (The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 2020)

to counter-terrorism policy as they speak to some of the broader concerns about discrimination discussed earlier. Further research to explore whether the removal of Section 44 has had any impact on these perceptions of individual or community victimisation and on perceptions of procedural justice would be useful.

Two criminological studies find that race and religion in isolation do not predict the likelihood of being stopped by police (for any type of crime), but they are a significant predictor of final outcome: [10]

- *Individuals from BAME backgrounds were more likely to be arrested once they had been stopped* according to an analysis of 53,858 stop-and-search incidents in one police force area. However, ethnicity was never the strongest predictor of being arrested, with factors such as being male or known to the police found to be stronger predictors of outcome.

- *'Muslim respondents were among the least likely to be stopped but among the most likely to be searched'* according to an analysis of five waves of the Crime Survey for England and Wales. Being

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9 This section draws on studies specifically focused on counter-terrorism policing in the UK (4) and overseas (3), relevant evidence from broader studies of UK counter-terrorism measures (5), and five criminological studies. For a discussion of historical perceptions of Section 44, see Choudhury and Fenwick (2011).

10 Analysis of arrest outcomes by ethnicity is based on an analysis of 53,858 stop-and-search incidents in one police force area (*Ariel and Tankebe, 2018*). This analysis also found that terrorism-related searches had one of the highest arrest rates. Caution is needed in interpreting these findings given that Home Office analysis of the use of stop-and-search in England and Wales finds that in the year ending March 2020, individuals from BAME backgrounds 'were stopped at a rate 4.1 times higher than those who were from a White ethnic group.' Home Office (2020). *Hargreaves (2018)* analysed Crime Survey data from 2006–2011 to explore the experiences of British Muslims. *Murray et al. (2015)* compared opinions of policing across religious and ethnic groups using survey data (n=30,412) collected between 2006–2008 and used police intelligence data to map localised levels of risk.

Muslim slightly increased the chances of being stopped, but other factors – such as ethnicity, age and gender – had a significantly larger effect. However, Muslims were eight times more likely to be searched after a stop when controlling for other demographic variables.

- *Ethnicity and religious identity may be a predictor of opinions on stop-and-search.* Survey data collected from 30,412 residents of one UK metropolitan area found higher levels of satisfaction than dissatisfaction with the overall level of service provided by the police, but also pointed to differences between religious and ethnic groups:

  - Overall, Muslims were more dissatisfied than non-Muslims, and Muslims from BAME communities were more dissatisfied than non-Muslims from BAME communities. Muslims from BAME communities also had a lower opinion on the appropriateness of stop-and-search and were more likely to believe that they were targeted by this practice, than non-Muslims from BAME communities..

  - Levels of confidence in the police were lowest in those areas where police intelligence suggested that the risk from violent extremism was highest. However, this study only explored correlations between these measures and did not discuss causation.

These experiences, and the perceptions of discrimination that accompany them, can be damaging, with qualitative research finding that many Muslims view police stops as evidence of discrimination:

- *Procedurally unjust street stops may increase the perceived risk of radicalisation* according to one nationally representative survey of 798 British Muslims. Respondents were presented with one of two scenarios: both involved a Muslim man who had been stopped by the police repeatedly, but in one scenario the individual felt as though he was always treated in a procedurally just way, and in the other they did not.

- When asked about the impact such experiences might have on the risk of the individual in the scenario engaging in, or supporting violence, respondents presented with the unjust scenario rated both outcomes as significantly more likely.

- Muslims who had come into contact with the authorities (for either real or perceived counter-terrorism purposes) were twice as likely to feel as though they had been targeted than non-Muslims who had come into contact with the authorities according to one quantitative study (n=927) from France. They were also much less likely to say they had been treated well.

- *Perceptions that Muslims are targeted by counter-terrorism measures increased scepticism* towards the police in one survey of 800 Australian Muslims

- *Perceived discrimination can elicit a range of emotional responses* when stopped by the police, such as infuriation (a sense of resentment and injustice); disenchantment (feelings of resignation); or responsibilisation (a desire to challenge ignorance and intolerance of Islam);

- *The impact of being stopped is not the same for all people.* While some individuals may feel 'responsibilised' to reassert their religious identity, others choose not to be 'outwardly Muslim' to avoid a repeat of previous negative experiences of being stopped.[11]

Procedural justice is regularly identified as crucial for maintaining trust in police counter-terrorism powers. One survey of 300 British Muslims found that perceptions of the fairness by which government forms counter-terrorism policies, and the fairness with which they are delivered, are predictors of willingness to support the police in counter-terrorism work, and willingness to alert police about a terror-related risk in their community.

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11   *Tankebe (2020)* used an experimental design to survey whether respondents thought that specific experiences might increase an individual's risk of being radicalised. Evidence from France is drawn from *Ragazzi et al. (2019)*. *Cherney and Murphy (2017)* conducted a regression analysis on their survey data to explore the link between trust and scepticism amongst Australian Muslims. *Mythen et al. (2009)* developed the cited typology of three emotional reactions to counter-terrorism measures based on focus groups with British Muslims, and both *Abbas (2019)* and *Mythen et al. (2013)* speak of young Muslims seeking to demonstrate 'safeness' or choosing not to be 'outwardly Muslim'. Two further studies that are particularly useful are those from *Schclarek Mulinari (2019)* and *Sentas (2016)*, who explore the experiences of individuals specifically targeted by Swedish and British security services respectively.

A survey of 800 Australian Muslims reported similar effects and found that 'procedural justice is a significant predictor of Muslims' willingness to cooperate with police in counter-terrorism initiatives', even among those respondents who were distrusting of the police.[12]

While some surveys suggest that trust in the police is consistent across the population, others have found it is lower among some communities. Perceptions of personal or community-wide victimisation can undermine feelings of procedural justice, and trust in police counter-terrorism powers. The aforementioned survey of 800 Australian Muslims found that perceptions that Muslims were being targeted by counter-terrorism measures can significantly reduce perceptions of procedural justice.

In the UK, a study with 22 Asian Muslims interviewed by police when suspected for a crime (of any kind) found that 17 respondents 'believed that police officers' perceived attitudes towards them were negative', most commonly because of their ethnicity or religion. It is not possible to make generalisations based on the small sample size of this study, so further research to explore perceptions of procedural justice in the UK will be important.

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12   Both *Huq et al. (2011)* and *Cherney and Murphy (2017)* explore how perceptions of procedural justice influence willingness to cooperate with the police. While both *Clements et al. (2020)* and *Murray et al. (2015)* use survey data to argue that Muslim communities are less trusting of the police, *Shanaah (2019)* and *Hargreaves (2015)* use similar data to argue that levels of trust are comparable between Muslims and non-Muslims. While it is hard to explain these differences, the key point is that a lack of trust can undermine willingness to cooperate with the police. For a discussion of how perceived biases can undermine trust in the UK context, see *Minhas et al. (2017)* and *Minhas and Walsh (2018).* Suspects' experiences of police interviewing are discussed in the former.

PREVENT AND THE PREVENT DUTY

KEY POINTS

1. Opposition to Prevent and the Prevent Duty may be less pronounced than qualitative research has often suggested. However, a significant proportion of the general public still hold concerns.

2. Challenges faced by individuals tasked with delivering Prevent as part of their professional function – such as challenges in assessing risk or in engaging communities – have been widely studied.

3. Far less is known about how individuals who have been supported through Prevent have experienced programmes such as Channel. However, Prevent can have impacts that extend beyond those directly engaging with the programme, particularly in the specified authorities of the Duty.

The academic literature on Prevent is vast. However, much of this literature is theoretical. Quantitative evidence is rare and constitutes two surveys that have explored attitudes towards Prevent, and one that has surveyed willingness to engage in less formal counter-extremism efforts. Qualitative studies have explored anecdotal evidence of individuals impacted by Prevent and broader perceptions of the strategy. However, no studies have examined the experiences of individuals who have received Prevent support through Channel. There has been more research among those who deliver Prevent, such as the police, local authority practitioners, and Channel intervention providers. A smaller body of research has explored the experiences of communities involved in local Prevent work.

Since the introduction of the Prevent Duty in 2015, a range of 'specified authorities' have been legally required to deliver Prevent. Since then, a large body of literature has explored the impacts of this duty on a range of these specified authorities, including local government, social work and healthcare. However, by far the most widely studied sector is education, with one literature review finding that by 2018, 27 qualitative or mixed-methods studies had already been conducted in schools and colleges.[13]

AWARENESS OF PREVENT [14]

A significant number of British adults are aware of Prevent but most have not heard of the strategy. One survey suggested that one-third (32%) of British adults (n=1,000), and less than half (44%) of British Muslims (n=1,000) have heard of it. A second survey (n=2,022) found that only 41 per cent of university students have heard of Prevent (and 47% of Muslim students), the vast majority of whom (27%) have only encountered it through the media. While this sample cannot be considered representative of the general population, this finding points to a need for research into how media coverage shapes perceptions and experiences of Prevent. Qualitative studies have suggested that media coverage of 'critical incidents' related to Prevent (such as the now-debunked 'Terrorist House' case) can shape public perceptions of the strategy, while national and local counter-terrorism practitioners have noted how high-profile anti-Prevent campaigns can create barriers to engaging local communities.

It is clear that levels of awareness vary considerably across different groups. For example:

- *Professionals* working in the 'specified authorities' will inevitably have more awareness of Prevent. Awareness among young people attending educational institutions will vary according to how much work the individual institution does with them around Prevent.

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13 Based on a review conducted by *Jerome et al. (2019)*. Since that review was published, a number of important studies have been published in this space (e.g. *McGlynn and McDaid, 2018* and *Busher and Jerome, 2020*).
14 *Clements et al. (2020)* and *Guest et al. (2020)* use survey data to explore levels of awareness of Prevent among the general population (n=2,000) and students (n=2,022) respectively, and qualitative research from *Abbas (2019)* illustrates how awareness of Prevent might shape distrust of the strategy and local divisions. For a discussion of the challenges created by anti-Prevent campaigns, see *Parker et al. (2019)*, and for critical incidents, see *Lundie (2019)*.

- *Individuals or communities* with direct experience of Prevent will also be more aware. Qualitative interviews with 26 British Muslims in Yorkshire found high levels of awareness of Prevent, and that disputes over its validity had led to divisions between community members who had engaged with Prevent and those refusing to do so. While the small sample size means that these findings are not generalisable, further research into the community impacts of Prevent, and into how Prevent is experienced by communities that engage with it, is needed.

OPINIONS OF PREVENT [15]

Levels of overt opposition to Prevent are low but a significant proportion of the population hold some concerns about it. Several studies have found that many British Muslims are willing to engage with Prevent; to engage in less formal counter-extremism activity, such as donating to counter-extremism efforts, challenging extremists online, or disrupting the activities of extremists operating in their local area; and to report a friend or family member to Prevent when they have genuine concerns about them, and when they believe that this is the best way of supporting that individual.

For example, one survey found that 85 per cent of British adults (n=1,000) and 80 per cent of British Muslims (n=1,000) offered 'qualified or unqualified support' for a 'neutral representation of Prevent', with approximately half offering unqualified support.

It also found that two-thirds of British Adults, and two-thirds of British Muslims would be willing to refer somebody to Prevent if they had concerns about them. However:

- *Around 40 per cent of respondents had concerns about Prevent, including 37 per cent of British adults and 33 per cent of British Muslims who supported the neutral representation, but who had concerns.*

- *Respondents were less supportive when told that Prevent was 'currently mostly aimed at Muslims',* which is how it is often perceived according to qualitative studies. When presented with this representation, the number of Muslims expressing no concerns fell from 47 per cent to 36 per cent, and the number that opposed this approach rose from 7 per cent to 13 per cent. There was no change among the broader sample of British adults.

Similar trends are reported in the previously-cited survey of university students. This survey found that only nine per cent of students (14% of Muslim students) agreed that Prevent was damaging to university life, although a further 45 per cent felt that Prevent was important, but could be damaging if not implemented sensitively. Students who had previously heard of Prevent were more likely to say that Prevent was damaging to university life (9%) than those who had not heard of the strategy (1.4%).

Friends and family members are willing to report an individual to the authorities under the right circumstances as listed above. However, there are also a number of barriers to reporting, including the emotional impact in the 'pre-reporting' and 'post-reporting' stages, such as the anxiety or uncertainty about what might happen to the reporter or the person being reported, which may be exacerbated by a lack of communication or support offered to individuals once they have reported someone.

LOCAL PRACTITIONERS' EXPERIENCES OF WORKING WITH AND DELIVERING PREVENT [16]

Several studies have examined the experiences of

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[15] Surveys conducted by *Clements et al. (2020)* and *Guest et al. (2020)* have explored levels of support for Prevent amongst the general population and students respectively. Figures for qualified and unqualified support are taken from the former. Research from *Shanaah (2019)* and *Innes et al. (2017)* explored British Muslims' willingness to engage in more informal or community-led counter-extremism work. *Thomas et al. (2017)* have explored the willingness of communities in Australia (n=33) and the UK (n=66) to report friends and family members to the authorities, as well as barriers to reporting. *James (2020)* outlines the need for pre and post-reporting support.

[16] For an exploration of the subjectivity in Channel, see *Pettinger (2020)* and *Thornton and Bouhana (2019)*, and for subjectivity within the Police, see *Dresser (2019)*. For a detailed exploration of the Channel mentorship programme and a discussion of some of the credibility risks that these actors face, see *Weeks (2018)* who has interviewed 23 Channel intervention providers as well as six post-release offenders. Unfortunately, his interviews with offenders are not discussed in much detail. The impacts of Prevent work at the community level, including some of the divisions that have emerged, have been discussed by *Abbas (2019)*, *Weeks (2019)*, and *Innes et al. (2017)*, with the latter two studies exploring specific examples of community-led counter-extremism work. British Muslims' opinions of Muslim counter-extremism activists have been explored in detail by *Shanaah (2019)*.

different local actors involved in delivering local Prevent work, such as police officers, local authority Prevent Coordinators and Education Officers, Channel mentors, and community organisations. There are several common themes in this research:

Managing and evaluating risk is challenging. Several studies note how police officers and local Channel panels identify risk in subjective ways, and point to regional differences in how risk is managed:

- *There are regional differences in how Channel is delivered.* One study of six local Channel actors – three intervention providers and three members of local authority Channel teams – found that the threshold for Channel intervention varied across different regions. It also highlighted that different local authorities took different approaches to selecting and training Channel intervention providers, and that some actors were critical of the quality of providers.

- *Different regional approaches can directly impact on whether an individual is deemed to meet the threshold for Channel intervention, and how any subsequent support is delivered.* However, research into experiences of Channel mentees is lacking, which makes the impact of these dynamics difficult to determine.

Community organisations and Prevent and Channel intervention providers must balance the perceived costs and benefits of engaging with Prevent which include:

- A *detrimental impact on an individual/ organisation's credibility*, with one study suggesting that an individual or community organisation's decision to engage with Prevent might perpetuate divisions in local communities.

- However, *quantitative evidence of this effect is mixed.* One author points to conflicting results across two surveys of British Muslims. The first found that only 45 per cent of the 825 people

interviewed said that they identified with Muslim activists engaged in counter-extremism (versus 27% who took the opposite position.), while the second found that 78 per cent of the 917 people interviewed felt such activists were 'doing an important thing for the sake of fellow Muslims.'

- Several studies have illustrated that local communities are willing to engage in bottom-up counter-extremism work by exploring specific examples of *genuinely community-led interventions* that operate outside of formal Prevent funding streams.

EXPERIENCES WITH THE PREVENT DUTY

While a smaller number of studies have explored how practitioners working in social work and in local authorities have responded to the Prevent Duty, this section focuses explicitly on studies on experiences within education and in healthcare as the evidence-base for these sectors is more robust.[17]

EDUCATION

While experiences will vary between individuals, and across different institutions, qualitative research suggests that many educators have limited experience with Prevent beyond training sessions: while Prevent is often embedded in the curriculum, many educators have no personal experience of referrals.

Attitudes toward the Prevent Duty [18]

Most educators working in schools and colleges are seemingly unopposed to the Prevent Duty. This lack of opposition is underpinned by the belief that Prevent is safeguarding. A survey of 225 educators found more agreement (54.5%) than disagreement (29.3%) with the statement 'the Prevent Duty on schools and colleges is a proportionate response to a clearly identified problem'. And, in the largest survey identified (n=345), three-

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17   For work on local authorities, see *Chisholm and Coulter (2017)*, and on social work, see *Vaughn (2019)* and *Chivers (2018)*.

18   A recent edited volume (*Busher and Jerome, 2020*) has identified this rapid normalisation of Prevent in education and has discussed the broad acceptance of the safeguarding message across the education sector. However, smaller-scale qualitative studies have suggested that concerns about Prevent may be more widespread in some regions or individual institutions (e.g. *Moffat and Jeane Gerard, 2020*). The muted acceptance of the Prevent Duty in higher education has been identified by both *McGlynn and McDaid (2018)* and *Spiller et al. (2018)*. For a discussion of policy 'acceptance' and 'accomodation' (*Busher et al. 2019*) and the broad level of support for Prevent in schools and colleges, see the surveys of *da Silva et al. (2020)* (n=345) and *Busher et al. (2017)* (n=225). *Busher et al. (2017)* also point to some evidence of concerns about stigmatisation and a potential 'chilling effect', particularly among BME respondents. For a discussion of pupils' views, and a review of the literature on self-censorship, see *Elwick et al. (2020)*. No single study explores spurious referrals in specific depth but examples have been identified in many of the studies cited in this section.

quarters agreed 'The Prevent Duty belongs within education'. However, two smaller qualitative studies suggest that acceptance of the safeguarding framing, and of the Prevent Duty itself, whilst still common, is more muted among staff working in higher education settings. Because the combined sample size for these studies is small (n=30), more research in this space would be useful.

Some educators hold concerns about the Prevent Duty. These focus on concerns that Muslim students are stigmatised by the Duty , and a potential 'chilling effect' on classroom discussion. Although 41 per cent of educators interviewed for one survey (n=225) felt that the Duty had led to more open discussions of topics related to extremism in classrooms, a significant number (12%) felt that students and staff were less willing to discuss these topics openly since 2015.

While some of these concerns are based on perceptions of Prevent's potential effects, others are based on educators' and students' direct and indirect experiences of detrimental impacts. Home Office statistics show that a significant proportion of referrals made to Channel from the education sector do not meet the threshold for Channel intervention, or for other forms of support. Although the reasons for this have not been examined systematically, many studies published since 2017 have provided anecdotal evidence regarding possible explanations for these figures, including educators adopting an over-cautious approach; a lack of understanding of extremist ideology; and a lack of confidence in discussing issues with students when they arise. Qualitative interviews with college and university students, and with school pupils, have regularly illustrated that perceived discrimination and monitoring can lead them to self-censor their opinions around topics relating to extremism, terrorism and politics.

In the context of this guide, it is useful to consider how different elements of the Prevent Duty can be experienced in different ways. Overall, most educators' experiences of the Prevent Duty sits somewhere between

'reluctant policy accommodation' and 'straightforward policy acceptance', and is marked by indifference. For others, experiences can be more markedly either positive or negative.

Training and Support [19]

Educators are broadly positive about the training they receive. Positive experiences are evidenced by high levels of confidence as to how to raise a Prevent concern, and by the reassurance that staff feel from knowing how to raise concerns.

Positive experiences appear to be linked to *who* is delivering the training and *how* it is delivered. One survey suggested that training from colleagues is viewed most favourably, although ongoing support from external Prevent practitioners, such as Prevent Coordinators or Prevent Education Officers, is also highly valued.

However, several smaller-scale studies report that negative perceptions of training outweigh positive perceptions in their samples, often because training is perceived to be poor quality, or in some cases, is seen to contain unconscious biases. While these findings might not be representative of all educators, they highlight that opinions of training, and of the Prevent Duty, can vary across individual institutions, and across different regions.

Reporting Concerns [20]

In schools and colleges, the common procedure for making a Prevent referral is that an individual educator will raise a concern with their institution's Prevent lead, who will ultimately decide whether to make a formal referral to local authority Prevent teams. According to qualitative research, educators believe that the Prevent Duty has had an impact on the number of young people being referred to Channel – although some schools are more comfortable in dealing with lower-level concerns than others. Without the Duty, one survey of 225 educators found that approximately 42 per cent of all

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19   Both *Busher et al. (2017)* and *da Silva et al. (2020)* report high levels of confidence within their surveys, while Busher and his colleagues explicitly explore the theme of reassurance and the high levels of positivity educators hold towards different forms of training and support. In contrast, only two of 12 educators interviewed by *Moffat and Jeane Gerard (2020)* were positive about their training, while both local practitioners (*Webb, 2017*) and *Ofsted (2016)* have discussed how training quality can vary across different providers and regions.

20   The quantified impact on referrals has been noted by *Busher et al. (2017)*, while the volume edited by *Busher and Jerome (2020)* explores similarities and differences between reporting practices across the education sector, and discusses educators' concerns about potentially missing something. *Richards (2019)* has also explored the decision-making process of reporters, and the effects that such a decision can have.

Prevent referrals, and 46 per cent of concerns about radicalisation raised internally, were unlikely to have been made – although it is impossible to know for sure whether this effect as perceived by educators is accurate. The nature and process of referring a pupil can have various effects on educators:

- *Educators identify risk in subjective ways, which can lead to anxiety about 'missing something'.* Being able to share concerns informally with colleagues, and with local Prevent officers, can go some way towards alleviating these concerns.

- *The process of evaluating risk can have varying impacts on educators.* Some educators adopt a 'better safe than sorry' mentality to referrals, while others are conflicted about whether referring a student is in their best interests. This means that, while for many educators the ability to pass the risk on might alleviate feelings of anxiety, for others it is a cause of anxiety.

HEALTHCARE [21]

In comparison to education, the Prevent Duty has been more contested within the healthcare sector. While research in this sector is more limited (n=4), it has suggested that the message of safeguarding is more disputed. One survey of 329 NHS staff found that only 47 per cent agreed that Prevent was safeguarding (22% disagreed) and 48 per cent agreed that Prevent belonged in healthcare.

While more research is needed, the healthcare and education sectors have very different professional cultures. Both educators and healthcare professionals take safeguarding seriously, but the practice of safeguarding is known to differ between these two sectors: while educators have an established procedure of taking a 'better safe than sorry' approach to reporting safeguarding concerns, the threshold for breaking confidentiality will likely be higher within healthcare institutions based on their professional standards.

Data from NHS trusts finds that religion and ethnicity are a predictor of referrals. Based on the number of referrals as a proportion of the number of patients that were from each population, data from nine trusts found that Asians/British Asians were reported to Prevent four times more than non-Asians (based on a total of 99 referrals), while data from six trusts found that Muslims were referred to Prevent eight times more than non-Muslims (based on a total of 92 referrals).

It is worth noting that the overall likelihood of being referred was low (less than 0.01% of admitted patients were referred). The author of this study also notes that individuals with mental health conditions were disproportionately referred, and draws on 10 case studies to illustrate how referrals can both cause and exacerbate pre-existing conditions.

Interviews with NHS staff also suggest some are concerned about the potential for the Duty to disproportionately impact Muslim communities. While based on a small sample (n=17), one study reported that respondents identifying as Muslim felt that Prevent training was overly focused on Islamist extremism, or that discussion of other forms of extremism was 'disingenuous', while a number of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents felt they had to censor their opinions about the Duty.

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21   *Heath-Kelly and Strausz (2018)* have explored the opinions of NHS staff and some of the sensitivities relating to Prevent and mental health within the NHS. *Aked (2020)* has also explored issues relating to mental health in relation to Prevent referrals and has analysed the disproportionate representation of Asian and Muslim patients in referrals made by NHS trusts. Both of these studies, as well as *Younis and Jadhav (2020a)* and *Younis and Jadhav (2020b)*, report significant concern about the Prevent Duty among healthcare staff.

PROTECTIVE SECURITY

KEY POINTS

1. Protective security measures can enhance feelings of safety and security. However, the British public are seemingly unwilling to trade convenience for enhanced security.

2. There are barriers to encouraging the widespread adoption of protective security measures in the private sector, including low awareness of the threat from terrorism, and practical and financial constraints that render such measures as low priorities.

3. A number of potential incentives have also been identified. These include increasing awareness of the current threat, financial incentives, and supportive policy and legislation.

Protective security measures – which, in the UK, are delivered through the Protect strand of CONTEST – have become increasingly important. High-profile attacks both in the UK and overseas have illustrated that terrorists are increasingly targeting 'softer' targets, including public spaces. [22]

Protective security measures are designed to communicate to both would-be attackers and the broader public, however this section focuses on the impact of such measures on the public. Although several theoretical studies have discussed the principles of designing these measures, studies into public perceptions of protective security measures, or the experiences of private-sector organisations tasked with implementing them, are not common (n=10). Although a number of useful conclusions can be drawn from this literature, this section is therefore largely exploratory.

DESIGNERS, DEVELOPERS, AND OPERATORS OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT [23]

There are a number of ways that buildings can be designed so as to minimise vulnerabilities. One typology laid out below, outlines a series of objectives such as deflection or disguise to mitigate the potential impact of any terrorist attack.

'Designing-in' protective security measures is often considered preferable to retrofitting them. However, qualitative studies have found that many private developers do not design-in protective security measures because they are not legally required to do so. These studies have identified a number of reasons for this reluctance to include such measures, including:

- Practical barriers: comprising time and financial constraints

DEFLECT an attack by showing that the chance of being successful is reduced	**DISGUISE** valuable parts of the building so that an attack fails to make desired impact	**DISPERSE** potential targets so that an attack cannot impact every potential target	**STOP** an attack from reaching its target through the use of physical measures	**BLUNT** the impacts of an attack should an attacker reach the target area.

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22   The shifting focus of terror attacks is noted in several studies (*McIlhatton et al. 2020*; *Parker et al. 2019*). For a discussion of the different audiences for protective security measures, see *Dalton et al. (2015)*, and for a broader discussion of the principles of designing these measures, see *Coaffee (2010)* and *Bosher and Kappia (2010)*.

23   Case study is drawn from research by *Booth et al. (2020)*. The typology of approaches is presented in *Harre-Young et al. (2010)* and is similar to one developed by *Paraskevas (2013)* for the hospitality sector. *Harre-Young (2012)* presents policy recommendations based on an exploration of the issues relating to retrofitting, barriers to the adoption of protective security measures, and the potential incentives to overcome these barriers. *McIlhatton et al. (2020)* also explore barriers based on interviews with stakeholders in the UK, USA and Australia, and discuss financial incentives in *McIlhatton et al. (2019)*. *Kappia et al. (2009)* explore these issues within public transport.

- Psychological barriers: lack of awareness about the threat and belief that 'it won't happen to us'.

Factors that might incentivise the adoption of designed-in or retrofitted protective security include:

- Supportive policy and legislation

- Financial benefits or direct financial incentives

- Having a greater awareness of the terrorism threat.

Research with public transport stakeholders suggests that willingness to adopt protective security measures is linked to perceptions of the current threat. Measures were considered more acceptable when they tied in with broader security and safety features; did not restrict the flow of passengers; were non-obtrusive; and the benefits were seen to outweigh any financial costs.

THE BROADER PUBLIC [24]

Protective security measures are an increasingly common feature of urban environments. Some measures are overt, and deliberately obtrusive – such as target hardening measures, or barriers – whilst others are less visible or deliberately camouflaged. Consequently, many people may be unaware of specific protective security features, or unaware that they are specifically designed to protect against terrorism.

In general, the public are accepting of more visible forms of protective security measures, provided that they are not obtrusive or inconvenient. On average, public transport users ranked ticket price, convenience, and journey time as being a higher priority than safety

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CASE STUDY:
CHALLENGES AND DRIVERS TO IMPLEMENTING PROTECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES

Booth et al. (2020) explored the current challenges and potential drivers to implementing protective security measures in the built environment. Based on interviews with 23 Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSA) and 19 built environment professionals (architects, developers, and local authority planners) they report:

- Built environment professionals had a low awareness of CTSAs and of current security advice: Only five had received advice from a CTSA, and only four were aware of the published advice.

- Cost was the biggest challenge when considering protective security advice: 11 built environment professionals, and all 23 CTSAs cited this as the biggest challenge. Other challenges included concerns that measures would affect the appearance of developments, complacency towards the terrorist threat, and specific concerns related to modifying listed buildings and conservation areas.

- All interviewees believed that the best time to receive advice is in the design stage, and that early advice could drive the adoption of these measures. Other drivers included terrorist attacks, the creation of specific policies and guidance, and improved promotion of existing advice and guidance.

The authors also make a series of recommendations, including:

- training CTSAs so that they have a better understanding of the planning system

- introducing tailored counter-terrorism guidance and awareness training

- making CTSAs statutory consultees within planning legislation.

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24   Public experiences, awareness, and opinions of protective security measures are explored in a pan-European study of 489 public transport users conducted by *Carter et al. (2015)*. The difficulties faced by individuals with cognitive, physical, or motor impairments in navigating these measures are outlined in *Adams and Ward (2020)*. The positive impact that such measures can have on feelings and security are discussed in *Dalgaard-Nielsen et al. (2016)*, in which the authors note that their positive findings were unexpected based on smaller-scale research conducted in the United States (*Grosskopf, 2006*) and Australia (*Aly and Green, 2010*). However, their observation that trust in the government is linked to perceptions of security is supported by *Rykkja et al. (2009)*.

and security in one pan-European survey of 489 people. When respondents were asked about potential physical security measures, over 60 per cent considered more obtrusive measures to be 'unacceptable', although it was unclear why.

Intelligence measures, law enforcement, protective security, and emergency management services cannot stand alone. Inclusiveness, fundamental freedoms, and a civil society willing and able to take responsibility are linked directly by the sample population to feelings of safety and security when being in a crowded place.

(Dalgaard-Nielsen et al., 2016)

Visible protective security measures can have a positive impact on 'self-reported feelings of safety and security' at major events, transport hubs and other crowded places. Research with 2,000 Danes, argued this effect is 'likely to be very much dependent on the level of societal trust and trust in government authorities', and that the high level of trust that Danes have in the government contributes to their feelings of safety and security when in crowded places. More research is needed to explore whether more theoretical concerns about these measures potentially contributing to a sense of fear play out in practice, as there is a clear evidence gap here. Similarly, more research is needed into how protective security measures contribute to levels of trust in government.

CASE STUDY:
THE IMPACT OF PROTECTIVE SECURITY ON PEOPLE WITH COGNITIVE, PHYSICAL, OR MOTOR IMPAIRMENTS

Adams and Ward (2020) are the only authors to explore how the protected characteristic of disability influences experiences of counter-terrorism measures. They conducted go-along interviews to explore how 10 Birmingham residents who 'self-identified as having temporary or permanent restricted mobility' navigated physical counter-terrorism measures. Their study highlights how public experiences can vary and the challenges faced by individuals with different 'cognitive, physical or motor impairments'. across the general population, and the diversity of challenges faced by individuals with different 'cognitive, physical, or motor impairments':

- While there was broad agreement with counter-terrorism measures in principle, there were some concerns that disability was an afterthought when putting security measures, such as bollards, in place

- The 'scale, design, colour and obtrusiveness of certain temporary measures proved particularly challenging for wheelchair users and those with visual impairments'

- Physical security measures, at times, had behavioural and psychological effects, as some respondents chose to avoid more 'obstacle-ridden' spaces, which served to reinforce their sense of difference.

- There was some concern at how those with restricted mobility would navigate this challenging urban environment in the event that they were caught up in a terrorist attack.

PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS CAMPAIGNS

KEY POINTS

1. Practitioners face challenges in delivering communications work, such as working with non-security-focused partners such as businesses; finding credible messengers; ensuring that the timing and content of messaging is correct; and mitigating the risk of the media undermining campaigns

2. Campaigns can have positive behavioural and psychological impacts when they are delivered by trusted and credible messengers. However, there may still be some psychological and practical barriers to behaviour change, such as a lack of awareness of the threat, or a lack of resources.

A number of counter-terrorism communications campaigns have been delivered in the UK. This includes campaigns to encourage reporting, such as 'Action Counters Terrorism (ACT)' or 'See It, Say It, Sorted'; campaigns that form part of broader police programmes, such as 'Project Servator'; and training programmes for the wider public, such as the now-defunct 'Project ARGUS' (Area Reinforcement Gained Using Simulation) training programme, or the 'Run, Hide, Tell' campaign. [25]

The evidence-base on these campaigns is limited. Only seven studies capture the experiences of those tasked with designing, delivering, and/or receiving counter-terrorism communications. Those studies that have evaluated the impacts of these campaigns have mainly focused on how these messages affect intended future behaviour. No studies were identified that had explored

awareness or understanding of these campaigns among members of the public. Further research in this space is therefore needed.

Public communications campaigns can elicit positive behaviours. Every study that has surveyed intended future behaviours has found that campaigns have directly contributed to some level of claimed future behavioural change. The strongest impact is reported in the evaluation of 'Run, Hide, Tell', where those issued with the guidance were significantly more likely to say that they would adopt the recommended behaviour in future. Further research is needed to explore whether public communications campaigns translate into longer-term and sustained behavioural change as there is a clear evidence gap here.

Challenges in designing and delivering effective public communication campaigns

Counter-Terrorism practitioners interviewed by Parker et al. (2019) identified several challenges:

- Engaging non-security-focused actors such as businesses and community organisations

- Finding credible messengers

- Ensuring that the timing and content of messaging is appropriate

- Mitigating the risks of media undermining campaigns.

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25   Impacts and challenges of communicating with the public have been explored in research into Project ARGUS based on 120 pre- and post-training interviews and 44 follow-up interviews (*Aplin and Rogers, 2020*); an evaluation of 'Run, Hide, Tell' guidance in Denmark and the UK based on 3,003 respondents (*Pearce et al. 2019a*); an evaluation of 'See, Say It, Sorted' guidance in Denmark and the UK based on 3,005 respondents (*Pearce et al. 2019b*); and a study into the adoption of counter-terrorism measures in the museum sector drawn from 20 interviews and FOI requests (*Atkinson et al. 2020*; *Atkinson et al. 2019*). In addition, *Baines (2019)* conducted an evaluation of 'Project Servator', but this does not discuss the communications strand of the project in any detail. Each of these studies explores some of the challenges faced by programme designers, but these are discussed in more depth in interviews conducted with 30 practitioners by *Parker et al. (2019)*. Similar conclusions about weaknesses in the evidence base, and the importance of choosing correct messages and messengers, are drawn in a review of the literature on Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism communications (*Jones, 2020*).

Counter-terrorism practitioners in the UK and Denmark – working in local authorities, central government, the security services, community/faith organisations, and in the private sector – have raised concerns about the unintended consequences of campaigns, such as increasing public fears or perceptions of stigmatisation. No study has yet examined whether such campaigns have increased perceptions of stigmatisation or had other long-term unintended consequences. This is a key evidence gap given the finding of this report that some communities feel targeted by counter-terrorism measures.

A quantitative study of 'Run, Hide, Tell' guidance based on 3,003 interviews across the UK and Denmark found that being issued with information in the form of a leaflet or film did not increase perceptions of personal risk. In fact, both forms of guidance enhanced respondents' perceptions of security services' preparedness and the levels of trust in police advice, while the film actually increased perceptions of personal safety and security.

However, there are practical and psychological barriers to behaviour change. These include:

- Two-thirds (68%) of individuals who had attended a 'Project ARGUS' training session reported that they had *faced obstacles in implementing their training,* 'predominantly due to the low perceptions of the threat' in their business, and the 'lack of time to complete the work'.

- *Response costs* such as 'the emotional cost of sheltering in place if it prevents parents reuniting with children' were found to reduce the intention of respondents to 'Run' and 'Hide' according to one evaluation of 'Run, Hide, Tell' guidance.

- Counter-terrorism security has become a 'routine' feature in museums according to interviews and FOI requests collected for one study. However, there are *financial constrains* on the type of measures that can be adopted, while senior staff have spoken of challenges trying to convince colleagues of the importance of counter-terrorism procedures.

Effective communication relies on trusted messengers.[26]

- *Social identification with the police and perceptions of procedural justice have been seen to increase the likelihood that rail users in the UK and Denmark will report an unattended item or suspicious behaviour to the Police* in response to 'See It, Say It, Sorted' advice.

- *Higher levels of trust in the police increased the likelihood of following the recommended actions* listed in 'Run, Hide, Tell' guidance issued to respondents in the UK and Denmark.

CHALLENGES AND EVIDENCE GAPS

While quantitative research suggests that the British public are broadly supportive of current counter-terrorism measures, it is important to recognise that a significant minority remain concerned about their effects. Qualitative studies have been invaluable for exploring concerns about victimisation, and further research of this kind will be needed to understand how best to address these concerns, and to explore whether counter-terrorism measures are having any additional unintentional effects.

Most research has surveyed individuals from Muslim and/or BAME communities, or subsections of these communities. A small number of studies compare different ethnic or religious groups, while larger attitudinal studies make more limited comparisons across age groups and gender. This is a weakness in the literature given that qualitative studies have shown how perceptions of the counter-terrorism system can vary, even within local communities. More research is needed into how experiences vary across different religious and ethnic groups; across other protected characteristics, such as age; and how intersectionality affects experiences within specific protected groups.

The evidence-base demonstrating the importance of procedural justice is strong. However, more research is

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26   While there is an important difference between willingness to take action and actually taking action, *Shanaah & Lindekilde (2019)* explored the willingness of 825 British Muslims to attend a counter-extremism demonstration based on receiving a call-to-participate from different actors. *Pearce et al. (2019b)* note that the vast majority of the 3,005 respondents in their survey were likely to report an unattended item (69.2% UK; 67.2% Denmark) or suspicious behaviour (64% UK; 52.4% Denmark). They also discuss how research from other fields has regularly found that 'trust in message source is considered a primary route to cooperation with protective health advice'. The positive impacts of 'Run, Hide, Tell' guidance are discussed in *Pearce et al. (2019a)*.

needed to understand broader perceptions of procedural justice among the British public.

While experiences with some areas of the counter-terrorism system are well understood, more research is needed into the experiences of directly engaging with officials in a counter-terrorism context, and into the short and long-term effects that such contact can have on individuals and communities.

Specific evidence gaps that need to be addressed include:

- the experiences of individuals supported through Prevent and Channel interventions

- the direct experiences of police counter-terrorism powers, such as those who are suspected of an offence, or who have been stopped under Section 43

- the longer-term impacts that public communications campaigns have on behaviour

- the impact that such campaigns and protective security measures have on feelings of fear, and levels of trust in government.

There are practical and ethical challenges for academics wishing to engage with those who are directly affected by the counter-terrorism system. This makes it important to find ways of gaining access to data ethically and sensitively, and increasing the opportunities for collaboration between academics, communities and statutory agencies.

READ MORE

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Langley, B., Ariel, B., Tankebe, J., Sutherland, A., Beale, M., Factor, R. and Weinborn, C. (2020). A Simple Checklist, That is All it Takes: A Cluster Randomized Controlled Field Trial on Improving the Treatment of Suspected Terrorists by the Police. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*. Early Access Article.

Shanaah, S. (2019). Alienation or Cooperation? British Muslims' Attitudes to and Engagement in Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Extremism, Terrorism and Political Violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence.* Early Access Article.

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