



Misogyny, Hostile Beliefs and the Transmission of Extremism: A Comparison of the Far-Right in the UK and Australia

FULL REPORT

MAY 2023

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This CREST report was produced from the Misogyny, Hostile Beliefs and the Transmission of Extremism project. This project examines the role of online channels in amplifying gender ideology and misogyny across transnational networks. You can find all the outputs from this project at: www.crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/misogyny-hostile-beliefs-and-transmission-of-extremism/

ABOUT CREST

The Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) is a national hub for understanding, countering, and mitigating security threats. It is an independent centre, commissioned by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and funded in part by the UK security and intelligence agencies (ESRC Award: ES/N009614/1).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Far-right extremism is not only on the rise in both the UK and Australia; it is rapidly becoming a primary security threat for both countries. Studies suggest that gender identity and gender ideology are connected to extremism and terrorism – including far-right extremism – and that prevention strategies should consider the gendered dimensions of radicalisation, recruitment, and participation in extremist groups. Yet limited research has been devoted to critically examining the transnational spread of extremism across online channels and offline sites and the degree to which this transmission intertwines with gender ideology, misogyny, and violent beliefs.

Comparing the current threat of far-right extremism in the UK and Australia, this project seeks to examine the role of online channels in promoting gender ideology and misogyny across transnational networks on three levels:

1. misogynistic views and hostile/sexist beliefs held and espoused at the individual level
2. in-group dynamics, with particular focus on how women and men are positioned within the group itself and their roles
3. the general far-right concepts that frame both supporter beliefs and roles, offering them a ‘sense of meaning’ that shapes how they participate in the movement.

Using a mixed-methods approach, the project analysed language in far-right online forums used by both UK and Australia far-right actors in relation to concepts of gender ideology and identity, as well as examining these gendered dynamics in offline fora.

While limited evidence of *direct exchanges* between members of the groups and channels in the two respective countries was found in the research, the project nonetheless reveals overt similarities in the *gendered narratives* – including *gendered threat narratives* – that were promoted in the discourse in both countries. Even though some outgroups differ in the UK and Australia contexts, many of the gendered threat narratives were the same. *What this suggests is that gendered narratives present an effective mode of transmission even absent of direct engagement between individuals from these two environments, and that misogyny presents a unifying element across different local contexts.* For example, while demonised out-groups vary (depending on the ethnic groups that are strongly represented in the migration profiles of each country), the portrayal of the LGBTQ+ community as a sexualised threat as well as the opposition to feminism and race-mixing were the same in both countries. Furthermore, another shared element across both the UK and Australian contexts was that offline sites and activities can further reinforce gendered narratives and hostile purported online amongst the far-right, and that concepts of masculinity were overtly reinforced in these spaces.

This has significant implications for existing P/CVE policy and strategy, given that gendered narratives espoused online by far-right communities in both the UK and Australia have offline spill overs. The impact of the online/offline intersection of communication throughout language can be used to promote and legitimise violence and misogynist narratives. Therefore, it is essential that these gender dynamics are considered in risk assessment, preventative and rehabilitative work, as they can play a key role in the transmission of extremism.

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INTRODUCTION

Far-right extremism is not only on the rise in both the UK and Australia; it is rapidly becoming a primary security threat for both countries. Studies suggest that gender identity and gender ideology are connected to extremism and terrorism – including far-right extremism – and that prevention strategies should consider the gendered dimensions of radicalisation, recruitment, and participation in extremist groups. Yet, less research has been devoted to critically examining the transnational spread of extremism across online channels and offline sites and the degree to which this transmission spreads gender ideology, misogyny, and violent beliefs.

Comparing the current threat of far-right extremism in the UK and Australia, this project examines the role of online channels in promoting gender ideology and misogyny across transnational networks on *three layers*:

- **Layer one:** the general far-right concepts that frame both supporter beliefs and roles, offering them a ‘sense of meaning’ that shapes how they participate in the movement
- **Layer two:** in-group dynamics, with particular focus on how women and men are positioned within the group itself and their roles
- **Layer three:** misogynistic views and hostile/sexist beliefs held and espoused at the individual level

METHODOLOGY

Using a mixed-methods approach, we conducted a quantitative corpus linguistics analysis of language in far-right online forums, used by both UK and Australia far-right actors, in relation to concepts of

gender ideology and identity. This analysis was then followed by a qualitative thematic analysis/ case study of comments in relation to the identified concepts of the gendered language used on such platforms.

- Quantitative corpus linguistics analysis: using SketchEngine and AntConc software, each dataset was compared to neutral text to determine statistical differences in the frequency of keywords used between the two bodies of text.
- Qualitative thematic analysis/ case study of comments in relation to the identified concepts of gendered language used on such platforms based on a manual selection of discussion threads.

We examined word frequencies in the two datasets and identified relevant terms regarding gender ideology and other thematic areas that stood out in both the UK and Australia corpora. This included analysing the absolute frequency of words as well as comparing the two corpora to a corpus of neutral English language used on the internet to identify which words were used more often in the examined far-right channels and discussion boards than in general English-language discourse on the internet.

In addition, we identified keywords relating to concepts of gender ideology from existing research on the topic, including language used in men’s rights movements. These keywords were organised on three levels, as outlined above, and their prevalence in the reference corpora was examined to determine how common these expressions of misogyny and gender power relations were.

KEY FINDINGS

Serving as potential motivators for extremism amongst the far-right, a typology of gendered narratives,

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which includes appeals to *female control*, *female compliance*, *anti-feminism*, *the 'ideal Man'*, *hyper-masculine 'brothers-in-arms'*, *men's rights*, and *'the patriot 'hero'*, was established. Using this typology as a framework, the project assessed the types of gendered narratives and ideological constructs that are specifically espoused across both UK and Australian online channels to ascertain how prevalent common expressions of misogyny and gender power relations were across the three layers being examined.

Layer one found that the politicised, gendered ideologies amongst the far-right do in fact exist, with certain communities directly espousing misogyny as part of their ideological outlook. These gendered ideologies play a role in the crafting of narratives and recruitment strategies, and frame beliefs and roles that provide a sense of meaning, in turn shaping adherents participation.

To assess whether gender power relations were also promoted, in layer two we examined in-group dynamics to see whether women were positioned in the outgroup or a sub-in group. This analysis provided the means to examine how both women and men are positioned within the examined organisations and how their roles are ideologically justified by some across the far-right spectrum. Some identified words in this layer of research, particularly in terms of 'traditional' family structures were much less frequent in the discourse than the words that were identified for layer one (such as 'tradwife' and 'housewife'), suggesting that while far-right communities may engage in hostile misogynistic discourse it may not always be as explicitly stated as one would assume. But importantly, the underwriting logic included in many far-right online posts still do indicate a gendered, specifically, misogynistic belief structure. For instance, even though it may not be explicitly stated, traditional family structures and the role of women as carers and mothers are consistent thematic occurrences in the online posting of far-right actors. In part, this is seen in imagery, rather than words, that promote these values as well as the promotion of a specific solution to

identified concerns, that being the reproduction of the pure white race.

Finally, we revealed that misogynistic views and hostile/sexist beliefs espoused at the individual level are not only present, but that these misogynistic views and gendered narratives impact on the gender expectations for men at the individual level- including how they need to behave and look in the movement as men, the constant promotion of masculine traits, and in some cases how they need to behave towards women.

IMPLICATIONS

Our project found limited evidence of *direct exchanges* between members of the groups and channels in the two respective countries. However, it nonetheless revealed overt similarities in the *gendered narratives* – including *gendered threat narratives* – that were promoted in the discourse in both countries. Even though some outgroups differ in the UK and Australia contexts, many of the gendered threat narratives were the same. *What this suggests is that gendered narratives present an effective mode of transmission even absent of direct engagement between individuals from these two environments, and that misogyny presents a unifying element across different local contexts.* For example, while the demonised out-groups may vary depending on the ethnic groups that are strongly represented in the migration profiles of local contexts, race mixing was seen as a common threat. Moreover, the portrayal of the LGBTQ+ community as a sexualised threat as well as the opposition to feminism and race-mixing were a clear threat across contexts. Furthermore, another shared element across both the UK and Australian contexts was that offline sites and activities can further reinforce gendered narratives and hostile purported online amongst the far-right, and that concepts of masculinity were overtly reinforced in these spaces. For example, this was particularly evident in the promotion of specific physical images and the prominence of this in relation to gyms across contexts.

Our findings have implications for existing P/CVE policy and strategy, given that gendered narratives espoused online by far-right communities in both the UK and Australia have offline spill overs. The impact of the online/offline intersection of communication throughout narratives can be used to promote and legitimise violence and misogynistic messages towards women. Our findings suggest some important considerations for thinking about how to make existing threat assessment models more gender responsive. It is also essential to ensure more evidence be gathered. This further necessitates a focus on increasing knowledge of the impact of gender identities and ideologies, such as those identified in this report, and how they play a role in the formation and transmission of violent ideological motivation – and, thus, why it is important to assess them.

GLOSSARY

Gender: A fluid set of socio-culturally constructed norms and assumptions about what individuals should be and do. The primary categories of analysis in this field are masculinity and femininity, however the spectrum of gender identity does factor into violent extremist narratives.

Gender essentialism: Assumptions about an individual's behaviour or character based upon their gender.

Gender mainstreaming: A strategy for implementing gender equality and gender perspectives in policy or legislation, involving the process of assessing gender implications of such initiatives.

Gender perspective: When one applies a gender perspective, they consider or analyse the impact of gender on interactions, roles, expectations, and opportunities. These observations can be considered when implementing gender mainstreaming.

Gender power relations: A structure of power between men and women that is sustained and often reinforced over time. Generally, gender power relations ascribe power to (some) men, while taking power away from women.

Male chauvinism: A belief in male dominance and supremacy.

Sex: Categorisation, usually assigned at birth, based upon biological and physiological differences between individuals.

Sexism: Discrimination against women extending from everyday acts to open hostility and aggression. Hostile sexism is often used as a synonym with misogyny.

Misogyny: Hatred for women or an attempt to maintain patriarchal societal roles and often manifests

in harassment, coercion, sexual harassment and/or violence against women.

1. INTRODUCTION

A growing body of evidence, some of which is reviewed below, suggests that gender identity and gender ideology are connected to extremism and terrorism, and that prevention strategies should take into account the gendered dimensions of radicalisation, recruitment and participation in extremist groups. However, less research has been devoted to critically examining the transnational spread of extremism across online channels and offline sites and how this transmission spreads gender ideology, misogyny, and violent beliefs. This project asks three main questions. First, how do online channels promote and attract membership into far-right extremist groups while amplifying misogynist and hostile beliefs that fuel the contagion of violent extremism? Second, to what extent do offline sites (such as fitness studios, gyms, shooting ranges etc.) reinforce such hostile beliefs purported online amongst the far-right? Third, how can preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) programming better account for gender identities and ideologies and their impact on the transmission of extremism?

When identifying and examining channels used by transnational far-right networks, it is crucial to analyse how online forums contextualise and spread extremist ideologies and justify the use of violence. Such online channels are also used to promulgate extremist, gendered ideologies about women's and men's 'proper' roles within the movement and broader society and to espouse hostile sexist beliefs towards women transcending state boundaries. There has been some exploration of this trend but no investigation of the impact of gendered narratives on the contagion of extremism even though misogynous beliefs are commonly held amongst extremist groups. Moreover, while the gendered dimensions of radicalisation should inform P/CVE strategies, few interventions have examined how online/offline gendered counter-messaging could prevent recruitment by challenging or disrupting the

gender roles and norms of women and men in extremist organisations and their espoused ideology.

Far-right extremism is not only on the rise in both the UK and Australia; it is rapidly becoming a primary security threat for both countries. Comparing the current threat of far-right extremism in the UK and Australia, this project seeks to examine the role of online channels in amplifying gender ideology and misogyny across transnational networks on three levels 1) misogynistic views and hostile/sexist beliefs held and espoused at the individual level, 2) in-group dynamics, with particular focus on how women and men are positioned within the group itself and their roles, and 3) the general far-right concepts that frame both supporter beliefs and roles, offering them a 'sense of meaning' that shapes how they participate in the movement. This project examines the intersection points of how these dynamics manifest in the offline space, with specific concern as to whether there are offline sites that reinforce gender identity and ideology which in turn justify both violence and hostile beliefs. We ask:

- Are online channels used to amplify misogynist and hostile beliefs that may fuel and increase the contagion of violent extremism?
- Are there narrative links between channels being used on in the UK and Australia, and to what degree are misogyny and hostile beliefs amplified across continents via these channels? Whilst the UK and Australia both have increasing far-right extremism, the two countries also provide for a timely comparison, as the UK-based Sonnenkrieg Division has recently been recently prescribed as Australia's first designated far-right terrorist organisation due to alleged links via online forums and discussion boards.

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- To what degree do offline sites (such as fitness studios, gyms, shooting ranges etc.) reinforce online hostile beliefs amongst the far-right?
- How can the insights on online-offline intersection of communication channels promoting violent and misogynistic messages be incorporated into existing radicalisation models and risk assessment tools?
- How can P/CVE interventions be improved by accounting for the gendered identities and ideologies encouraging the spread of extremism?

The research has implications for P/CVE stakeholders and practitioners in that it will improve understanding of how gender affects the online-offline intersection of far-right communication channels. It suggests how gender and misogyny indicators can be incorporated into existing models and risk assessment tools to better account for gendered extremist norms being distributed through the online-offline ideologically extreme groups across borders.

2. BACKGROUND: LITERATURE REVIEW

Recent scholarship has become more attentive to the importance of gender dynamics in violent extremism and terrorism. This not only includes how such dimensions can affect the recruitment and participation of women and men differently, but also how gendered narratives can facilitate radicalisation across different ideologies and countries (Pearson et al., 2021). Despite the evolving and diverse roles of women and men, gender stereotypes often continue to shape (and hinder) our understanding of how men's and women's motivations, radicalisation and participation in extremism can diverge, including the degree to which involvement can differ based on past gendered experiences (Phelan, 2020, p.1). Additionally, according to Pearson (2020, p.139), scholarship on gender in extremist ideology has noted "the relative dominance of men in both far-right and Islamist movements; the reliance on gender binaries, in roles and in ideology; the use of violent groups to assert particular forms of masculine status; and the agency of women in supporting both violence and anti-feminist themes in jihadist and far-right groups". Despite this recognition, limited studies have critically examined the impact of gendered narratives on the contagion of extremism, although misogynistic beliefs tend to transgress the normal distinctions between far-right and other violent extremist ideologies (e.g., Islamist, etc.).

ONLINE SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKS AND GENDERED RADICALISATION

The interplay between gender identity, gender ideology and channels that promote violent extremism through transnational networks (such as social media and online forums) remains relatively underexplored. Far-right extremism has seen a substantial increase in the West, with multiple sources highlighting the increasing

severity and frequency of violence conducted as part of this ideology in the contemporary global environment. Perhaps most notably, incidents such as the 2019 El Paso and Christchurch shootings have drawn particular attention. Within this environment, several authors have noted the role of online spaces as an increasingly important component of far-right extremism. While the use of the internet within the far-right can be traced back to the use of Stormfront as a messaging board, Baele et al outline the increasingly complex and multidimensional nature of the contemporary right-wing online ecosystem (Baele et al., 2020). Baele et al identify a heterogenous and expanding ecosystem comprising four levels – entities, communities, biotopes, and whole network – that uses every single platform at its disposal to disseminate ideas and mobilise activities (Baele et al., 2020).

From this, commentators have noted the technological affordances of this online milieu as one which allows for the rapid dissemination of information establishing spaces of both initial identity formation, and the subsequent entrenchment of identities. In other words, the communicative ability of the internet has allowed for a process of connection and discussion that circulates ideas through interactions (Conway, 2017; Caiani and Kröll, 2015; Futrell and Simi, 2014). In particular, new media allows for more diversified access and greater input at the margins, with individuals being able to circumvent traditional agenda setting and gatekeeping mechanisms (Schroeder, 2018). Consequently, social media networks and forums can provide ideal channels for individuals across ideological spectrums engaging with extremist ideologies to transnationally interact with like-minded individuals with social media platforms having created a "paradoxical illusion of intimacy and anonymity, where individuals can explore extremist ideologies while making virtual affiliations that seem as real as

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physical relationships” (Lokmanoglu and Veilleux-Lepage, 2020: 184).

Transcending time and space, online networks and forums can create virtual spaces that promote and attract membership into extremist and violent extremist groups across the ideological spectrum. At the most basic level, this in turn leads to a process of exposure. The presence of online discussion forums and online interactions that encourage potential recruits to visit these sites, regardless of physical boundaries, have been shown to facilitate the initial radicalisation process (Gaudette et al., 2020). In the more extreme cases, the internet provides a means of social isolation. Online spaces allow an individual to completely disengage from the offline world and its interactions. Instead, these individuals seek alternative social belonging online (Mølmen and Ravndal, 2021). Following this, the nature of the internet allows for a process of immersion where individuals, to ‘feel like part of a group,’ more deeply interact with online discussion forums, chatrooms and social media platforms (Gaudette et al., 2020). This has the effect of identity entrenchment and echoing, wherein existing beliefs are polarised and reinforced (Wojcieszak, 2010, Scrivens et al., 2020, Mølmen and Ravndal, 2021).

As a more general example, Mølmen and Ravndal demonstrate the importance of online echo-chambers in legitimising extremist and violent behaviour in the cases of far-right violent actors Anders Behring Breivik, Dylann Roof and Peter Mangs (Mølmen and Ravndal, 2021). Likewise, Heiss and Matthes, who analysed the relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and selective exposure to populist radical right content on Facebook, found that anti-elitist and anti-immigration sentiments were increased following an individual’s exposure to and interaction with right-wing populist political actors expressing these ideas online (Heiss and Matthes, 2020). Moreover, Urman and Katz outline a process of platform migration from mainstream platforms such as Facebook and Twitter to alternative platforms such as Telegram (Urman and Katz, 2020). Importantly, for Urman and Katz, due

to Telegram’s absence of moderation, “on Telegram users can communicate in ideologically homogeneous groups and distribute extremist content without fearing any legal consequences, with anonymity and ideological homogeneity increasing radicalization potential” (Urman and Katz, 2020: 5).

Specifically, commentators have noted how Salafi-Jihadist as well as far-right groups have created forums that are designed to be utilised by both women and men. For some extremist groups, this includes the creation of ‘women’s only forums’ that can specifically radicalise and recruit women (for example, see Lokmanoglu and Veilleux-Lepage, 2020; Windsor, 2020; Conway, 2017). Extremists have also used online gendered messaging to radicalise and frame the participation of both women and men distinctly (for example, see Phelan et al., 2020; Johnston et al, 2020; Pearson, 2018). Herein, this process of reinforcement can be highly gendered when online platforms or chatrooms are ‘men-only forums’ or ‘women-only forums,’ or when gender norms and gender ideology become inherently intrinsic in providing individuals with a like-minded ‘sense of meaning’ (Lokmanoglu and Veilleux-Lepage, 2020; Windsor, 2020; Conway, 2017; Leidig, forthcoming). Moreover, as will be outlined in greater detail below, others have noted the specific misogynistic attitudes embraced by certain elements of this online ecosystem, which, when taken together with the amplifying nature of online spaces, serves to engrain these misogynistic attitudes and sentiments (O’Connor, 2021).

THE SPECTRUM OF MISOGYNY AND HOSTILE/SEXIST BELIEFS AND THEIR IMPACT

Indeed, some groups have specifically and strategically utilised and exploited gendered narratives through their communication strategies online to not only justify and legitimise hostile beliefs towards women, but also to capitalise on toxic masculinities under the guise of ‘men’s rights.’ This points to an overlap between the far-right and the distinct, but in many ways similar,

'manosphere' – the world of men's rights movements and communities. The manosphere is a complicated collection of various actors that include "[men rights activities], pickup artists, MGTOW (men going their own way), incels (involuntary celibates), fathers' rights activists, and so forth." (Marwick and Caplan, 2018:546) While the manosphere includes a range of actors who incorporate wider far-right sentiments to various degrees, they all share the central belief that feminist values dominate society and in fact suppress male rights.

Within this environment, Krendal, who examined the discourse used by the manosphere, found that women were constructed in particular ways. Specifically, women were understood to have particular innate features such as 'selfishness,' and 'being manipulative' and were "dehumanised through animalistic and mechanistic means and reduced to their physical appearance." (Krendel, 2020: 627) Furthermore, Jane (2014) outlines this online subculture as one that specifically engages in what she refers to as 'e-bile.' According to Jane there is an online far-right discourse that specifically participates in gendered vitriol, language that is couched in misogynistic and sexualised references (Jane, 2014). Furthermore, Jane argues that this type of language is increasingly becoming normalised within online spaces to such an extent that even the 'most minor disagreement' is expressed "through the most affronting, offensive and aggressive sexualised venom" (Jane, 2014:566, See also; Banet-Weiser and Miltner, 2016; Citron, 2016; Fairbairn, 2015).

Moreover, a dominant theme within this milieu is the notion of needing to respond to the purported male subjugation by emphasising narratives of personal and collective suffering, which in turn justifies the networked harassment or violence that often emerges from the manosphere (Ging, 2017, For wider examples of narratives of victimhood see; Johnson, 2017, Boehme and Isom Scott, 2020, Isom et al., 2021). Perhaps most notably, this potential extreme can be seen in the case of Elliot Rogers who killed six people

and injured a further 14 in an apparent attempt to punish women for their sexual disinterest in him and other men for their sexual success (see Pelzer et al., 2021; Cottee, 2020; Hoffman et al., 2020; and Jaki et al., 2019). While Rogers is an extreme exemplar, and while the manosphere is not an ideologically homogenous bloc and the entire community should not be seen as synonymous with the far-right, the unchecked misogyny this community produces nevertheless works to establish harassment and violence against women as legitimate behaviour through the language of victimhood (Agius et al., 2021).

Moreover, the misogynistic and hostile views towards women often espoused in these online domains through social networks have offline consequences. A small amount of research has examined the links between misogyny, hostile/sexist beliefs, and violent extremism. For example, Diaz and Valji (2019: 38) suggest that there is an underexplored relationship between misogyny and violent extremism. They argue that the "explicit ideology of today's most prominent terrorist groups in conflict-affected settings and the individual personal histories of domestic abuse or documented misogyny in the majority of perpetrators of acts of violence in Western countries" may be seen as demonstrative of this (see also McCulloch et al 2019). In a study by Bjarnegård, Melander and True (2020), the scholars interrogated the link between attitudes and norms linked to sexist ideals of dominant masculinity and subordinate femininity as drivers to violent extremism. The authors found that individuals – both women and men– with hostile attitudes towards women, and gender equality more generally, are not only prone to violent extremist views and to intolerance towards other nationalities and extremist groups but are also more likely to support violent groups and to participate in political violence (Bjarnegård, Melander and True, 2020: 1). Similarly, in their research on Libya in North Africa as well as Indonesia, Bangladesh and the Philippines in Asia, Johnston and True (2019) found that hostile sexist attitudes toward women and support for violence against women were the factors most strongly associated with support for violent

extremism, and more than any other factor included in the study, support for violence against women predicted support for violent extremism. Therefore, it is important to better understand how these beliefs drive forward all forms of violent extremism across borders and ideologies by utilising the ‘othering’ of women and anyone not seen as the ‘ideal male’.

In the context of far-right extremism, misogynistic and hostile beliefs towards women have overtly been espoused by groups in both the UK and Australia. For example, the Sonnenkrieg Division was recently proscribed as an Australian far-right terrorist organisation, despite larger Australian far-right organisations being more prolific. What is worth investigating here is that Australia’s former Home Affairs Minister, Peter Dutton, justified the listing because the Sonnenkrieg Division’s risk profile in the Australian context had increased during the pandemic, where the “availability of the group’s online propaganda had provided ‘fertile ground’ for radicalisation” (9News, 2021). The choice not only exemplifies the contagion of extremism from the UK and the use of online channels, but also the gender dynamics of this contagion. The group has also been responsible for publicly advocating sexual violence, carrying out violent assault, abuse and rape of women supporters (see Australian National Security, Terrorist Organisation Designation).

GENDER ROLE EXPECTATIONS AND THE INTERPLAY OF GENDER NORMS WITHIN VIOLENT EXTREMISM ORGANISATIONS

In existing literature, far-right groups are more often than not seen as adopting a viewpoint that is male dominated, with far-right actors typically promoting hyper-masculine rhetorical frames that ideologically endorse traditional gender norms. The common assumption is that far-right organisations have broadly masculine and patriarchal cultures and habits, promising a homosocial brotherhood of male

belonging which dictates and limits the ways in which men and women can participate. For instance, within the German far-right the conception of the nation is semantically linked to idealised understandings of manliness, and power. These notions are manifested in valorisation of heterosexuality, a fetishization of national reproduction through fatherhood, venerated images of soldiers, and a set of idealised characteristics which include toughness, bravery, discipline, and order (Miller-Idriss, 2017). Within this context, roles for both women and men are strongly prescribed along strict ideological guidelines. For example, Latif et al (2020) outline the typical archetypal roles for women adopted by white supremacist movements. These archetypes of women as either a mother, a whore, or a fighter, define legitimate behaviour for women within the movement – behaviour that promotes the segregation of binary gender roles, places an emphasis on domesticity, and a reverence for patriarchy (Latif et al., 2020, See also; Belew, 2019).

However, when examining women’s behaviour within the far-right, as well as how far-right organisations in fact interact with the question of gender, the reality is less clear-cut. Campion, for example, identifies the six forms of female participation within the far-right as violent actors, thinkers, facilitators, promoters, activists, and exemplars (Campion, 2020). Although Campion does identify positions of passivity within this spectrum, she concurrently outlines roles in which women are active participants of either violence itself, or the justification and support of violent activities, highlighting how women both accept and resist group-level gender expectations in far-right movements (Campion, 2020). For instance, Mattheis (2018) outlines how Lana Loktef functions as an active producer of a far-right narrative. For Mattheis, Loktef extolls a transcendental identity of traditional and appropriate femininity that establishes roles for women as coherent with traditional gendered stereotypes. Although this narrative does embrace traditional gender roles, it nevertheless allows women to act in the political domain without threatening male political dominance. Moreover, at the micro level, Latif

et al. (2020) further argue that through a process of self-ascription women have been able to exert a certain level of autonomy by redefining their roles within the framework of expected behaviour provided by white supremacist organisations. In both instances, women have interacted with the ideological ecosystem and have sought to offer an alternate interpretation, albeit to varying degrees, rather than passively receiving content.

Beyond this, others have highlighted how certain far-right actors in fact recontextualize the question of gender. In particular, the literature notes the way in which certain far-right actors express their opposition to identified enemies in a specifically gendered way (Fangen and Lichtenberg, 2021, Fangen, 2020; Blee, 2020; Sanders-McDonagh, 2018; Busher, 2015; Pilkington, 2017; Spierings and Zaslove; 2015; de Lange and Mügge, 2015). For example, Fangen and Lichtenberg (2021) demonstrate the ways in which the German far-right present a liberal value-based argument, where Muslims and Islam are considered to be misogynistic and gender-unequal, and therein a threat to Western societies and values. Likewise, Pilkington demonstrates how the English Defence League, a UK-based far-right movement, alleges and attempts to justify itself as a 'defender' of women and LGBTQ+ rights against a perceived oppressive and intolerant Islamist ideology (Pilkington, 2017). In these cases, value-based dividing lines have been constructed, resulting in an idea of the incompatibility of cultures rooted in a gendered framing and understanding of the world. In other words, gender matters for the far-right. It is however not always articulated in and interacted with in the most straightforward way. These similarities and disconnects often manifest in both online and offline spaces, but what is clear is the importance of gendered dynamics and misogynistic thought when considering the far-right. However, the interplay between gender identity, gender ideology and channels that promote violent extremism through transnational networks (such as social media and online forums) remains relatively underexplored.

GENDER ROLE EXPECTATIONS AND THE INTERPLAY OF GENDER NORMS WITHIN P/CVE PROGRAMMING

In addition to gender role expectations within far-right groups and organisations, there have historically also been gendered stereotypes and norms propagated through P/CVE programming (Winterbotham, 2020). Over the last 15 years this type of programming has largely been focused in the transnational space on addressing the threat of Islamist extremism. Concurrently, the Women, Peace and Security agenda has been developing since the initial United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 in 2000. Even though this agenda positively recognised the essential nature of the role of women in peace and security solutions, it has in many cases harmfully securitised ongoing women's rights related initiatives and encouraged assumptions about the roles that women should play in these types of solutions (Davies and True, 2019). Often P/CVE programmes have employed the assumption that women have innate understanding of the radicalisation status of members of their family due to their 'maternal instincts', as well as often assuming that women are innately more peaceful and therefore can be useful in peacebuilding roles (Gordon and True, 2019; Winterbotham, 2018). This, however, is gender essentialism and simultaneously imposes assumptions on women and robs them of credit when they do happen to be exceptional peacebuilders, etc. (White, 2020; See also Pearson et al., 2021b)

However, over the last several years, the conversation around gender in P/CVE has moved forward to include a more multi-dimensional understanding of not only the roles that women can play in P/CVE, but also the roles that they play in violent extremist organisations, and the more general way in which gender role expectations impact why every individual gets involved in violent extremism (Pearson et al., 2021a; Brown, 2020). Based on this, gender analysis needs to be applied across contextual research, policy formulation

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and programme design, implementation and evaluation (White, 2022). The importance of this is currently being enforced in the academic conversations around P/CVE; however, more evidence needs to be gathered in this space in order to indicate the importance of this element to policy makers (Brown et al. 2019; Agius et al., 2021). This is especially true in the ideologies and narratives of the far-right. As shown above there are overtly gendered identities and ideologies among some of these self-proclaimed misogynist networks, as well as a multitude of underlying gender dynamics across the spectrum of these ideological influences. This research will help add to the evidence base on how and why it is essential to study these narratives with a gender lens to fully account for their complexities and to better understand how the gendered nature of the radicalisation that is occurring potentially makes it a more transmissible transnationally.

3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: TYPOLOGY OF MISOGYNISTIC AND GENDERED NARRATIVES

Based on the review of existing research on gender ideology and identity, we derived the following categories as helpful in defining a typology of gendered narratives. This typology forms the conceptual framework for our analysis.

HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY

Hegemonic masculinity refers to a structure of gender ideology and power relations that is designed to reproduce male domination and the subordination of women. It is closely linked to ‘male supremacy’¹, which is regarded as a hateful ideology that overtly advocates for the subjugation of women and the maintenance of rigid, stereotypical gender roles (i.e., ‘tradwife’, etc.).

- **Female control:** this signifies appeals to gendered power relations reinforcing the control of women, including how women should behave within society and the policing of this, under the assumption that they are subordinate to men. This type is closely associated with ‘male supremacy’, in that women are perceived as genetically and naturally inferior to men, and their subordination is necessary for the survival of ‘the white race’. For example, a far-right leader in Australia argued on a Telegram channel that women “will never stop until you put them in their place...Put a foot down early and explain your principles or forever be a cuck.”² In some cases, this type can signify the legitimisation and justification of sexual violence and rape

against women as not only a means of control, but of punishment for women. In this case, the use of misogyny is sometimes intertwined with the idea of existential threats to the white race and often, but not always, directed towards women identified as being involved in interracial relationships or being deemed as ‘race traitors’.

- **Female compliance:** this signifies appeals to gender norms that can be framed by the group’s ideology that reinforce the compliance of women, including to traditional gender roles, their roles as mothers and homemakers etc., in pursuit of the group’s overall ideological objectives. For instance, chats linked to the far-right often include images of pregnant women and ‘loving mothers,’ and where women are seen as deviating from these appropriate societal roles their activities are seen as contributing to ‘the destruction of the ethno-cultural identity of the nation’.³
- **Anti-feminism:** **anti-feminism:** this signifies a backlash to gender equality and even the promotion of gender inequality, specifically opposing feminism and proposals to enhance women’s or LGBTQ+ rights. This could include discourse relating to anti-abortion, birth control, women’s rights to vote, women’s positions as leaders, and general feminist affirmative action. Moreover, the promotion of aspects such as feminism, abortion rights, and divorce are noted as aspects that lead to the destruction of a race without ‘killing it directly’⁴ while other chats outline a critique of feminism as manipulating

1 See the Southern Poverty Law Centre’s overview of ‘Male Supremacy’, available at <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/male-supremacy>

2 Quote from a chat linked to an Australian far-right leader on Telegram.

3 Quote from the ‘Identity England’ group on Telegram. These notions can also be seen in chats such as one related to an Australian far-right leader on Telegram.

4 Quote from ‘WLM_AUSTRALIA’ on Telegram

people into ‘forgetting their natural instincts’⁵ (i.e., traditional gender roles)

HYPER-MASCULINITY

Hyper-masculinity refers to the exaggeration of masculinity and masculine stereotypes. It emphasises and reinforces ‘masculine ideals and traits’ that males should hold or strive towards, particularly in relation to physical strength, aggression, and dominance.

- **The patriot ‘hero’:** this signifies appeals to men’s specific role and duties as ‘protector’ and ‘guardian’ of the groups in pursuit of the movements’ overall objectives, which could include giving up personal freedom (i.e., arrest) or safety. For example, this would relate to men fulfilling the role of ‘protector’ and ‘guardian’ of the family and racial purity, in pursuit of the ‘White Nation’. It can also extend to justifying violence in the need to ‘protect white daughters from dangerous animals’ (non-white or non-Christian men). Passivity, in other words the absence of violence and male protection in the face of this threat, “is not an option that White people will be given if they want to survive in the future.”⁶
- **Appeals to hyper-masculine ‘brothers-in-arms’:** this signifies appeals to compatriotism within the movement against non-whites, the LGBTQ+ communities, and feminists. It also includes calls that the group should ‘do something’ about the perceived societal discrimination against and hatred of men (allegedly promoted by feminists) in fraternal solidarity. This also extends to the targeting of other religious and ethnic groups, and the LGBTQ+ community, where anyone who is not straight (particularly transgender), white (particularly black or Muslim men), or a man (particularly committed feminists) is regarded as part of the targeted enemy outgroup and deemed

a threat to the white race. The presence of these elements of society, for some far-right groups, are seen as a manifestation of a degenerate society. The perceived degeneration of these external groups are extolled to such an extent that their existence will lead to weak willed men that will not be able to stand up to the threats faced by the ‘White Race.’

TOXIC MASCULINITY

Toxic masculinity refers to cultural and societal pressures for men to behave and act in certain ways that can simultaneously be harmful for men, women and the community at large. It promotes the idea that violence and acts of aggression carried out by men are the way that gender power relations and patriarchy are upheld. It can also lead to intolerance, aggressive and competitive behaviour.

- **Male dominance:** this signifies appeals to those who embrace the idea that females are ‘privileged’ over men, and that men and their rights are ‘oppressed’ as a result. For example, movements such as the Men’s Rights Movement argue that, in general, society and even institutions adversely impact and discriminate against men and boys. These movements reinforce the righteousness of male dominance, which can also extend to the legitimisation of gender-based and sexual violence.
- **The ‘ideal man’:** this signifies appeals to physical masculine attributes and characteristics that men should have to participate in the movement and the rationale for this appearance, including (in some movements) the necessity for physical strength. This includes far-right groups setting up dedicated fitness chats on platforms such as Telegram and hosting regular in-person training sessions to promote and

5 Quote from a group linked to Britain First on Telegram

6 Quote from ‘Hard Knocks Chat’ on Telegram

encourage ‘activists and supporters to self-improve and explore our beautiful homeland’.⁷ Furthermore, one of the criteria of being a ‘top tier male/female’ is to ‘stay in shape.’⁸ An assumption that is often promoted and overlaid onto this is the idea that white straight men are the core of white civilisation.

These categories were examined against and reinforced by the quantitative and qualitative analysis of far-right online discourse in the UK and Australia. This enabled researchers to examine how online channels are used by far-right groups to amplify hostile and sexist beliefs across channels, and to what degree this impacts on group beliefs transnationally. However, it is important to note that many of the narratives that were collected for this project overlap these categories.

7 Quote from a group linked to Patriotic Alternative on Telegram. See also ‘Hard Knocks Chat’ and ‘Hard Knocks Combat’ on Telegram for clear examples of these trends.

8 Quote from ‘WLM_AUSTRALIA’ on Telegram

4. DATA AND METHODS

This project is a study of gender within far-right extremism focusing comparatively on the use of online/offline channels in the UK and Australia to amplify misogynistic beliefs and hostile gender ideology transnationally. The methodology adopts a mixed-methods approach in answering the key research questions, including a quantitative corpus linguistic analysis of language used within online forums, and qualitative analysis of the same corpus, identifying some of the gendered narratives used by these groups.

Initially, a review of recent literature was conducted to formulate a baseline assessment of the state of research, as well as to help devise a gendered typology of the conceptions of gender within existing knowledge of far-right ideologies and spaces. This typology helped guide the data collection and analysis phases of the project.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Our project asked three main research questions:

- First, how do online channels promote and attract membership into far-right extremist groups while amplifying misogynist and hostile beliefs that fuel the contagion of violent extremism?
- Second, to what extent do offline sites (such as fitness studios, gyms, shooting ranges etc.) reinforce such hostile beliefs purported online amongst the far-right?
- Third, how can preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) programming better account for gender identities and ideologies and their impact on the transmission of extremism?

To answer these, we sought to examine the following dynamics:

- The types of misogynistic and hostile beliefs espoused in these forums at the individual level;
- How specific messaging may motivate individuals to actively or passively participate in online channels within far-right extremist networks/organisations;
- The role of women and men in their own organisation/network as compared to others within the far-right, including how they are positioned in the group;
- The general far-right concepts that frame both supporter beliefs and roles, offering them a ‘sense of meaning’ that shapes how they participate in the movement

DATA COLLECTION METHODS

Firstly, the research team identified the most significant online forums used by both UK and Australian far-right extremist groups. An initial review of the literature revealed that UK and Australian far-right activities are largely taking place on Telegram. Therefore, the research team started the identification process with public Telegram channels associated with the far-right in both countries. Key influencers within the far-right context in both countries were identified as starting points of analysis. Subsequently, a ‘snowballing’ process’ was employed wherein significantly active individuals and communities on Telegram linked to and by the above-mentioned influential actors have been highlighted and followed. This also included following links to connected and ideologically similar individuals and communities on Telegram and other platforms, including Gab, YouTube and DLive. A similar search process was continued on Gab, the live

streaming service DLive, and YouTube, and relevant discussion threads were identified on the white supremacist platform Stormfront.

Based on this exercise, Telegram was selected as the principal online forum as it represents a platform with significant online activity in both the UK and Australian far-right environment. 15 Telegram channels were selected for each country based on three criteria for our project, 1) they are open access, 2) they discuss relevant content and have a clear definition of location, and 3) they have a relatively large follower base and/or represent a prominent group in the national far-right space. It is important to note that for ethical reasons and to ensure replicability, closed channels were not accessed. A full list of selected channels can be found in Annex I.

Stormfront was further chosen as a global forum, given its prevalence in both contexts as well as its continuity over the decades, its continued popularity as an entry point into the far-right sphere and its open access. Furthermore, there are clearly defined sub-forums for individual countries, in addition to topical sub-forums, including the UK and Australia (although it is important to note that Australia is covered together with New Zealand): Stormfront Britain and Stormfront Downunder (Australia and New Zealand) and their respective sub-forums (incl. general discussion, politics and activism, news links). Given the global presence of the platform, we hypothesised that this is a space where the UK and Australian far-right interact due to its transnational nature.

From the selected forums, we collected a large corpus of discussion threads through webcrawling, using Scrapy software and utilising proxy providers to bypass the Cloudflare protections on some of the content. The period we covered in the data was 1 August 2017 – 1 August 2022, which coincides with the period just before the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia in August 2017, until the time of data collection in August 2022. Charlottesville was used as a benchmark given the impact the rally had on the far-right space online, including emerging debates on content moderation and removal. Therefore, looking at

the period since this event ensures a level of stability in the online environment the analysed far-right groups are operating in.

The resulting data were divided into two main datasets: one continuing all content from UK Telegram channels and UK-based Stormfront sub-forums and one containing all respective content for the Australian context.

DATA ANALYSIS METHODS

Two approaches were used to conduct analysis on the datasets resulting from this data collection exercise: 1) a quantitative corpus linguistics analysis of language in each far-right online forum in relation to concepts of gender ideology and identity; and 2) a qualitative thematic analysis/ case study of comments in relation to the identified concepts of gendered language used on such platforms. It is important to note that we did not analyse memes and other image-based content, which was especially relevant for Telegram), although illustrative examples are included in the qualitative analysis.

Quantitative corpus linguistics analysis: To analyse the two datasets, the research team used the corpus manager and text analysis software Sketch Engine. Firstly, we examined word frequencies in the two datasets and identified relevant terms regarding gender ideology and other thematic areas that stood out in the two corpora. This included analysing the absolute frequency of words as well as comparing the two corpora to a corpus of neutral English language used on the internet to identify which words were used more often in the examined far-right channels and discussion boards than in general English-language discourse on the internet.

In addition, we identified keywords relating to concepts of gender ideology from existing research on the topic, including language used in men's rights movements. These keywords were organised on three levels and their prevalence in the reference corpora was examined to determine how common these expressions of

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misogyny and gender power relations were. The three levels included:

1. the general, politicised gendered ideologies that frame both the beliefs and roles, offering a 'sense of meaning' that shapes participation (gender ideology) - LAYER ONE
2. in-group dynamics, with particular focus on how women and men are positioned within the group itself and their roles (gender power relations) - LAYER TWO
3. misogynistic views and hostile/sexist beliefs held and espoused at the individual level (gender identity and gender norms) - LAYER THREE

For layer one we asked, *are members of far-right groups/organisations themselves directly espousing misogyny as part of their overall ideological perspective and outlook (and thus recruitment, etc. narrative)?*

- Keywords: rapefugee, soyboy, rapist, pedophile/paedophile, pedo, beast, brother*, transgender, transsexual, tranny, gay, lesbian, drag queen, queer, LGBT*, gender, faggot

For layer two we asked, *are women positioned in the outgroup or a sub-in group (e.g. brotherhood)?*

- Keywords: sister, mother, wife, tradwife, housewife, slut, thot, cunt, roastie, unicorn, bimbo, stacy, becky, karen, whore, hoe, mudshark

For layer three we asked, *how do their misogynist views and gendered narratives impact the gender dynamics of their expectations for men at the individual level?*

- Keywords: defender*, provider*, hero*, warrior*, breadwinner*, viking*, alpha, beta, omega, chad, white knight, mangina, simp, gymcel, cuck, real m*n, normie

Qualitative thematic analysis: case study of comments in relation to the identified concepts of gendered language used on such platforms. This was used to add context to the quantitative findings on relative

frequencies of keywords. Discussion threads were manually selected from the datasets to reflect the variety of topics discussed in the forum. Comparisons were drawn between the UK-based forum and the Australian forum to analyse how prevalent specific narratives are in these different spaces.

Following the quantitative and qualitative analysis of far-right online discourse, the research team used the thematic gendered language prevalent on such platforms to conduct comparative analysis on if and how these gendered identities and ideological narratives manifest in far-right use of offline sites. This analysis was based on a review of publicly available literature, including groups' videos, blog posts, propaganda, newspaper articles/coverage on certain events, including sites such as fitness studios, gyms, shooting ranges, camping grounds etc. The research team reviewed how such sites seek to reinforce hostile beliefs amongst the far-right, including if appeals to toxic masculinities are used to justify and legitimise violence, and whether there is consistency between online and offline channels/sites of radicalisation and participation in supporting or challenging gendered dimensions of violent extremism.

Lastly, the team examined relevant existing radicalisation models, risk assessment tools, and programming that seeks to address far-right violent extremism in the UK and Australia. This informed the assessment of gaps in tools and programming and their understanding of gender, informed by our research on the gendered elements of identities and ideologies. On the basis of this assessment, the team was able to provide recommendations on the impact of online/offline intersection of communication channels through language and messaging used that promote and legitimise violence and misogynistic messages towards women, and therefore how to better adjust programming to address this impact. A gender analysis of these policies, strategies, programmes and other initiatives was also conducted in order to ascertain the extent to which they are gender responsive and, more specifically, where there are gaps, opportunities and best practice. In particular, opportunities for policy development and reform were identified.

5. RESULTS: ANALYSIS OF FAR-RIGHT ONLINE CHANNELS

In order to examine the role online channels play in amplifying gender ideology and misogyny across transnational networks, the research team collected and analysed data in relevant far-right channels and forums frequented by far-right extremists in the UK and Australia.

The resulting datasets contained a total of 16,841,697 words, with the corpus containing data from Australian Telegram channels and Stormfront boards accounting for 2,103,821 words and the corpus containing the respective data for channels and boards for the UK accounting for 14,737,876 words. The differences in volume between the two countries can be attributed to the higher number of discussion threads in the UK-specific sub-forums on Stormfront as well as higher posting volumes in some of the identified Telegram channels. For the analysis conducted here, these differences in volume between the datasets do not present a problem as comparisons are made between the ranks of words within a corpus (i.e., how often a certain word is used compared to other words in the same corpus) rather than analysing absolute frequency counts (i.e., comparing how many times a certain word occurs in one corpus compared to another corpus).

Following the data analysis procedures explained in the previous section, the research team then conducted quantitative and qualitative analysis of the datasets. Specifically, we asked:

- Are online channels used to amplify misogynist and hostile beliefs that may fuel and increase the contagion of violent extremism?
- Are there narrative links between channels being used in the UK and Australia, and to what degree are misogyny and hostile beliefs amplified across continents via these channels?

Are online channels used to amplify misogynist and hostile beliefs that may fuel and increase the contagion of violent extremism?

To respond to this research question, we analysed the prevalence of gendered words in general, followed by an analysis of the prevalence of the specific words that were identified for each layer of our research in both the UK and Australia.

Wordlists were created to determine the general prevalence of gendered words in the corpora of far-right discourse in Australia and the UK. This analytical tool counts all the words that are present in the corpus and presents them in an ordered list, thus making it possible to find which words are the most frequent in a corpus. As the two corpora are different in scope, the absolute frequency of these words is not relevant. However, the rank of specific words within each corpus can be compared. In the 1,000 most frequent words in the two corpora, the following gendered terms stood out.

Australia:

Rank	Word	Frequency
58	he	5821
115	man	2507
131	her	2141
143	guys	1973
172	men	1643
173	him	1640
185	family	1512
237	children	1132

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Rank	Word	Frequency
274	woman	973
283	women	950
370	kids	717
437	mates	590
496	boys	514
552	girl	476
671	guy	387
776	father	338
813	families	324
814	mother	324
973	parents	269
988	date	266

UK:

Rank	Word	Frequency
25	he	74979
37	his	47106
47	her	37421
65	man	30052
67	she	29723
87	him	20125
108	woman	16214
149	children	11370
182	women	8723
192	girl	8230
194	family	8155
248	child	6427

Rank	Word	Frequency
450	girls	3688
484	boy	3402
486	boys	3391
490	kids	3336
529	himself	3132
648	guy	2579
700	parents	2419
727	mother	2318
738	guys	2290
772	female	2194
791	male	2138
800	couple	2121
849	father	1992
888	single	1919

In both countries, words referring specifically to men are significantly more common than those referring to women, children or families, with the word 'he' ranking on top of both lists, as the 58th most common word in the Australian discourse and the 25th most common word in the UK discourse. No significant differences were observed regarding the types of gendered words that were most common in the two countries, but there were slightly more words that fell into this category in the UK top 1,000 words (26) than there were in the 1,000 most common words in the Australian corpus (20).

Secondly, to determine how prevalent misogynistic and hostile discourse was in the analysed online channels, the frequency of the identified terms relating to misogyny and hostile beliefs was determined for the two corpora. For singular and plural versions of the same word, the frequencies were added up and the rank was determined based on the cumulative frequency.

For combinations of words, the N-gram feature on SketchEngine was used, which makes it possible to determine the frequency of multiword expressions.

Layer 1:

	Australia		UK	
	Rank	Frequency	Rank	Frequency
Rapefugee(s)	/	0	18533	27
Soyboy(s)	20579	3	22431	19
Rapist(s)	2330	100	908	1899
Paedophile(s)/ Pedophile(s)	1429	178	1323	1275
Pedo(s)	1645	152	3326	408
Beast(s)	2035	119	2630	553
Brother(s)	619	415	610	2776
Trans(gender)	2233	106	1722	935
Transsexual(s)	8497	16	18581	27
Tranny	8093	17	8421	105
Gay(s)	1237	208	1004	1738
Lesbian(s)	3467	58	3736	349
Drag queen	n/a	14	n/a	440
Queer(s)	5317	32	3791	342
LGBT(Q/I)	3381	60	1831	868
Gender(s)	1969	124	1797	891
Faggot(s)	2412	95	7037	139

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Layer 2:

	Australia		UK	
	Rank	Frequency	Rank	Frequency
Sister(s)	1375	186	1373	1223
Mother(s)	573	454	597	2836
Wife/Wives	947	276	724	2348
Trad wife	/	0	/	0
Housewife	16133	5	16056	35
Slut(s)	9084	14	12312	55
Thot	17502	5	17002	32
Cunt(s)	4189	45	2203	690
Roastie	/	0	/	0
Unicorn(s)	9305	13	21233	21
Bimbo	/	0	20244	23
Stacy	/	0	34103	9
Becky	/	0	14711	41
Karen(s)	13256	7	6854	145
Whore(s)	6993	21	4562	265
Hoe(s)	13259	7	12311	55
Mudshark(s)	14424	6	16279	34

Layer 3:

	Australia		UK	
	Rank	Frequency	Rank	Frequency
Defender(s)	11165	10	5802	187
Provider(s)	10408	11	6706	150
Hero(es)	1376	186	1566	1040
Warrior(s)	1179	220	2344	642
Breadwinner	23429	3	/	0
Viking(s)	3468	58	4526	268
Alpha(s)	7997	17	3056	455

	Australia		UK	
	Rank	Frequency	Rank	Frequency
Beta(s)	16808	5	10545	72
Omega	19085	4	23082	19
Chad(s)	6240	25	11956	58
White knight	n/a	0	n/a	5
Mangina	50050	1	/	0
Gymcel	/	0	/	0
Simp	17404	5	36199	8
Cuck(s)	4322	43	3659	359
Real m*n	n/a	6	n/a	128
Normie	3658	54	4892	240

Regarding **layer one**, focusing on the role of misogyny in the ideological perspective of individual members, the data revealed that while the word ‘brother’ was the most common word on the list in both corpora, ranking as the 619th most common word in the Australian corpus and the 610th most common word in the UK corpus, which highlights the importance of the idea of ‘brotherhood’ in both groups. The importance of this gendered norm is especially apparent when one considers the frequent use of the expression “Train & Tribe” by Australian far-right actors. The use of this specific expression highlights two elements of the Australian far-right’s gendered thinking. On one hand, as will be explored more below, the expression demonstrates the importance of physical training, and what version of manhood this emphasis represents. On the other hand, the frequent use of this expression demonstrates the importance of the ‘Tribe’ for Australian far-right adherents. Australian far-right actors repeatedly express the idea of needing to establish an external community, separate and isolated from the cultural deviancy of modern-day society, of like-minded individuals. While women are not excluded from this ‘Tribe’, the underlying logic is that men would be the main actors within this brotherhood.

The fact that the word ‘brother’ was the most common word on the list in both corpora, illustrates this fact and the importance of a gendered, specifically homosocial, brotherhood for far-right adherents.

In the UK corpus, the word ‘brother’ was followed in frequency by the term ‘rapist’ (rank 908 in the UK corpus), which points to the portrayal of outgroups as a sexualised threat. This is in line with the high frequency of the words ‘paedophile’ (and its various spellings) and ‘beast’. In conversations in UK Telegram channels, for example, one member posted, “cultural paedophilia must be stopped in Britain! Capital punishment is a deterrent if you can’t deport these vermin.” Similar sentiments were also found on UK Stormfront forums, linking both Jews and Muslims to paedophilia:

Lots of pedos for sure. Kid molesters by the tons. Powerful politicians, banking elite Shlomosteinbergs, priests, and ugly desperate people, mixed with wealth, make the perfect society for abusing children. The Islamic faction of pedos is fairly recent, less than 100 years.

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Language of this nature was also used in the same forum to discredit members of the LGBTQ+ community by linking them to allegations of paedophilia: “When fags adopt little boys I find it especially sick because you never know what sexual behaviour it will be exposed to. Give homos rights give pedos and perverts rights. No, they do not reproduce and have a demented sense of being, humor.”

Those terms were also common in the Australian corpus, with the word ‘rapist’ occurring slightly less frequently in that corpus (rank 2330), while the word ‘beast’ as well as terms relating to paedophilia were slightly more frequent in the Australian corpus. While the respective out-groups are partly different in the Australian context, the narratives themselves are very similar to those employed in the UK context. For example, one Australian far-right supporter on Stormfront posted “You won’t hear Abo’s condemning paedophilia, it is part of their culture they have always been famous for pedo activities and if you speak out against it then you be raciss [sic].” The following post from a sub-forum in the Australian section of Stormfront provides a typical example of the types of rhetoric that are being used in this context:

Why should it matter if she was ‘racist’ or not? By their reasoning Lovett was justified in raping her for calling him a racial slur. That is because the jew media has created the illusion in peoples minds that a racist is someone of pure evil who wants to gas everyone who isn’t a blue eyed blonde Aryan Because of all the holohoax propaganda etc, being accused of being a racist is on a par with being called a rapist or pedofile[sic]. In fact worse. You can see that when she pleaded with the lawyer [sic] that she wasn’t ‘racist’ and just ‘traumatised’ (which I’m sure she was with that gorilla on top of her).

In Australia, these sexualised threat narratives are used to highlight the dangers posed by both internal

and external identified enemies. More broadly, when expressing anger towards governmental or law enforcement actors, Australian far-right actors will usually frame their opposition to these groups in highly gendered and sexualised language. For instance, one post would note:

ASIO director-general Mike Burgess Journalists, system pigs and their anti-fascist auxiliaries tried so hard to hinder our Grampians trip, but were completely outclassed by us and achieved nothing. Now all of them are begging the federal government to make it illegal for us to go for Hitler-hikes. Sorry faggots, but you ought to get over your envy and learn to live with the fact that the Grampians happened; you will never be able to take that trip away from us. Grampians for the White man! Hail victory!

This quote highlights the fact that through the use of words like ‘system pigs’, far right actors engage in a similar dehumanization process to other extremist organizations. It is revealing that sexualised, specifically homophobic, language remains a leitmotif even discussing male opponents. The use of such language not only seeks to dehumanise opponents, but at the same time extols the perceived deviancy of the gay community.

Additionally, similar, but often more extreme, sexualised and gendered language is used when describing the threat emerging from external communities and individuals. For instance, a Telegram post by a member of the Australian far-right outlines a number of incidents which demonstrate the perceived threat posed by migrant actors:

White Child Stalked by Migrant (PURE RAGE)

Migrants Who Gang Raped a Swedish Girl Until Her Abdomen Burst, AVOIDS jail time

White Child Stalked by Indian Migrant Predator Harasses and Films Polish Girls

Subhuman Migrant Grooming Gang Raped 14 Year Old Girl and ‘Robbed Her of Her Childhood’

Migrants grab old French people and drag them along a moving car, going faster and faster, until they fall

Migrant Woman DECAPITATED Little European Girl

White Kid Chased and Attacked by Black Teen

When examining the online posts of Australian far-right actors, this is by no means an isolated incident, and the promotion of a sexualised threat posed by migrant actors, alongside a simply violent threat, is telling. The use of a sexual language demonstrates the gendered threat far-right actors perceive themselves to be under.

Similarly, the importance of sexualised and gendered threat narratives are highlighted when one considers the fact that terms relating to the LGBTQ+ community, including ‘LGBT(Q/I)’, ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’, ‘queer’, ‘transgender’, and ‘faggot’ were very frequent in both corpora, pointing to frequent (and, given the high frequency of derogatory terms relating to individuals within the LGBTQ+ community, very offensive) discourse relating to these topics. Specifically, the LGBTQ+ community is labelled as a threat because there is the perception that it promotes and normalises behaviour that is seen as deviant and culturally destruction. In particular, the deviancy of these sentiments is noted in its impact on male and female behaviour, especially the creation of ‘weak-willed’ men who will be unable to confront the above-mentioned threats.

For example, combining different gendered issues discussed here, one post in the UK forum on Stormfront read:

Good to see the ‘ultra’ right wing protestors (meaning people who aren't woke and don't particularly like child molesters) had the foresight to set up outside the UK's largest supplier of nail guns and hammers, just in-case it get's a bit tasty with the faggotry supporters. Not that I condone violence.

Rallying specifically against transwomen, numerous abhorrent posts like the following from the UK sub-forum on Stormfront were found in both countries:

Trannies are the real war on women. Trannies are men with dicks who want to intimidate real women and erase them. [...] They have used their access to female private spaces to rape or grope women and sometimes even girls. I think the only solution to trannies is euthanasia like one does with a rabid dog.

In an Australian Telegram channel, one member posted similarly transphobic comments:

What you tolerate today, you'll have to live with tomorrow. If we fail to challenge the evil spewing from the system, then there is no limit to the horrors they will inflict on our people. Ten years ago, it was ‘trans rights are human rights’. Today, it's ‘permanently mutilate your child or the state will do it for you’.

The centrality of narratives around gender identities and sexual orientations is also highlighted by the relatively frequent occurrence of the word ‘gender’ in both corpora (rank 1969 in Australia and 1797 in the UK corpus). On the other hand, the term ‘drag queen’, which was mentioned as a topic of concern for the far-right in both countries in the literature, did not occur very frequently, only featuring 14 times in the Australian corpus and 440 times in the UK corpus. Taking into account the discrepancies in size of the

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UK and Australian corpora, the term was over 4 times more frequent in the UK corpus.

The terms ‘rapefugee’ and ‘soyboy’, which were both featured in the literature on misogyny in the far-right, were not as prevalent as expected, with the term ‘rapefugee’ only ranking 18,533rd in the UK corpus, while it did not occur at all in the Australian discourse, and the word ‘soyboy’ only being used 3 times in the Australian corpus and 19 times in the UK corpus, which corresponds to a rank below the 20,000 most frequent words in both countries.

For **layer two**, discussing the portrayal of women, the word ‘mother’ was the most frequent word in the list of pre-selected terms, featuring in the top 1,000 words in both corpora (573 in Australia and 597 in the UK). In both countries, this was followed in frequency by the terms ‘wife’ and ‘sister’, ranking 947th and 1,375th in Australia and 734th and 1,373rd in the UK, respectively. This indicates that ingroup women are central in the discussions in the analysed online spaces, especially in the context of the (heterosexual) family. Yet, terms that were identified in the context of ‘traditional’ family structures, including ‘trad wife’ and ‘housewife’ were not as common in the two corpora as expected, with the term ‘trad wife’ not featuring at all in either one of the corpora.

Derogatory words relating to outgroup women, partly also taken from the literature on men’s rights movements and incel groups, including the words ‘slut’, ‘thot’, ‘cunt’, ‘roastie’, ‘bimbo’, ‘stacy’, ‘becky’, ‘karen’, ‘whore’, and ‘hoe’ were not frequent in the discourse in the analysed corpora. Many of the terms, particularly those prominent in the discourse in men’s rights groups, did not feature at all in one or both corpora. In most of the cases where they were they did appear in the corpora, they were not used in the same ways as they would be used in the manosphere. For example, ‘Karen’, ‘Stacy’, or ‘Becky’ were mainly mentioned as first names of concrete women rather than being used more generally to discuss certain types of women.

Similarly, the term ‘mudshark’, which refers to white (in-group) women who enter into relationships with non-white men, was not found in the corpora as often as the literature would suggest. This term was only found 6 times in the Australian corpus and 34 times in the UK corpus. However, this does not mean that the concept of race-mixing was not discussed – quite the contrary – however, this specific term was not used often to discuss the issue. In the discourse in both countries, declining white birth rates and miscegenation are key concerns for far-right adherents. In this context, the threat posed by external communities is portrayed as the core of the problem. For instance, an Australian comment on a post of an advertisement featuring an inter-racial picture comment stated “This shit makes me so sick! The worst thing about it is that I can’t do anything to make those satanic serpents stop poisoning the minds of our people.” Evidence for the presence of such narratives can also be found in different UK channels and forums. For example, one member of a UK sub-forum on Stormfront posted the following:

I can only imaging decent Polish nationalists feel as sick as we do when we see a white woman with uprights, or upright children, filthy race traiting whores. Brooding Negroid? Probably because each one of those Mullato children are from a different father and not his...mostly the Negroids hang around just long enough to impregnate the Mudshark and move on..

The fact that posts such as these often include images of white women with partners of colour demonstrates that this threat perception is not gender-neutral, and by identifying race-mixing and the non-production of white children as deviant behaviour, these posts in turn define appropriate behaviour for white women note any behaviour by white women that is interpreted by group members as ‘inappropriate’ as a concern. For example, an individual in a UK forum on Stormfront lamented that:

It's not realistic to expect British men to intervene in these situations if there is a risk of being stabbed or later surrounded by a group of invaders, outnumbered, for women who quite blatantly disrespect [sic] men and don't value their own civilisation highly enough. Nothing to do with 'balls' or lack thereof. You have to believe something is worth fighting for, and worth protecting. Otherwise, the women will just have to become accustomed to this new reality of not being safe in town at night. Well done, to those ladies.

Altogether, the identified words in this layer of research were much less frequent in the discourse than the words that were identified for layer one. All of this points to the fact that, while far-right communities may engage in hostile misogynistic discourse it may not always be as explicitly stated as one would assume. Importantly, however, the underwriting logic included in many far-right online posts still do indicate a gendered, specifically, misogynistic belief structure. For instance, even though it may not be explicitly stated, traditional family structures and the role of women and care and mothers are consistent thematic occurrences in the online posting of far-right actors. In part, this is seen in imagery, rather than words, that promote these values as well as the promotion of a specific solution to identified concerns, that being the production of more 'white children.' As mentioned previously, for far-right actors the creation of a 'Tribe' is of particular importance, and within that 'Tribe' women are seen as occupying traditional, supportive, motherly roles.

This sentiment can further be seen in posts lamenting the advert of feminism as an ideology. Rooted in elements of casual sexism, feminism is criticised as a form of 'cultural cancer' where women are encouraged to prioritize monetary gain and where "the organic, loving ties of husband to wife, and mother to child are reviled as tantamount to slavery and psychological abuse." For example, one member of a UK-based far-right channel on Telegram stated that "the White Communists females in this country are the worst traitors. And there are many of them. They just want

to erase White Males and replaced [sic] them." In the Australian sub-forum on Stormfront, one member quoted a news headline that reported on a far-right leafletting campaign in Canberra "White supremacists stuff Nazi leaflets through hundreds of letterboxes branding diversity 'genocide' and saying feminism will 'destroy the white race'," commenting "Only the cucks and white sluts were horrified. The smart ones had profound happiness [sic] moment." From this we can see that feminism is demonised as it has resulted the shift in woman's role away from its traditional, and correct, societal place.

It emerged from the online discourse that also the women in the examined far-right groups and forums themselves are still grappling with these societal transformations and the best ways for them to live up to their 'expected' gender roles. The following comment from Stormfront (UK) captures this uncertainty and frustration:

I'd like to know what us women could do to improve the situation. Other than advertising the fact that I'm NOT a feminist to pretty much everyone I meet and teaching the younger girls in my family to reject modern feminazi behaviour, what do the men think would help mend the obvious gap between the genders? In-fighting clearly isn't going to benefit anyone in the WN [white nationalist] community. I'd honestly like to know if the men have any suggestions. a) Be nice and understanding of men's situation, in particular in regards to the unfair dating scene and all the negativity and frustration it arises. b) Have a white nationalist boyfriend and work for building a white family. c) Identify as a white first and as a woman second. I don't think many WN men have issues with women because they are women, but rather because they found their behaviour wanting in their experiences with them. Basically, you have to act diametrically opposed to what

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feminism, modernism, egalitarianism, 'bitchism' and careerism demand.

Significantly, as demonstrated by the lack of extremely misogynistic and derogatory terms towards women, while elements such as feminism are demonised by far-right posts, they often stop short of promoting and endorsing violence against women. Nevertheless, even the existence of casual sexism should be seen as a problematic element of the far-right. At a minimum, it normalises the notion of a woman's rightful place as a passive caregiver, which in turn inherently subjugates women and reinforces traditional gender stereotypes.

For **layer three**, which focuses on the expectations for men at the individual level, the terms 'hero' and 'warrior' were the most frequent among the terms identified from the literature. The word 'hero' ranked 1,376th in the Australian corpus and 1,566th in the UK corpus, while the word 'warrior' ranked 1,179th in Australia and 2,344th in the UK. The contexts in which these terms are used span a wide range of issues. For example, one post in the Australia sub-forum on Stormfront read "In honour of Joe Rowan; a true hero of our race who was murdered by a non-White lowlife just over 15 years ago," while one forum member of the UK sub-forum stated, "We need to stop denigrating those who have made a contribution to our cause and identify those who are role models. We are a movement desperately in need of heroes and JT was one such hero that we should acknowledge and lionise." Combining a few of the gendered issues that were discussed in this section, the following post was made in a UK-based Telegram channel:

Fascism promoted the belief that there was a heroic ideal that we should strive towards. A healthy mind, a healthy body, a healthy nation. There were no fat lads in the Hitler Youth, and no fat girls in the League of German Maidens. ... It's no surprise that all of the fitness manuals and schoolbooks in Germany were destroyed

after the war. The future was to be one of ugliness, mediocrity, and equality.

Other words relating to men in the in-group, including 'defender', 'provider', 'Viking' and 'alpha' ranked roughly in the top 10,000 words in both countries, which means that they were not particularly prevalent in the discourse. The word 'breadwinner' (considering different spellings) was surprisingly absent from the discussion, with only three mentions in the Australian corpus and no mention in the UK corpus. Also, the term 'real man' (or 'real men') did not occur as often as expected, with only 6 mentions in the Australian corpus and 128 mentions in the UK corpus.

Like the findings from layer two, terms that are popular in the discourse in men's rights movements, including 'beta', 'omega', 'chad', 'gymcel', 'white knight', 'mangina', or 'simp' were not particularly popular in either one of the corpora under examination, with each term occurring less than 100 times in both corpora combined. Slightly more prevalent was the word 'cuck', which ranked 4,322nd in the Australian corpus and 3,659th in the UK corpus. Nonetheless, concurrent to the elements discussed in relation to boundaries placed on female participation, the idea that men need to occupy traditional gender roles can be pointed to as an underlying sentiment within far-right posts. One Australian far-right post, for example, notes that "our future generations must be prepared to fight if they want to survive." Similarly, a post in the Australian sub-forum on Stormfront suggested that "Now it seems its illegal to defend your family when attacked by a pack of apes." What becomes explicitly clear when one examines online activities of the far-right is that men, from the perspective of the ideology, are expected and required to be physically strong and capable of violence.

Are there narrative links between channels being used in the UK and Australia, and to what degree are misogyny and hostile beliefs amplified across continents via these channels?

In addition to computing wordlists and analysing the absolute frequency of general gendered terms as well as the pre-selected terms corresponding to the three layers of analysis, the research team also conducted keyword analysis using SketchEngine software. This tool identifies words that appear unusually frequently in the target corpus (i.e., the Australian and the UK corpus) in comparison with the words in the reference corpus based on a statistical measure (i.e., ‘keywords’). The identified keywords can therefore be characteristic of the target corpus. The reference corpus that was used for this analysis is the English Web 2020

corpus, which is an English corpus made up of texts collected from the Internet. The most recent version of the enTenTen corpus consists of 36 billion words. The texts were downloaded between 2019 and 2021. The sample texts of the biggest web domains which account for 40% of all corpus texts were checked semi-manually and content with poor quality text and spam was removed.⁹

For the two corpora under review, the following tables list the top 10 keywords related to misogyny and hostile beliefs. These terms are not only frequent in the corpora in absolute terms, but they also stand out in comparison to the neutral English language corpus.

Australia

Item	Frequency (focus)	Frequency (reference)	Relative frequency (focus)	Relative frequency (reference)	Score
pedo	117	4522	46.85854	0.10486	43.316
faggot	81	20187	32.44053	0.46810	22.778
normie	52	2892	20.82602	0.06706	20.454
pedophile	99	53063	39.64953	1.23044	18.225
cuck	37	2725	14.81851	0.06319	14.878
rapist	100	78773	40.05003	1.82661	14.523
rape	539	849382	215.86966	19.69572	10.479
paedophile	34	25406	13.61701	0.58912	9.198
uncuckables	20	1	8.01001	0.00002	9.010
cunt	43	61261	17.22151	1.42054	7.528
pedophilia	27	25120	10.81351	0.58249	7.465

⁹ <https://www.sketchengine.eu/ententen-english-corpus/>

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UK

Item	Frequency (focus)	Frequency (reference)	Relative frequency (focus)	Relative frequency (reference)	Score
rapist	1900	78773	109.60318	1.82661	39.129
rape	14017	849382	808.58307	19.69572	39.118
paedophile	996	25406	57.45514	0.58912	36.785
sexually	4764	373109	274.81555	8.65176	28.577
cuck	344	2725	19.84394	0.06319	19.605
nonce	314	8947	18.11337	0.20747	15.829
paedo	241	1483	13.90230	0.03439	14.407
grope	564	58939	32.53484	1.36669	14.169
pedo	245	4522	14.13304	0.10486	13.697
miscegenation	210	7018	12.11404	0.16274	11.279

Highlighting some of the findings from the wordlist analysis above, these lists clearly show that narratives portraying outgroups as sexualised threats are highly prevalent in the discourse in both countries. While versions of the word ‘paedophile’ particularly stand out in the Australian corpus, terms related to rape are more prominent in the UK corpus. In contrast to the Australian corpus, where terms such as ‘faggot’, ‘normie’, ‘cuck’, ‘uncuckables’, and ‘cunt’ are in the top 10 gendered keywords, the UK corpus overall appears to focus more on outgroups as a sexual threat, with terms such as ‘sexually’, ‘nonce’, ‘grope’ featuring in the list. Also, the term ‘miscegenation’ stood out in both corpora, though it did not make it in the top 10 in the Australian corpus, indicating an emphasis in the discourse on ‘racial purity’ and the ‘threat’ posed to the survival of the white race by mixed-race relationships.

Comparing the UK corpus directly against the Australian corpus (rather than the neutral enTenTen corpus), the following gendered terms and phrases stood out.

Item	Frequency (focus: UK corpus)	Frequency (reference: Australia corpus)	Relative frequency (focus: UK corpus)	Relative frequency (reference: Australia corpus)	Score
inappropriately	540	4	31.15	1.60	12.356
nonce	314	2	18.11	0.80	10.613
slag	159	0	9.17	0.00	10.172
mudslime	100	0	5.77	0.00	6.769
custodial	141	1	8.13	0.40	6.522
paedophilia	180	2	10.38	0.80	6.321
pervert	948	20	54.69	8.01	6.180
inbred	132	1	7.61	0.40	6.151
grope	564	12	32.53	4.81	5.776
schoolgirl	838	19	48.34	7.61	5.731
attractiveness	79	0	4.56	0.00	5.557
anti-grooming	79	0	4.56	0.00	5.557
schoolboy	189	3	10.90	1.20	5.407
predatory	210	4	12.11	1.602	5.040
exploitation	790	21	45.57	8.41	4.949
groom	2304	68	132.90	27.23	4.743
prosecute	1035	30	59.70	12.02	4.664
condom	127	2	7.32	0.80	4.623
serious sexual assault	376	1	21.69	0.40	16.201
child sexual exploitation	260	0	14.99	0.00	15.998
british woman	201	0	11.59	0.00	12.595
count of rape	953	9	54.97	3.60	12.157
white women	440	3	25.38	1.20	11.984
man in connection	180	0	10.38	0.00	11.383
child sex offence	178	0	10.27	0.00	11.268

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Item	Frequency (focus: UK corpus)	Frequency (reference: Australia corpus)	Relative frequency (focus: UK corpus)	Relative frequency (reference: Australia corpus)	Score
indecent image	243	1	14.02	0.40	10.723
sexual offence	816	9	47.07	3.60	10.440
count of sexual activity	160	0	9.23	0.00	10.230
grooming gang	737	9	42.51	3.60	9.450
lone woman	146	0	8.42	0.00	9.422
image of children	141	0	8.13	0.00	9.134
black baby	456	5	26.30	2.00	9.094
sex offender	1188	18	68.53	7.20	8.470
black male	305	3	17.59	1.20	8.446
charge of sexual assault	124	0	7.15	0.00	8.153
unconditioned canuck	223	2	12.86	0.80	7.698
underage girl	168	1	9.69	0.40	7.634
indecent image of children	113	0	6.52	0.00	7.519
alleged offence	110	0	6.35	0.00	7.345
black woman	359	5	20.71	2.00	7.230
connection with a sexual assault	108	0	6.23	0.00	7.230
offence of rape	103	0	5.94	0.00	6.942
indecent exposure	143	1	8.25	0.40	6.604
sex attacker	418	7	24.11	2.80	6.603
mixed race	689	13	39.75	5.21	6.565
child groom	95	0	5.48	0.00	6.480
suspicion of rape	95	0	5.48	0.00	6.480
sex attack	914	19	52.72	7.61	6.240
convicted rapist	90	0	5.19	0.00	6.192

Item	Frequency (focus: UK corpus)	Frequency (reference: Australia corpus)	Relative frequency (focus: UK corpus)	Relative frequency (reference: Australia corpus)	Score
sex pest	121	1	6.97	0.40	5.698
white victim	118	1	6.81	0.40	5.574

Conducting the same analysis for the Australian corpus, the following words and phrases stood out compared to the UK corpus.

Item	Frequency (focus)	Frequency (reference)	Relative frequency (focus)	Relative frequency (reference)	Score
boogieman	137	0	54.86854	0.00000	55.869
convoy	928	200	371.66428	11.53718	29.725
quaxxed	64	1	25.63202	0.05769	25.180
caravan	450	121	180.22514	6.97999	22.710
pro-choice	29	5	11.61451	0.28843	9.791
uncuckables	20	1	8.01001	0.05769	8.519
family member in regional areas	384	0	153.79211	0.00000	154.792
big love	384	10	153.79211	0.57686	98.165
brave freedom fighter	30	0	12.01501	0.00000	13.015
family member	433	304	173.41663	17.53651	9.409
monkey pox	79	45	31.63952	2.59586	9.077
fathers side	26	5	10.41301	0.28843	8.858
child steal	17	0	6.80851	0.00000	7.809
new boogieman	16	0	6.40800	0.00000	7.408
mothers side	27	11	10.81351	0.63454	7.227
dark complexion	34	18	13.61701	1.03835	7.171
white boy training	12	0	4.80600	0.00000	5.806
practical mma skill	12	0	4.80600	0.00000	5.806

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This, again, points to a higher prevalence of discussions around migrants and other outgroups as a sexualised threat, responsible for sexual attacks ranging from grooming young children to indecent exposure, rape, sexual assault, and acts of paedophilia in the UK corpus than in the discussions in the Australian online forums under review. While there was some narrative overlap regarding these topics, the volume of discussion about these topics in Australia does not compare to the discourse in the UK. On the other hand, narratives around Covid-19 were much more prevalent in the Australian corpus than they were in the UK.

The analysed discourse in each country also included mentions of the respective other country. While most references to Australia in UK forums were relating to Covid-19 policies or police responses to the pandemic, some examples of gendered views on Australia and Australians were found in the corpora. For example, as part of a conversation about 'white' immigration to the UK in a UK-specific sub-forum on Stormfront, one member stated:

I'm not generally a fan of white immigration to the UK, actually. [...] Most Aussie women in London are lefty-liberal types, and many Polish women are mudsharks. You're mistaken in claiming these groups follow conservative ideas (remember the UK voted for Brexit while Poland and Hungary are still happy to be totally controlled by the USA and Germany, like totally owned bitches). Similarly, men from Australia, USA and South Africa seem to enjoy taking the position of ridiculing British men in our own homeland, when they're actually weaker than us. The USA is finished and China will totally own Australia in the future, with the men powerless to stop it. They are all living in a fantasy land where they believe they are stronger than men of other nationalities. They're just not.

In Australia, conversations about the UK similarly revolve mainly around the Covid-19 pandemic, such as the following comment on the alleged surge in miscarriages due to the vaccine: "The UK gov website has contracts out for tender for baby funerals as data suggests a surge in miscarriages." In addition, members of Australian Telegram groups have picked up on the threat narratives around grooming gangs and other sexualised threats posed by migrants in the UK, as exemplified in the following two comments:

The TR movement raised £millions in donations from working class Brits, who were expecting more information and some justice regarding the tens of thousands of English girls who've been groomed, raped & used as sex-slaves by migrant gangs. Instead all they got was a documentary called 'Shalom'.

The Anti white system strikes again. A woman has been jailed for 14 weeks in the UK for calling a nigger a nigger! She will now spend the next 3 months locked in prison where she will have to fight every sort of ethnic invader just stay alive! May God protect her.

While little evidence of direct exchanges between members of the groups and channels in the two respective countries was found in the research, there were clearly some similarities with regard to the gendered narratives that were utilised in the discourse in both countries. Even though some of the outgroups were different in the two countries, many of the gendered threat narratives were the same. For example, while the portrayal of the LGBTQ+ community as a sexualised threat as well as the opposition to feminism and race-mixing were the same in both countries, other demonised out-groups vary, depending on the ethnic groups that are strongly represented in the migration profiles of each country.

6. RESULTS: ANALYSIS OF OFFLINE REINFORCEMENT OF HOSTILE BELIEFS

As noted in the desk review, a growing corpus of research has sought to understand far-right mobilisation online, and the role the online space plays in the simultaneous radicalisation of individuals and diffusion of far-right ideology. However, only limited attention has been placed on how far right dynamics play out in offline space. Nevertheless, a smaller subset of the literature has noted the importance of considering the offline space as a crucial element of the success of the far-right (for example, see Peucker et. al. 2020; Busher, Harris, and Macklin 2019). Although this project deals explicitly with gendered narratives, misogyny and hostile beliefs in online space, this section provides an exploratory overview as to what extent offline sites (such as fitness studios, gyms, shooting ranges etc.) reinforce such gendered narratives and hostile beliefs purported online amongst the far-right.

OUTWARD FACING OFFLINE ACTIVITY

Over the last decades, there was a notable shift in far-right group dynamics in the UK, moving from groups made up mainly of ‘pub brawlers’ and gangsters to groups like National Action (now proscribed) who aimed to attract younger people with ‘cleaner’ criminal records as members. These new types of groups have a strong online presence – typically much stronger than their offline presence – on platforms such as Telegram, Gab, BitChute, but also gaming(-adjacent) platforms such as Discord or Steam, and they often mature online before evolving to offline activities (Project 2020). This shift also emerged with a partial change in views towards women in the context of new ideological narratives of ‘white Jihad’ and race war, with some groups espousing explicit hatred towards

women rather than narratives solely revolving around protecting women and children (Collins 2022).

In line with the increased online activities of these ‘younger’ far-right groups, offline activities declined noticeably (Gayne 2021). Despite the general decline in offline activities, the physical presence of far-right groups in the UK remains visible, for example through protest and counter protest initiatives, and stickering campaigns. While online engagement is often noted as a key feature of contemporary far-right movements, in-person protests remain popular among the far-right. Most recently, the involvement of far-right actors has been seen in anti-Covid and anti-Lockdown protests.

While the far-right community should not be seen as responsible for these protests, the underlying sentiment is clearly supportive of the broader far-right’s anti-government narratives. Importantly, while the grievances underwriting protests movements motivated by Covid lockdown mandate are not naturally reflective for the ethno-centric espoused by far-right communities, it nevertheless provided these movements with exploitable circumstances. For example, a report produced by the Victorian government in Australia outlines the fact that while the majority of protestors do not fit into the criteria of the far-right, it nonetheless highlights the fact that “individuals in non-extremist groups were increasingly susceptible to far-right ideology, with anti-lockdown protest activity has [proving] to be a gateway for some individuals to engage with NRVE [nationalist and racist violent extremism] ideologies.” (Committee 2022). Moreover, Agius et al. described how, “members and supporters of far-right extremist groups ... promoted, supported, and attended anti-lockdown demonstrations in Melbourne ... [the groups] were also found to have actively sought to provide recruits and supporters

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with combat training to confront police during demonstrations at anti-lockdown protests in 2021. Of further concern were neo-Nazi calls to violence in response to lockdowns and vaccination mandates, most prominently against Victorian Premier, Daniel Andrews” (Agius et al. 2022).

Likewise, far-right communities have emerged as a response to the Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests and marches. In the UK, these BLM counter-protests in 2020 led to over 100 arrests ('Over 100 arrested as UK far-right groups clash with police' 2020). Furthermore, UK far-right communities have organized single-issue protests. For instance, in 2022, far-right protest activities were also directed against libraries in Kent and elsewhere as drag queens were scheduled to hold reading sessions with children (Daleny 2022) - an offline extension of narratives against LGBTQ+ rights and agendas that are online in far-right online discourse. The Patriotic Alternative (PA), the same group who has conducted the anti-drag protest, has also organized a number of counter-protests movements to combat the perceived dilution of Remembrance Day (Boothby 2021).

Significantly, the Australian far-right has conducted similar offline-activities. In September 2022, Australian far-right actors staged a counter-protest to a drag-queen performer and a school holiday event in Melbourne. The reasoning behind the offline activity is illustrative and was outlined in a Odysee video posted after the fact (Sewell 2022). On one hand, the activity was condemned simply on the fact that it promoted and normalised what is seen as deviant behaviour by far-right actors. At the most basic level the counter-protest was rooted in an anti-gay, ant-trans, anti-drag sentiment. However, a further justification narrative provided in support of the counter-protest was directed at the local council. Local council members were criticised for sanctioning and allowing a drag-queen to perform at a school holiday event attended by children. Significantly, according to the counter-protestors the reason why such activity was allowed was because of the perceived, council's predominately

female composition. According to Sewell, it was these 'obvious subversive entities' (the female local council), recruiting a 'Jewish transgender entity' who is likewise referred to as a 'literal demon', that created a scenario representative of what was deemed as part of the 'age of Kali' (Sewell 2022). The age of Kali, according to the far-right actor, represents an 'age of chaos' and an 'age of the slut' (Sewell 2022). In other words, it was this combination of and collusion between actors that for the NSN leader represents the cultural degeneracy of the modern age and the collapse of civilisation, as outlined in the Kali Yuga mythology. Interestingly, the specific use of the word 'slut' as interchangeable with the Kali Yuga indicates that for the author of the video women who disregard their motherly duties in favour of multiple sexual partners are key contributors to this civilisational destruction.

What is clear here is that the motivations and rationale for these counter-protests are clearly gendered. This counter-protest was implemented to combat perceived deviant cultural elements which go against their idealised version of manhood, as well as governmental forces, specifically and explicitly female local council members, who promoted such cultural elements.

While a definition process of tactical diffusion between the similar tactics used by the PA and the counter-protests held by Australian far-right actors cannot be pointed to, a potential element of passive diffusion can be highlighted. For instance, a survey of Australian far-right Telegram channels very clearly demonstrates that certain members of the Australian ecosystem are monitoring the UK landscape and in particular PA. For instance, the individual who posted the Odysee video linked the PA Telegram channel as one which should be followed for like-minded people. Moreover, other instances of relationship building exist. Prominent European far-right linked individuals have appeared on Australian hosted far-right podcasts, and vice versa (Zidan 2021; Kennedy 2021). All of this is to say that even if it is only a tentative relationship, a relationship between the far-right communities in Australia and the UK, as well as Europe more broadly,

has been established. Importantly, however, while the Odysee video mentioned similar anti-drag queen counter protest tactics used by the PA, it at the same time notes that how this tactic was used in Australia was distinct and unique from that of PA (Sewell 2022). This in turn would indicate that while some level of tactical diffusion can be inferred in this instance, Australian far-right actors nevertheless sought to filter the diffusion through their own particular lens.

Apart from protest movements, the far-right is prolific in its use of advertising techniques, in particular the use of stickering campaigns. This ranges from white supremacist propaganda stickers appearing at primary schools (Laversuch 2020) and stickers found on lamp post and other public locations in various cities linked to the far-right Identitarian movement and calling for the defence of Europe from ethnic minorities (TellMAMA 2021) to stickering campaigns led by National Action at universities ('Men guilty of racial hatred after posting stickers at Aston University' 2018). Moreover, as they had done in the case of anti-BLM protests, far-right groups also sought to take advantage of emerging issues, such as COVID-19, climate change, and the fear and uncertainty surrounding these issues, by putting up stickers with the logo of the environmentalist group Extinction Rebellion that contain far-right messages (Roffe 2022), or by hiding blades behind stickers containing messages such as 'mass immigration is white genocide', aiming to hurt those who remove the stickers, at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic (Stewart 2022).

Likewise, stickering campaigns are a favoured offline activity in the Australian context with the explicit goal of disseminating ideological messages with the goal of further recruitment. Stickering campaigns conducted by Australian far-right adherents have taken place in high school and university campuses, as well as more generalized locations across Australia. In a submission to the Victorian parliament, the Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies (CRIS) would note:

Several far-right groups in Victoria and other parts of the country seek to raise their public profile through offline action, such as stickering or leafleting (leaflets often include contact details), holding rallies or other public stunts. This is seen as a vehicle to make more people aware of their group and encourage them to follow them online or get in contact with the group directly (CRIS 2022: 14-15).

Moreover, within the internal propaganda of these movements, stickering campaigns have been used as a means of demonstrating solidarity and expansion, with the advent of advertising campaigns in previously unexpanded to Australian states celebrated within internal messaging.

Aside from stickering campaigns, other public in-person gatherings also include conferences and festivals, such as the annual conference held by the group PA, which have been met with increasing infiltration of the events, leading to police involvement, thus making it difficult to gather followers in large numbers (Davis and Lawrence 2021). An investigation by the advocacy group HOPE not Hate has indicated, for example, that while PA has a membership of around 5,000 subscribers on their official Telegram channel, only around 200-250 core activists are available for offline activities (Davis and Lawrence 2021).

These advertising campaigns and protests movements are seen as a form of community engagement, as a means of ideological advertisements, and increasingly within the Covid environment as sites of potential ideological exposure and mobilisation for those who may have broad ideological convergence with far-right sentiment. Moreover, within far-right communities these advertising campaigns are a means of ideological diffusion. For example, a Daily Mail post (Knight 2022) criticising drag-queen events such as those outlined above, was considered by the Patriotic Alternative's Telegram Channel to be a result of their own activities countering these events.

INWARD FACING OFFLINE ACTIVITIES

Another popular, and significant, area of offline activities for members of far-right groups in Australia and the UK are sports or other physical activities in various forms. Within the Australian context these offline sporting activities are typically centred around hiking/camping excursions, combat-centric military style boot camps, and wider involvement in Mixed martial arts (MMA) gyms. Former and active groups such as the Nationalist Socialist Network (NSN), the True Blue Crew (TBC), the European Australian Movement (EAM), the Lads Society (LS), and the Antipodean Resistance (AR), as well as influential individuals such as Tom Sewell, and Jarod 'Jaz' Searby, have been particularly active in engaging and promoting this type of offline activity.¹⁰

Similar offline dynamics are captured when one examines far-right offline activities in the UK. While football hooliganism has its roots in the UK, with strong links to far-right milieus being historically present in many hooligan groups, far-right links to hooligan groups are less pronounced than they used to be. Nevertheless, groups such as the Football Lads Alliance (FLA) have increasingly come under scrutiny for far-right ideology, hate speech, and far-right symbols present at FLA demonstrations and events (Network 2018).

However, as with the Australian setting, a particular interest for these groups in this space are MMA gyms and other combat sport activities, as well as fitness and training camps. Among the far-right fitness groups in the UK are the White Stag Athletic Club (WSAC), fitness groups linked to Patriotic Alternative, and a group of radical Covid-19 conspiracy theorists, who held combat training sessions under the name Alpha Men Assemble (Hume 2022). Far-right extremists in the UK also reportedly participated in military-style training camps

in Europe, led by the transnational far-right group Generation Identity, even before a UK branch of the group was opened in 2017 (Dearden 2018).

Noted as sites of recruitment and radicalization (Zidan 2021; McGoawn 2019; Ruddy 2018), what these offline activities often have in common in both contexts is a shared obsession with the male body, as well as a focus on (physical) self-improvement and training for physical confrontations as part of a wider 'race war' to prevent the destruction of the white race. (Townsend 2022). This is a significant point as it has been highlighted by these movements as internally quite important. For instance, criticising the 'Men Going Their Own Way' and 'pick-up artists' subcultures, in a piece of writing published on their now shutdown website the Antipodean Resistance noted the significance of the above point:

An Alpha Male, whether human or any other monogamous species, must remain physically fit and sound of body - not to 'impress' unwanted, degenerate sluts, but to guard and protect his current or potential female partner and children from all aggressors and foreign invaders. He will often band together with other Alpha Males of his species to fight against a large force of foreign aggressors (Resistance 2018c).

Building on this, the Antipodean Resistance would argue that physical activities allow an alpha male to defend one's own family, and that engaging in physical activities is the very essence of manhood and allows an individual to 'inherit the spiritual mantle of our ancestral fathers.' Advertised as a path to 'self-realisation,' 'physically arduous hiking and the pursuit of mountaineering' is promoted as the means by which the 'trivial comforts' and 'sedentary lifestyles devoid of any true struggle' of modern-day life can be countered

¹⁰ For an overview of the history and contemporary nature of the Australian far-right see; Kristy Campion, 'A 'Lunatic Fringe'? The Persistence of Right Wing Extremism in Australia,' *Perspectives on Terrorism* 13, no. 2 (2019); 'Darkest of Hours: The Extreme Right,' in *Chasing Shadows : The Untold and Deadly Story of Terrorism in Australia* (Sydney, AUSTRALIA: Allen & Unwin, 2022).

(Resistance 2018b). For the Antipodean Resistance, as well as many like-minded far-right organizations, offline activities based around fitness have become an intrinsic element of the wider movement's ethos and ideology. In other words, physical activities promote certain traits that need to be acquired to become in-group members; traits that foster an understanding of masculinity constructed around the physically fit, strong and violent ideal man.

Moreover, outside of engaging with notions of true manhood, these offline sites provide a means of community building and bonding and places where the in-group can 'get to know each other.'¹¹ For instance, in an 'interview' detailing the reasons behind an offline hiking activity conducted by the Nationalist Socialist Network, a video specifically notes that this activity was designed to advertise the fact that there is 'an alternative lifestyle' for 'white men of courage and conviction.' Moreover, this same video promotes the idea of building up 'men from the ground up' via the establishment of 'strong bonds and strong communities.' Likewise, the European Australian Movement would publish an image of a training camp on Telegram with the accompanying title:

NSW and QLD EAM members held a group training and camp weekend, cultivating and exchanging practical skills and combat training techniques. The importance of building bonds with your brothers in the racial struggle for a free White Australia cannot be understated. The bonds we forge, and the work we put in today, will carry us to victory tomorrow. Tribe & Train.¹²

Taken together, these two elements demonstrate the highly gendered nature of this type of far-right offline activity. Most notably, the patriot 'hero', the 'brothers-in-arms', and the 'ideal man' typologies are all readily apparent in these offline activities. In short, as the movements offline activities centred on providing its members with physical fitness are clearly and explicitly reflective of the established typologies, they concomitantly dictate appropriate male behaviour rooted in a gendered worldview.

Moreover, within promoted images of these offline activities and influential offline sites women are almost never present.¹³ Subsequently, as male behaviour is dictated so too is female participation with these groups. While the promotion of these activities does not specifically restrict women's roles, they nevertheless inherently subjugate women and regulate women to passive roles. This point is highlighted in the silences around female participation in such activities. For instance, within the Australian context, images promoting physical offline activities are accompanied by phrasing such as: "The Queensland lads went on a camping trip on Mount Beerburrum, rounding off a very eventful and successful month for AR;"¹⁴ "The Brisbane lads are at it again, and oh, what's this? A trophy;"¹⁵ "The Victorian lads went for another hike this Sunday. We recommend it for all who who [sic] both despise the modern world and love nature."¹⁶ While the lack of female members in publicised images advertising these activities may be due to predominance of male membership rather than an explicit attempt at female subjugation, the use of such language nevertheless demonstrates a gendered belief system, even if it is unspoken.

11 Quote from a Telegram video

12 Quote from a Telegram post

13 The authors noted one instance in far-right internal messaging where women were explicitly stated as needing to engage in such activities. "As well as participating in a variety of activities with the men, activities include cooking, gardening, family healthcare, sewing, hiking, fitness and self-defence" (Resistance 2018a)

14 Quote from a Telegram post

15 Quote from a Telegram post

16 Quote from a Telegram post

7. RESULTS: ACCOUNTING FOR GENDER IDENTITIES AND IDEOLOGIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE TRANSMISSION OF EXTREMISM

As the analysis indicates that gender identities and ideologies do impact the transmission of extremism both between online and offline contexts and across borders, in the transnational online far-right ecosystem, it is essential to ensure that threat assessment tools as well as preventative and responsive programming are including a meaningful gender mainstreaming strategy. This means that a gender lens must be used to consider the gendered dynamics for effective threat assessment, policy formulation and P/CVE programming implementation. These tools must be designed to either respond to the gendered dynamics or seek to transform gender inequalities.

GENDER RESPONSIVE THREAT ASSESSMENT

Based on the authors' review of VERA-2R, TRAP-18 and ERG 22+, the threat assessment tools most commonly used in Australia and the UK, it is evident that such models still fall behind in accounting for the distinct gendered experiences that can shape both women and men's radicalisation. For example, gender dynamics generally, let alone masculinity, and misogynistic, sexist, and hostile beliefs towards women serving as potential drivers in radicalisation, are not present within any of the indicators of the five domains in VERA-2R, nor in the additional indicators. Whilst TRAP-18 deals with a 'failure of sexually intimate pair bonding' being rationalised by ideology, the sexualisation of violence is deemed as a secondary component in absence of a sexual pair bond, rather than pointing out the relevance of specific hostile and sexist beliefs towards women including belief in patriarchal structures.

Although there remains a gap as to gender-specific indicators, or an acknowledgement how gender constructs, masculinities and femininities can play a role in joining the movement, sustaining involvement, or leaving, there are windows of opportunity for policy development and reform.

Our findings suggest some important considerations for thinking about how to make existing threat assessment models more gender responsive. It is essential to recognise also with tools such as these that their effectiveness is reliant upon the practitioners who are using them. These practitioners may or may not have a personal commitment to or understanding of how to implement them with a gender lens. Therefore, it is also essential to ensure that practitioners in these environments are receiving further training and information on the impact of the gender identities and ideologies identified in this report and their impact, so that they will have a better understanding of how they play a role in the formation and transmission of violent ideological motivation – and, thus, why it is important to assess them.

GENDER TRANSFORMATIVE THREAT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Historically, the security field has been an adamantly gender-blind space. It is only in recent years that projects, such as this one, have been funded to consider the gender dynamics of violent extremism more comprehensively. This means that shallow policy commitments to gender mainstreaming, often in relation to commitments to the international Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, have often led to misunderstanding of the complexity of gender

and its implications for policy and programming implementation. It is essential, as the analysis above indicates, to consider the multidimensional nature of gender as part of programming design, implementation, and evaluation – which requires a multi-faceted gender analysis framework. Gender is widely misunderstood, especially in the context of counter-terrorism policy, and is often employed as synonymous with women. However, this research shows the importance of considering misogyny and the various elements of toxic masculinity and their impacts on how, why, and where all individuals engage in online and offline far-right extremism.

GENDER IS A SOCIO-CULTURALLY CONSTRUCTED CONCEPT

A fuller understanding of gender and the underlying implications of socialised gender roles needs to be taken into consideration for transformative gender mainstreaming strategies. The concepts of femininity and masculinity have been introduced through the social and discursive constructions of ‘women’ and ‘men’ and are most often linked directly with them respectively. Addressing masculinities and femininities and socially imposed gender norms and relationships can improve effectiveness and sustainability of P/CVE program components.

YOUTH SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS GENDER-NEUTRAL

Youth often appears to be viewed as a gender-neutral concept, never further defined in the design or evaluation documentation as male or female youth even though they comprise a significant portion of the focus population for much P/CVE programming. Lack of recognition of the different experiences of male and female youth and their motivations for participation in violent extremism ultimately leaves programming lacking in its approach and impossible to evaluate. Programming design and evaluation, as well as theories of change and reporting structures must include recognition of the differences of the male and female youth experience, due to underlying socialised

expectations of masculinity and femininity in their cultural context. Without a deeper understanding of the complexity of gender and the impact of misogyny on why people of all ages are drawn to violent extremism, P/CVE programming will continue to have gaps.

ACCOUNT FOR INTERSECTIONAL AND COMPLEX IDENTITIES

Identity can easily become lumped into singular categories (e.g., women are one homogenised group and men are another). However, this is an oversimplification of a very complex issue like identity. Most people find themselves with more than one form of identity, often with intersecting points. This is evident in the complexity of issues formulated in the misogynist narratives espoused above. It is therefore essential that programming is equipped to grapple with intersectionality and any countering efforts are considering multiple elements of identity. This likely indicates that further training and awareness raising is needed with practitioners operating in this space, so that everything from risk assessment to design and implementation of programming is aware and respondent to the important role that gender, and other identity markers are playing in how and why people might be engaging with violent extremism. Risk assessment and other processes are highly individual, however encouraging understanding and awareness among practitioners should allow increased engagement and identification of how this factor is impacting the individual’s potential pathway to or from violent extremism.

GENDER ESSENTIALISMS HINDER THE OUTCOMES OF P/CVE PROGRAMMING

In addition to the need to account for complexity of intersecting identities, there is also a need to understand and avoid gender essentialisms, which are common throughout P/CVE programming (e.g., if P/CVE practitioners are operating under the assumption that men are inherently more violent, then they are reinforcing this gendered assumption). A comprehensive gender analysis framework is needed

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to examine underlying socio-culturally imposed masculinities and femininities and their impact on how and why people participate in violent extremism, as well as how they engage with P/CVE programming.

GENDER EQUALITY IS KEY

Based upon the analysis of this project, it is clear that gender inequality must be considered as a driver of violent extremism and misogyny as a key element of both extremist identities and ideologies, linking them across contexts and supporting transmissibility of extremist narratives. The data shows how gendered narratives and gender role expectations provide a pathway for extremism to be transnationally transmitted and applied across different local contexts. While the out-groups may be different in the different local contexts, and while there was limited direct interaction or exchange of information between individuals from the different contexts examined, it was clear that shared gender identities and gendered ideologies offered a point of connection and transmission. As gender inequalities are shown to be an integral part of both extremist ideologies and identities, it emphasises the importance of holistic P/CVE approaches that include gender analysis and addressing gender inequalities. P/CVE programming must be fully considering the social constructions of masculinity and femininity in local contexts and how inequalities impact people's experience of peace and security, so that they can more effectively work towards gender equality.

Use of a gender analysis framework is essential to gathering data and building the evidence base, as this project has contributed to, for how gender inequalities impact P/CVE outcomes. This type of gender analysis must be applied across the whole of P/CVE programming, starting from the design phase and carrying through to implementation and evaluation. Transformative gender mainstreaming strategies are essential to effective and sustainable counter-terrorism and extremism policy.

8. CONCLUSIONS

Our project has demonstrated that gendered narratives are commonly espoused through online channels, and that the impact of the online/offline intersection of communication throughout language and narrative can be used to promote and legitimise violence and misogynistic messages towards women, as well as shape the roles men and women play in groups.

Specifically, we have presented a typology of the types of gendered narratives that are used to serve as potential motivators for extremism, including appeals to *female control*, *female compliance*, *anti-feminism*, *the 'ideal Man'*, *hyper-masculine 'brothers-in-arms'*, *men's rights*, and *'the patriot 'hero'*. Furthermore, we further deconstructed this to assess, more specifically, the types of gendered narratives and ideological constructs that are specifically espoused across both UK and Australian online channels to ascertain how prevalent common expressions of misogyny and gender power relations were across three layers. Layer one found that the politicised, gendered ideologies amongst the far-right do exist and groups and communities may directly espouse misogyny as part of their ideological outlook. These gendered ideologies play a role in crafting narratives and recruitment strategies, and frame beliefs and roles that provide a sense of meaning, in turn shaping their participation. To assess whether gender power relations were also promoted, in layer two we unpacked in-group dynamics to see whether women were positioned in the outgroup or a sub-in group, which impacts on how both women and men are positioned within the community or group itself and how their roles are ideologically justified in the far-right movement. Finally, we revealed that misogynistic views and hostile/sexist beliefs espoused at the individual level are not only present, but these misogynistic views and gendered narratives impact on the gender dynamics of their expectations for men at the individual level- including how they need to behave

in the community or group as men, and in some cases how they need to behave towards women.

Gender dynamics were a key point of transmission across both the UK and Australian contexts. Our findings have key implications for threat assessment and prevention policy and strategy, given that the gendered narratives espoused online by far-right communities have offline spill overs. Online chats and discussion forums document a link between far-right beliefs and gender ideologies, particularly in terms of narratives seen within the typology deducted above. The effects of online engagement in such forums are important, as not only does it allow for the socialisation of men within these groups, provide a sense of community and meaning, it also leads to the normalisation of misogynistic and sexist beliefs. Similarly, when one examines the far-right's engagement with, and promotion of, offline activities centred around physical fitness, camping, and training camps, these gendered mythologies are reflective of and rooted in this typology that in turn dictates and defines the appropriate behaviour of both men and women in these movements. Gendered narratives and misogyny espoused by the far-right has implications for both the online and offline environments, and consequently has repercussions for existing policies and programming.

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ANNEX I: SELECTED CHANNELS AND FORUMS FOR ONLINE ANALYSIS

UK:

- Patriotic Alternative <https://t.me/PatrioticAlternativeOfficial>
- PA Fitness Club <https://t.me/PAFitnessClub>
- Resistance United Great Britain <https://t.me/ResistanceUnitedGreatBritain>
- Identity England (Generation Identity UK) <https://t.me/idenglandofficial>
- Independent Nationalist Network (INN) <https://t.me/IndependentNationalistNetwork>
- Britain First Chat <https://t.me/BritainFirstChat>
- Britain First <https://t.me/BritainFirst>
- Traditional Britain Group <https://t.me/TraditionalBritainGroup>
- Official Proud Boys Britannia <https://t.me/proudboysbritannia>
- Sam Melia: A Grug's Life <https://t.me/SamYorkshire>
- Alpha Men Assemble/ Alpha Team Assemble <https://t.me/ATAmainpage>
- The Absolute State of Britain <https://t.me/AbsoluteBritain>
- Laura Towler <https://t.me/lauratowler>
- Mark Collett <https://t.me/markacollett>
- Morgoth <https://t.me/MorgothsReview>

Australia:

- Nat-Soc-Aus - https://web.telegram.org/k/#@Nat_Soc_Aus
- Hard Knocks Combat - <https://web.telegram.org/k/#@HardKnocksCombatt>
- Thomas Sewell - https://web.telegram.org/k/#@Thomas_Sewell
- Proud Boys Australia - <https://web.telegram.org/k/#@proudboysaustralia>
- WLM_Australia - https://web.telegram.org/k/#@WLM_AUSTRALIA
- Antipodean Resistance Archive - <https://web.telegram.org/k/#@AntipodeanResistance>
- Converging Arrows Network: <https://web.telegram.org/k/#@convergingarrowsnetwork>
- Neil Erikson - <https://web.telegram.org/k/#@senatorslayer>
- National Socialist Network - <https://web.telegram.org/k/#@nationalsocialistnetwork>
- European Australian Movement - <https://web.telegram.org/k/#@EuropeanAustralianMovement>
- XYZ_News - <https://web.telegram.org/k/#@thexyztelegram>
- QLD True Blue Crew - <https://web.telegram.org/k/#@tbcqld>
- Blair Cottrell - <https://web.telegram.org/k/#@realblaircottrell>
- David Oneegs Aussie chat - <https://web.telegram.org/k/#@daveoneegschat>

- WA unite - ETM chat - <https://web.telegram.org/k/#@laststandcampout>

Stormfront Britain sub-forum (f39)

- UK Newlinks (f90)
- Politics and Activism (f91)
- Culture and History (f94)
- General Discussion (f92)
- Round Table (f93)

Stormfront Downunder (Australia and New Zealand) (f38)

- General Down Under Discussion (f116)
- Down Under Newlinks (f117)
- Politics and Activism Down Under (f118)

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