Public Mitigation of Terrorism Risk:
A Rapid Review of the Literature

FULL REPORT

JULY 2023

ROSAMUND MUTTON

JAMES LEWIS

SARAH MARSDEN

Public Mitigation of Terrorism Risk:
A Rapid Review of the Literature

FULL REPORT

Rosamund Mutton | University of St Andrews

James Lewis | University of St Andrews

Sarah Marsden | University of St Andrews

ABOUT CREST

UK**RI** Economic and Social Research Council

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OVERVIEW

This guide focuses on how the public can help to mitigate the risk of terrorism by engaging in activities relating to the Prevent and Protect workstreams of CONTEST. By considering these different elements of CONTEST, a greater understanding of counter-terrorism roles within the private sphere and performed as part of professional paid employment emerges.

The guide further highlights how public involvement in mitigating terrorism has pervaded different sectors of society, and is not limited to transportation environments or crowded areas. Barriers to public engagement in counter-terrorism roles are identified, with potential strategies for overcoming these barriers also considered.

METHODOLOGY AND STRENGTH OF EVIDENCE

This guide examines literature published between January 2017 and June 2022 and draws from work carried out in a wide range of disciplines and geographical contexts. The UK is the main focus, however evidence is derived from studies carried out in the USA, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Australia. The guide builds on two previous CREST reports that reviewed relevant research (Lewis & Marsden, 2021; Copeland & Marsden, 2020), and discusses 43 empirical studies.

The research focuses on a number of areas including how different categories of 'the public' might mitigate the risk from terrorism, and work that explores the public's potential engagement with the Prevent and Protect workstreams of CONTEST. Prevent is concerned with stopping people becoming involved in terrorism, whilst Protect aims to strengthen the UK's

protection against a terrorist attack. These workstreams are the focus of this report as they are the areas where the public have the greatest potential role to play.

The evidence base across these areas varies. In general, there is limited empirical research quantifying public efforts to mitigate the actual risk of terrorism. Instead, research tends to study participants' intentions in hypothetical scenarios; assesses how public communications campaigns influence behavioural intentions; and explores how these are experienced by civilians. This research predominantly uses quantitative surveys and self-report data and can be considered robust due to the large sample sizes that characterise this research.

A number of smaller-scale qualitative studies capture the reflections of practitioners who design and deliver campaigns and programmes linked to Prevent. This research provides useful insights into evaluations of training programmes captured by the experiences of end-users and/or trainers. However, because it is typically concerned with specific programmes and practitioner experiences, the findings of this research cannot necessarily be generalised.

Research examining the willingness of individuals to refer others to CVE programmes is mainly based on comparatively small samples of interview data with respondents from Muslim communities in the UK and Australia. This research provides useful, qualitative insights, however as most of these studies are focused on understanding experiences within Muslim communities, the transferability of these findings to other community contexts will benefit from further exploration.

Studies which examine the willingness of individuals to make use of more general information relating

to radicalisation risk are largely based in the USA, drawing on data that is nationally representative in terms of sex, age, and ethnicity, rather than focusing on a specific demographic group. Findings from this research are more generalisable beyond the scope of the specific study but may not capture the specific experiences of particular communities.

KEY FINDINGS

- Research typically discusses four different categories of public actors:

    1. Members of the general public.

    2. Intimates (i.e., family members and friends).

    3. Those working in professions that receive counter-terrorism training, but who are not subject to a specific legal duty mandating them to perform a counter-terrorism role.

    4. Those working in professions that are subject to a relevant statutory duty.

- Each category has different roles and responsibilities and differing potential to help mitigate the risk of terrorism.

- Different categories of the public have contrasting motivations, levels of knowledge and confidence and can be subject to different kinds of biases that might shape their potential to help mitigate the risk from terrorism. These issues are helpful to keep in mind when designing training or communication initiatives.

- Access to, and level of, training varies, as does societal and/or organisational expectations of how each category of public actor should contribute to countering terrorism.

- Training and communications campaigns shape how individuals are likely to respond to a perceived threat, ranging from concern someone is at risk of radicalisation, to suspicious behaviour, or an unattended item in a public space.

- Societal and/or professional expectations and the designation of counter-terrorism functions to specific people within a community or organisational setting shape the roles they may play.

- Research examining public conceptualisations of suspected terrorist actors is limited. However, several studies explore the impact of biases based on religion and ethnicity on public perception of terrorist suspects. Research has paid particular attention to the role of the media in shaping these biases.

PREVENT

- 'Intimates' and community members are generally willing to refer individuals to the authorities under the right circumstances. However, there is a preference for exploring other localised, intra-community actions prior to contacting the authorities.

- Reporting is perceived by community respondents as an ongoing social process. Prior to formally reporting concerns to the authorities, intimates may try to intervene themselves and will often consult with wider social networks or community leaders.

- The involvement of community members has been described as 'staging'. Staged decision-making and reporting emphasises the role of the community in responding to concerns of individual radicalisation.

- New research supports previous findings that uncertainty surrounding the outcome of reporting on the individual of concern and a lack of trust in authorities form key barriers to intimates' reporting.

- Perceptions of CVE policy legitimacy can also influence someone's willingness to formally report to the authorities.

PROTECT

- Willingness to report suspicious behaviour is partly informed by the severity of the perceived terrorist-related activity.

- Vigilant behaviour, such as reporting suspicious objects, is informed by contextual factors including the form the suspicious object takes; the availability of authority figures to report to; the location of the item (e.g., a train station; plane in flight, etc.), and the type of action that is possible given the circumstances.

- There is no guarantee that individuals will report activities that they recognise as being potentially suspicious.

- Barriers to reporting include fear of what might happen if the suspicious item is confirmed to be a security threat and a bystander effect where responsibility is deferred to others who are nearby.

- Communications targeted towards members of the public in specific professional roles and contexts can help to increase their understanding of the threat from terrorism.

- Only allocating counter-terrorism responsibilities to specific positions within an organisation can contribute to a knowledge gap amongst other staff, or disengagement from wider security practices.

- Constraints that can limit employee reporting include adherence to a 'need-to-know' principle which discourages employees from enquiring about broader aspects of the organisation's work, and reticence due to a belief in a co-worker's trustworthiness because they hold security clearance.

- Public information campaigns can improve public preparedness. Programmes which involve greater participant engagement (e.g., a drill rather than written material) can improve short-term preparedness.

- Private organisations – particularly transport companies – have the potential to play a key role in communicating appropriate responses to members of the general public.

BARRIERS TO PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT IN COUNTER-TERRORISM ROLES

- Whilst specific barriers vary depending on the type of counter-terrorism action being undertaken, two commonly reported constraints relate to unwillingness and uncertainty.

- The perceived legitimacy of security policies and extent to which they are carried out in line with the principles of procedural justice influence public willingness to participate in counter-terrorism.

- The potential severity of the threat shapes willingness to report. The more severe the perceived security issue, the greater the willingness to participate in counter-terrorism.

- Uncertainty appears to stem from gaps in public knowledge, such as the type of behaviour that should be reported as 'suspicious', or the consequences of reporting for the individual who is the subject of the report.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Communication campaigns will benefit from being tailored to recognise the heterogeneity of 'the public' and the differing levels of motivation, confidence, and biases different groups of people might hold.

- Initiatives to encourage the public to identify and report suspicious behaviours will be supported by reducing uncertainty by providing clear information about the specific types of behaviour that should be reported, and what will happen in the aftermath of a report.

- Reporting authorities can help family, friends and community members concerned about someone

at risk of radicalisation by offering transparent and sustained support including clear information about the reporting process. This can cover how to report, what to expect, and potential and actual outcomes for the individual of concern.

- Maximising opportunities to explain the reasons for counter-terrorism policies and practices to the public can help enhance their perceived legitimacy.

- Public communications campaigns are supported when delivered by trusted and credible messengers and when they can demonstrate that reports will be taken seriously.

- Organisations benefit from targeted advice and training that highlights the constraints and barriers that can act on reporting, for example, in relation to insider threats.

- Gaps in 'regular' workers' knowledge of security threats could be met by making basic information accessible to staff regardless of whether their professional role includes counter-terrorism responsibilities.

- Public preparedness to respond to a Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, Nuclear or explosives incident could be enhanced through education and communication campaigns that provide knowledge and enhance confidence about what to do in an emergency.

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

- More research to evaluate the effects of existing public communications campaigns and the factors that have influenced actual reports have the potential to help develop more effective campaigns.

- Barriers to reporting across the full range of counter-terrorism functions remain relatively poorly understood. Additional research to understand what, when, why, and how barriers shape behaviour and what helps to overcome them would help address this knowledge gap and could inform communication and training initiatives.

- Further research on what shapes community or intimates' willingness to report, and the circumstances under which barriers to reporting are overcome, would provide further insight into the public's role in relation to the Prevent strand of counter-terrorism.

- More work to understand the role procedural justice and perceived legitimacy of counter-terrorism policy play in shaping public willingness to support counter-terrorism efforts could inform a range of policy and practice contexts.

- Research to better understand what shapes public perceptions of terrorist actors, and what mitigates racial or religious prejudice in relation to violent extremists could help to tailor communication campaigns or other public outreach activities to different audiences.

1. INTRODUCTION

The public's role in helping to mitigate terrorism has been a feature of UK security practice for several decades. This began with a number of initiatives developed in response to the terrorist threat previously posed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In the years since 9/11, members of the public in the UK and a range of other countries – most notably the USA – have been asked to play an increasing role in mitigating the threat of terrorism. This guide examines empirical evidence relating to how the public in the UK and comparable contexts including the US, Australia and Scandinavia, perform different counter-terrorism roles.

These roles have often centred around remaining vigilant for suspicious behaviour or objects in crowded public spaces, communicated through government campaigns including 'See it, Say it, Sorted' (UK) and 'If you see something, say something' (US). This guide examines the effects of such campaigns but takes a broader focus by setting out the empirical evidence relating to other ways in which the public might help to mitigate the risk of terrorism, such as reporting concerns about an individual's radicalisation. It further discusses the limitations to public engagement. In doing so, the guide examines what the public can and has done to support activities relating to two workstreams of the UK's CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy: Prevent and Protect (HMG, 2018).

The evidence discussed in this guide is predominantly drawn from studies that capture the experiences or opinions of the public. This research seeks to understand the public's role in supporting Prevent and Protect, predominantly in relation to efforts to identify and report concerns related to potential radicalisation (Prevent) and suspicious behaviour in public spaces (Protect). The other two CONTEST workstreams, Pursue and Prepare, provide fewer opportunities for public involvement and so are not covered here. Where relevant, this guide also draws on studies examining the reflections of practitioners who deliver these workstreams. Further evidence is drawn from professionals employed in sectors which have some responsibility for protective security measures, relating to the Protect workstream.

This guide takes a broad approach to defining 'the public' to reflect the diversity of populations examined in the literature. Section 4.2. outlines four categories of the public, with categorisation informed by role type, level of responsibility, amount of training received, and societal and/or organisational expectations. The main findings of the guide are organised according to the two CONTEST workstreams listed above (Sections 4.3-4.4).

2. OVERVIEW OF THE REPORT

This guide explores empirical evidence on the public's role in mitigating the risk of terrorism, focusing on the UK context. It draws on relevant academic research published between January 2017 and July 2022 conducted in the UK, USA, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Australia. Literature searches were completed between June and August 2022.

Relevant literature was primarily identified through several phases of keyword searches in Google Scholar. This included searches focusing on general public mitigation measures, as well as searches for specific public vigilance campaigns, including 'See it, say it, sorted.' (UK); 'Run. Tell. Hide.' (UK); and 'If you see something, say something.' (USA). Additional studies were identified through forward and backward citation searching of key studies.

To be included in the guide, studies needed to contain robust empirical evidence and be methodologically rigorous.[1] Research is drawn from several disciplines, including political violence and terrorism studies; criminology; psychology and linguistics. This interdisciplinarity has been helpful in providing different perspectives.

---

1   More theoretical examinations of relevant topics are referenced where relevant (e.g., Kumar, 2017), but this theoretical literature is not considered in depth.

3. THE EVIDENCE BASE

Relevant research is found in multiple disciplines and the overall number of studies in the public mitigation of terrorism evidence base is growing. However, the research uses different terms and frameworks, which makes the evidence base challenging to identify and synthesise. Compared to other areas of terrorism-related research, work on the public's role in mitigating terrorism risk is not clearly consolidated in a specific sub-field of research and is often not the sole focus of a study.

There is a tendency for research on public mitigation to be found in studies that are focused on issues that are only tangentially relevant. This means that the significance of research has to be derived from literature which is often concerned with other issues. The potential transferability of insights of the existing research base should therefore be assessed carefully with an appreciation of the differing contexts and dynamics at work.

The guide builds on two previous CREST reports that reviewed relevant research (Lewis & Marsden, 2021; Copeland & Marsden, 2020), and draws on 43 empirical studies which are concerned with two primary areas. The first broad area focuses on different categories of actors within the broader grouping of 'the public'. The second covers research which explores public mitigation of terrorism through the counter-terrorism roles of Prevent and Protect.

Of the three categories of actors within the public sphere, the first consists of studies which draw out the reflections of practitioners who generate, coordinate, and implement relevant programmes (e.g., Kaleem, 2022; Aplin & Rogers, 2020). Although predominantly based on small-n qualitative data gathered through interviews, these studies provide useful insights into evaluations of training programs, captured by the experiences of end-users and/or trainers. Much of this research sets out good practices (e.g., acceptance of the need for training) and the challenges associated with this work (e.g., difficulties in embedding long-term learning).

Because it is typically concerned with specific programmes and practitioner experiences, the findings of this research cannot necessarily be generalised beyond the particular contexts they are concerned with, but do provide valuable insight into practitioner perspectives on the challenges and opportunities of this work.

The second category of studies explores how public communications campaigns influence the public's behavioural intentions (e.g., Shanaah, 2022; Pearce et al., 2020; Gøtzsche-Astrup et al., 2021; Huff & Kertzer, 2018; Lindekilde et al., 2021). Studies of this nature represent the largest body of research identified.[2] This research predominantly uses large quantitative surveys and self-report data to measure how participants would respond to hypothetical scenarios,[3] or how exposure to different information influences intended behaviour.[4]

This quantitative evidence base can be considered robust due to the large sample sizes used in much of this research. Several of these studies are strengthened by the use of nationally representative samples (e.g., Pearce et al., 2020; Haner et al., 2021; Gøtzsche-Astrup et al., 2021) and/or randomised research designs (e.g., Pearce et al., 2020). However, several authors recognise the limitations of using self-report data to gauge behavioural intentions in response to a hypothetical scenario, as it cannot be assumed that

---

2   Most of this literature has already been reviewed in previous CREST guides (e.g., Copeland & Marsden, 2020; Lewis & Marsden, 2020; Lewis & Marsden, 2021) and so will not be discussed in great depth here.

3   For example: Haner et al. (2021) [n=700]; Gøtzsche-Astrup et al. (2020) [n=13,992].

4   For example: Pearce et al. (2020) [n=3,005]; Lindekilde et al. (2021) [n=5,285].

claimed behavioural intentions would translate into actual actions (e.g., Haner et al, 2021; Gøtzsche-Astrup et al., 2021). Despite this limitation, and as there is no research that measures actual reporting behaviours in response to real-life scenarios, these studies remain useful.

The third category of research relating to actors within the broader grouping of the 'the public' includes studies examining the willingness of individuals to refer others to specific CVE programmes such as Channel (e.g., Thomas et al., 2020; Grossman, 2019) or to make use of more generic informational resources designed to provide guidance, relating to someone they are concerned about (e.g., Williams et al., 2019). Research concerning the referral of 'intimates' to specific CVE programs is mainly based on comparatively small samples of interview data with respondents from Muslim communities in the UK and Australia (e.g., Grossman et al., 2015; Grossman, 2019; Kaleem, 2022). Only one study includes White British participants from marginalised economic backgrounds (n=7)[5] in addition to Muslim respondents (n=40) (Thomas et al., 20 17).

Despite the small sample sizes, this research provides useful insights into the willingness of family members, friends and community members to make referrals, and the barriers to these processes. As most of these studies are focused on understanding experiences within Muslim communities, efforts to transfer these findings to other community contexts should be undertaken cautiously.

Studies which examine the willingness of individuals to make use of more general information relating to radicalisation risk are largely based in the USA, drawing on data that is nationally representative in terms of sex, age, and ethnicity, rather than focusing on a specific demographic group. Findings from this research is more generalisable beyond the scope of the study but may not capture the specific experiences of particular communities.

The second broad area of literature covers research which explores public mitigation of terrorism through the counter-terrorism roles set out by the Prevent and Protect workstreams. The evidence base for each workstream varies.

There is a growing body of research relating to the public's role in supporting activities in relation to the Prevent workstream. These studies tend to be based on smaller samples and use qualitative methods which provide useful insights into personal engagement with, and understandings of, specific training programs or reporting processes (e.g., Thomas et al., 2017; Grossman, 2019).

The largest body of research on the public's role in counter-terrorism relates to Protect, and focuses in particular on the impact of public communications campaigns (e.g., Pearce et al., 2020; Lindekilde et al., 2021; Parker et al., 2021). The use of quantitative surveys and more robust research designs means that these studies offer helpful insights into how members of the public respond to communication campaigns, but these are less able to elicit the kind of in-depth insights qualitative studies can offer.

Finally, research relating to the protection of physical infrastructure is limited. The studies which have been conducted use a mix of quantitative and qualitative research methodologies (e.g., Booth et al., 2020; McIlhatton et al., 2019; McIlhatton et al., 2020; Christensen, 2021).

---

5   Reference to (n=) relates to the number of people, or the sample size of the study.

4. ANALYSIS

4.1. OVERVIEW

The analysis that follows sets out the existing evidence concerning the public mitigation of terrorism risk, divided into five key themes. Section 4.2. describes the four different categories of "the public" that were identified from the literature in order to provide a greater understanding of how public roles in counter-terrorism might differ.

The following two sections assess the findings in relation to two different strands of CONTEST.[6] Section 4.3. examines research on Prevent including work that has considered the willingness of the public – and in particular family 'intimates' – to refer family members and friends to CVE programmes. Section 4.4. considers research relevant to Protect by discussing the general public's reporting of suspicious behaviour and objects to the authorities. This links to literature which explores how public communications campaigns influence behavioural intentions.

Diversity in public responses related to Protect are also explored in this section which covers differences across sectors in regard to the training opportunities that are offered/ available, and expectations related to counterterrorism as a professional responsibility. The research covers chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism issues in the transport sector; co-worker reporting in a critical national infrastructure (CNI) company; and the effectiveness of security advice in supporting the planning, designing and security of crowded places.

Finally, Section 4.5. investigates the potential barriers that might inhibit the public from engaging in different counter-terrorism roles. Key challenges include an unwillingness to report and uncertainty surrounding how terrorism is understood and defined.

4.2. UNDERSTANDING THE PUBLIC

This section first describes who constitutes 'the public' in the research, and then synthesises the empirical evidence on who the public conceptualises as suspected terrorist actors.

Existing research suggests that 'the public' can be differentiated by their profession, the level of training they receive, and the expectations surrounding their role in mitigating the risk of terrorism. Different categories of actor are likely to differ in their understanding of their role in counter-terrorism. It is important to distinguish between different groups in this way because there are multiple counter-terrorism programmes and training initiatives, which target diverse demographics and sectors of society. Differentiating between categories of public actor helps to identify appropriate strategies, training needs, and knowledge gaps.

---

6   'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism' (HM Government, 2018).

Key Findings

- Research typically discusses four different categories of public actors:

  1. Members of the general public.

  2. Intimates (i.e., family members and friends).

  3. Those working in professions that receive counter-terrorism training, but who are not subject to a specific legal duty mandating them to perform a counter-terrorism role.

  4. Those working in professions that are subject to a relevant statutory duty.

- Each category has different roles and responsibilities and differing potential to help mitigate the risk of terrorism.

- Different categories of the public have contrasting motivations, levels of knowledge and confidence and can be subject to different kinds of biases that might shape their potential to help mitigate the risk from terrorism. These issues are helpful to keep in mind when designing training or communication initiatives.

- Access to, and level of, training varies, as does societal and/or organisational expectations of how each category of public actor should contribute to countering terrorism.

- Training and communications campaigns shape how individuals are likely to respond to a perceived threat, ranging from concern someone is at risk of radicalisation, to suspicious behaviour, or an unattended item in a public space.

- Societal and/or professional expectations and the designation of counter-terrorism functions to specific people within a community or organisational setting shape the roles they may play.

- Research examining public conceptualisations of suspected terrorist actors is limited. However, several studies explore the impact of biases based on religion and ethnicity on influencing public perception of terrorist suspects. Research has paid particular attention to the role of the media in shaping these biases.

4.2.1. CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE PUBLIC

Although not consolidated in a formal typology, the research broadly focuses on four different categories of 'the public' which together capture the different types of roles people have in this context:

1. Members of the general public.

2. Intimates (i.e., family members and friends).

3. Those working in professions that receive counter-terrorism training, but who are not subject to a specific legal duty mandating them to perform a counter-terrorism role.

4. Those working in professions that are subject to a relevant statutory duty.

1. Members of the general public

This category includes individuals who, in the process of going about their daily lives, may find themselves in a position to mitigate the risk of terrorism, such as rail passengers (Pearce et al., 2020) or retail customers (Aplin & Rogers, 2020).

The general public is unlikely to have undergone any counterterrorism training, although some individuals may voluntarily engage with relevant online learning resources and training. Statistics released by the UK's National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) in April 2020 stated that since April 2018, over 400,000 people had engaged with Action Counters Terrorism (ACT) Awareness online learning resource modules (Tech Monitor, 2020). These resources are appropriate for and accessible to any member of the general public. Beyond this kind of training, it is assumed that the general public can help to mitigate the risk of terrorism through reporting suspicious behaviours or objects observed in public spaces. There is an expectation that all individuals will engage in this role.

Some authors refer to the engagement of the general public in community reporting as 'bystander reporting' (e.g., Rowe, 2018). Thomas et al. (2020) use the term

to differentiate broader categories of individual from those who have a close relationship with the individual they are reporting on, who are described as 'intimates'.

2. 'Intimates'

Intimates include family members and/or friends who might be concerned that an individual is at risk of radicalisation (e.g., Thomas et al., 2020; Williams et al., 2019). Intimates may decide to formally report their concerns to the relevant authorities, or may choose to take a less formal course of action, such as contacting other family members or community leaders.

3. Trained employees with no legal duty to perform a counter-terrorism role

Individuals who are employed in roles that are not security-focused may receive formalised counter-terrorism training, even though they are not under a legal duty to perform any specific counter-terrorism function. This can include train conductors; railway station employees (Pearce et al., 2020); retail workers and managers (Aplin & Rogers, 2020). Training may be considered relevant because of the type of sector they are employed in (e.g., transport or aviation), because they work in a crowded place, or because they hold a particular position (e.g., managerial, front-line etc.).

Some may never encounter a real-life situation which utilises this knowledge, for example if their role involves establishing organisational standards and training. Others may benefit from their training on a daily basis, for instance if they work in a public-facing role that carries some responsibility for public safety, such as a store manager.

4. Individuals working in professions subject to a legal duty such as the Prevent Duty.

A number of professions such as teachers, social workers, and NHS staff (Rodrigo Jusué, 2022) are mandated to perform specific counter-terrorism functions. As part of this, specific members of staff may be given a specific role, such as Prevent officer.

This guide focuses on research relating to the first three conceptualisations of the public, including studies capturing practitioners' perspectives of how such groups engage with specific roles relevant to counter-terrorism (e.g., Parker et al., 2019). Research into the experiences of individuals who have a legal responsibility to perform a counter-terrorism function (e.g., those working in institutions affected by the Prevent Duty) is captured in a separate guide examining the community impacts of counter-terrorism measures (Lewis, Hewitt & Marsden, 2022).

4.2.2. PUBLIC CONCEPTUALISATION OF SUSPECTED TERRORIST ACTORS

Research explicitly examining public conceptualisations of suspected terrorist actors is limited. However, there is some evidence to suggest that violence committed by some identity groups is more likely to be perceived as terrorism than others. One of the first experimental studies to investigate what the public perceives to be terrorism (n=1,210) found that the suspect's ethnicity, group affiliation and public perception of a motive, inform whether an attack is likely to be defined as terrorism in the USA (D'Orazio & Salehayan, 2018). The authors stated that compared to similar violence committed by Whites, that committed by Arabs was more likely to be labelled by those in the study sample as terrorism. Violent actors associated with groups, particularly Islamist groups, were more likely to be labelled as 'terrorist' than those perceived to be lone actors (D'Orazio & Salehayan, 2018, p. 1035).

Several studies explore whether biases (conscious and unconscious) based on religion and ethnicity might influence how the public perceives terrorist suspects (Carson & Politte, 2021; Sloan et al., 2021; Selod, 2018; Williamson & Murphy, 2022). Evidence suggests that the media and negative stereotypes of Muslims are two key influences upon public biases towards terrorist suspects.

The media's role in shaping public perceptions of suspected terrorist attackers post 9/11, has been examined in the UK and USA (Dolliver & Kearns, 2022). Several studies refer to the ways in which the American media biases public perception of terrorists against Muslims and people of Middle Eastern origin (e.g., Huff & Kutzer, 2018; Mitnik et al., 2020).

One indicator used to evaluate bias is the amount of news coverage Muslim and non-Muslim offenders receive. An assessment of news articles (n=3,541) covering 136 US-based terrorist attacks which took place between 2006-2015 found that attacks perpetrated by Muslim offenders garnered almost 360 per cent more coverage than those committed by non-Muslim offenders (Kearns et al., 2019).

Possible biases in media framing of terrorism in relation to a perpetrator's mental illness is a further indicator used to understand public perceptions of terrorist attackers (Betus et al., 2020; D'Orazio & Salehayan, 2018). White suspects in D'Orazio & Salehayan's study were more likely to be perceived by participants as mentally ill than Arab suspects (38.5 % compared to 25.5%). White suspects' actions were also less likely to be attributed to a political or religious ideology and so were instead more often referred to as 'mass shooters' than 'terrorists'.

Utilising the same news article dataset as Kearns et al. (2019),[7] Betus et al. (2020) found 'the odds of an article referencing mental illness does not differ between White and non-White perpetrators' (p.1133). Moreover, the odds a news story would mention terrorism was five times greater when the perpetrator of an incident was Muslim. Whilst Kearns et al. (2019) and Betus et al. (2020) point to a link between media messaging and unconscious biases in the general public towards Muslims, this link needs to be more robustly explored to understand the scope and mechanisms by which the media might play a role in shaping perceptions.

---

7   Betus et al.'s sample excluded 36 US-based terrorist attacks, leaving accessible media coverage for 100 attacks. Owing to variances in the level of media coverage of different attacks, the number of articles remained 3,541.

In the USA, a knowledge gap exists with regards to the race and ethnicity of those who are negatively stereotyped as 'suspected terrorist actors' and those who have perpetrated the majority of domestic terrorist acts. As discussed in Huff & Kutzer (2018) and Carson & Politte (2021), Muslims and people perceived to be of Middle Eastern or Arab descent are at greater risk of being considered 'suspected terrorist actors'. As well as being informed by negative racial and religious stereotypes, this perception contrasts with the reality of the terrorism threat in America.

Silva et al. (2020) obtained demographic information detailing the race and ethnicity of 325 out of 420 perpetrators of attacks in the USA post-9/11: 82.2 per cent (n=237) were White, 8 per cent (n=26) were Black, with only 6.5 per cent of Arab descent and 3.3 per cent categorised as 'Others' (including those who were Hispanic, Asian or biracial). From this evidence, the authors conclude: 'perpetrators responsible for U.S. attacks after 9/11 were majority White and suggest claims that terrorists are primarily of Arab descent are not supported' (p. 314).

Recent research suggests that biases relating to physical markers such as race, ethnicity and appearance may have become less pronounced. An Australian study identified a positive association between perceptions of Muslims as threatening and support for punitive counterterrorism measures, potentially suggesting an implicit association between Islam and terrorism (Williamson & Murphy, 2022). Yet, this association was found to be weaker amongst those interviewed after the 2019 Christchurch terrorist attack (n=1,344) which was carried out by a far-right extremist. The survey results suggest that this attack may have shaped respondents' views regarding the relationship between terrorism and particular identity groups.

Similarly, findings from a large-scale, nationally representative survey in the USA (n=700) indicate that participants were not more likely to report a Muslim terrorist suspect of Middle Eastern origin compared to a White terrorist suspect (Haner et al., 2021, p. 19). The same study found that participants who rejected Muslim stereotypes were more likely to report White suspects who demonstrated terrorism-related behaviours. Whilst the cause of this finding was not examined empirically, the authors speculated that one factor may be the prevalence of domestic, right-wing terrorist attacks over Islamist attacks in the USA in recent years.[8]

Very limited research has looked at public perceptions of terrorism in relation to ideological affiliation. Only a few studies touch on (often tangentially) extreme right-wing terrorism, and how the public identify and perceive perpetrators of these threats. Although not reporting on public perceptions of extreme right-wing terrorism, responses to instances of extreme right-wing violence from security services across Western Europe and Russia (Bjørgo & Ravndal, 2019) could be considered relevant to interpreting the general public's likely response. In the early 2000s, right-wing violence was often underestimated or misidentified as other types of crime, such as gang-related violence, which failed to acknowledge that actions were motivated by right-wing ideology (Bjørgo & Ravndal, 2019).

Perhaps reflecting these dynamics, attacks conducted by Whites and members of White supremacist groups were less likely to be described as terrorism by participants in one study (D'Orazio & Salehayan, 2018, p. 1029-1030). Public awareness of extreme right-wing violence has developed more recently, likely due to the mass violence conducted in Norway (2011) and New Zealand (2019) which may shape public perceptions into the future. However, more research is needed to understand these shifts.

---

8   This explanation is supported by Silva et al.'s (2020) analysis of 630 terrorist incidents occurring in the US from 1995-2017. When post-9/11 attacks were analysed according to ideological motivation, Islamist, jihadist-inspired attacks were the least common (n=71, 18.3 per cent). 49.6 per cent (n=192) of all domestic terrorist attacks included in the sample (n=387) were attributed to the far right. The remaining 32 per cent (n=124) were motivated by far-left ideology (p. 312-313).

4.2.3. CONCLUSION

Understanding the heterogeneity of the public will help to ensure that activities seeking to increase awareness of, and ability to perform, specific roles are appropriate and relevant to the intended target audience. Public communications campaigns and primary prevention initiatives will benefit from taking account of these different groups and tailoring their approach accordingly. This can include being aware of different motivations (e.g. personal or professional); levels of knowledge and confidence (e.g. as a result of training or public awareness campaigns); and the potential for biases to shape behaviour (e.g. through the consumption of certain kinds of media content).

Although research into public conceptualisations of suspected terrorist actors is limited, there is some evidence that conscious and unconscious biases shape how the public perceives suspected terrorist attackers. Whilst some research suggests that these biases might have weakened, they still have the potential to shape how the public interprets behaviour in problematic ways.

4.3. PREVENT: REPORTING SUSPECTED RADICALISATION

4.3.1. INTRODUCTION

The Prevent workstream of CONTEST is concerned with safeguarding individuals against radicalisation. Since 2015, a range of 'specified authorities', including schools and healthcare institutions, have been placed under a statutory duty to perform this function in the UK. However, a range of other actors can play a role in countering radicalisation, including community members and 'intimates'. These are family and/or friends who have a strong emotional and socially intimate relationship with an individual at risk of radicalising (Grossman, 2019; Thomas et al., 2020).

By virtue of their close relationship, intimates are more likely to recognise behavioural changes and other early warning signs of radicalisation (Grossman, 2019; Neo et al., 2018). This section explores empirical evidence relating to intimate and community reporting of radicalisation risk in the UK and other contexts. It also refers to research cited in previous CREST research on contemporary CVE interventions (Lewis & Marsden, 2021).

Key Findings

- 'Intimates' and community members are generally willing to refer individuals to the authorities under the right circumstances. However, there is a preference for exploring other localised, intra-community actions prior to contacting the authorities.

- Reporting is perceived by community respondents as an ongoing social process. Prior to formally reporting concerns to the authorities, intimates may try to intervene themselves and will often consult with wider social networks or community leaders.

- The involvement of community members has been described as 'staging'. Staged decision-making and reporting emphasises the role of the community in responding to concerns of individual radicalisation.

- New research supports previous findings that uncertainty surrounding the outcome of reporting on the individual of concern and a lack of trust in authorities form key barriers to intimates' reporting.

- Perceptions of CVE policy legitimacy can also influence someone's willingness to formally report to the authorities.

4.3.2. REPORTING BY INTIMATES

Research into reporting by intimates is limited. Existing research tends to focus on identifying the conditions and reporting mechanisms which would encourage community members to report (Thomas et al., 2017). Comparatively little attention has been given to what happens following referrals from intimates or the kinds of support that might help family and friends in the aftermath of a referral.

The willingness of intimates and community members to refer individuals to the authorities under the right circumstances is common across different countries. Research into community reporting thresholds in Australia (Grossman et al., 2015 as reported in Grossman, 2019) and the UK (Thomas et al., 2017, reported in Thomas et al., 2020) found that respondents in both countries (n=99) would be willing to report a family member or friend under the right circumstances when concerned about potential radicalisation. Similar findings are reflected in larger scale survey data collected in the USA (n=1,151) by Williams et al. (2020) and Scandinavia (n=13,991) by Gøtzsche-Astrup et al. (2021).

International research points to a preference for less formal intervention prior to reporting. Respondents in a UK study (n=66) spoke about their willingness to intervene themselves prior to formally reporting a family member or friend (Thomas et al., 2017). This study provided evidence that reporting processes are 'staged'; intimates tend to initially consult family members, friends, and community leaders, before formally reporting to the authorities.

The type of people who were considered 'community leaders' varied among respondents. Several Muslim participants considered respected figures who have religious authority, such as Imams, as community leaders, while others took a broader definition which included youth workers, local elders and 'ordinary' people who have 'influence over community matters' (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 34-35). A number of female respondents were unable to identify a community leader who they would be comfortable sharing their concerns with, partly due to an absence of female community leaders. These findings suggest there is a diverse range of individuals who could be considered to enact leadership roles within a community, but that not all of them may considered appropriate for all members of the community to engage with.

In Australia, contacting the authorities was seen as being a 'last resort' by Muslim community members and leaders (n=16) interviewed by Grossman (2019, p. 204). Respondents cited a range of other intra-community actions they would take prior to contacting the authorities. These included 'seeking counsel and support from community and religious leaders' and 'removing people from negative influence settings' (p. 214). These range of preferred actions demonstrate the preference for less formal methods prior to reporting.

While respondents from a study in the USA (n=1,151) expressed a preference for 'direct engagement' with a friend or family member over involving a third-party, similar to the findings cited above, there was a willingness to engage other parties when deemed necessary (Williams et al., 2020).

Research into the experiences of intimates after they have reported is lacking and is an important area for future research (Thomas et al., 2017; Thomas et al., 2020). From the little data that exists, a key recommendation for shaping future interventions relates to keeping intimates informed of what is happening to their friend or family member after reporting them (Thomas et al., 2017; Thomas et al., 2020). Most respondents stated a desire to be kept informed and recognised the importance of dialogue between the police and the community continuing after the initial report had been made (Thomas et al., 2017).

Based on this, Thomas et al., (2017) recommended developing support mechanisms for intimate reporters during and after reporting (p. 87) as well as localising and personalising the reporting process (p. 86). One

suggested mechanism was the introduction of a 'feedback loop' (p. 54) to the post-reporting stage. This would extend the dialogue between the community and police, keeping the family and friends of a reported individual informed about what was happening to them and providing information about the investigation's progress. Thomas et al. (2017) further suggested that this feedback loop could help to build trust between the community and the police, as well as acting as a mechanism to hold the police accountable.

4.3.3. BYSTANDER REPORTING

'Bystander reporting' refers to when members of the general public (i.e., non-intimates) report individuals to CVE programmes. Similar to research on reporting by intimates, research in the UK has found that most members of the public appear willing to refer people into Prevent under the right circumstances. Survey data from Clubb et al. (2022) found that approximately 60 per cent of respondents (total n=515) would be likely to make a referral to Prevent when concerned about an individual's potential radicalisation. Interestingly, the likelihood of making a referral was consistent, regardless of whether respondents were presented with a 'neutral' description of Prevent, or a fictitious newspaper story that was critical of the strategy, although the authors caution against comparing samples from what are two different experiments.

Research from Scandinavia highlights that bystander reporting is contingent on counter-terrorism policies being perceived as legitimate. Gøtzsche-Astrup et al.'s (2021) survey examined whether members of the public would report concerns about an 18-year-old individual's radicalisation (n=13,991). The study found that respondents' collaboration with the authorities – measured by a range of ten potential responses, eight of which related to reporting to the individual's family,

the authorities or other organisations – was largely contingent on them perceiving government counter-terrorism approaches to be legitimate.[9] For this study, legitimacy was understood as a subjective concept, but which broadly referred to public confidence in the appropriateness and justifiability of government decisions in relation to CVE policies (Gøtzsche-Astrup et al., 2021).

4.3.4. BARRIERS TO REPORTING

Existing research identifies four barriers to reporting, discussed in more depth in section 4.5. Distrust in government policies is one of the most common barriers and was found to hinder reporting by both intimates and bystanders. A lack of trust in the authorities was identified as a barrier to reporting by intimates in a number of the studies cited above (e.g., Grossman, 2019; Thomas et al., 2020). Respondents to Gøtzsche-Astrup et al.'s (2021) survey were more hesitant to report concerns when they perceived CVE policies to be illegitimate. Instead, there was a preference for more direct and localised actions involving intimates. In contrast, when respondents perceived CVE policies to be appropriate and justifiable (i.e., legitimate), they were more willing to report.[10]

Intimates may face a number of specific, additional barriers which inhibit reporting. Concerns about what will happen to the individual who has been reported are common (e.g., Grossman, 2019; Neo et al., 2018; Williams et al., 2020; Thomas et al. 2020; Pearce et al., 2020).[11] Knowledge gaps, including a lack of certainty about how to make a referral, what the process of reporting involves or the appropriate actors or agencies to contact, have been found by several studies to pose a barrier to reporting (e.g., Grossman, 2019; Thomas et al., 2020; Williams et al., 2020). In Australia, respondents referred to unclear and flawed reporting

---

9   When indicating their willingness to take different reporting actions, participants were asked to imagine they were responding to a scenario where a local 18-year-old young male had begun to verbally support political groups considered 'extreme' by the government and to call for dramatic democratic reform. The vignette further stated that following the introduction of a new CVE law, the 18-year-old had been formally reported by a neighbour. Participants were randomly assigned into three condition groups: positive manipulation of CVE policy legitimacy; negative manipulation of CVE policy legitimacy; or no manipulation (baseline condition) (Gøtzsche-Astrup et al., 2021).

10   This finding is discussed in more depth in section 4.5.

11   The various expressions and manifestations of concern regarding outcomes for the individual are discussed in more depth in section 4.5.

mechanisms as providing a further barrier to reporting (Grossman, 2019).

Finally, Williams et al. (2020) found that the more closely respondents (n=1,151) identified with a friend, the less likely they were able to recognise illegal activities perpetrated by that friend. Yet in cases where such activities are recognised, respondents indicated greater willingness to intervene, compared with friends they did not identify as closely with. The authors related these findings to the potential efficacy of close friends and family members acting as gatekeepers to enact successful interventions.

Communications campaigns have the potential to overcome these barriers. Gøtzsche-Astrup et al. (2021) recommend that policy legitimacy can be sustained through regular communication with the public, to explain and justify the relevance and achievements of counter-terrorism policies.

4.3.5. CONCLUSION

Intimates, communities and bystanders appear willing to report concerns about a radicalising individual to the authorities, although there is a preference for attempting less formal interventions before moving to formal reporting. However, as discussed in more detail in Section 4.5, there are a number of potential barriers to reporting that need to be overcome. Echoing the conclusions of a previous CREST report on contemporary research on CVE interventions (Lewis and Marsden, 2021), policymakers and practitioners can help to overcome barriers to reporting through communication campaigns and considering how to facilitate informal interventions within social networks.

4.4. PROTECT: DIVERSE RESPONSES

4.4.1. INTRODUCTION

The Protect strand of the CONTEST strategy provides a number of opportunities for public involvement in mitigating the risk of terrorism. Three aspects of this workstream are relevant: encouraging the public to report suspicious activity, most often through public communication campaigns; reducing the vulnerability/ improving the resilience of transport and critical national infrastructure sites; and reducing the vulnerability of crowded places.

Key Findings

- Willingness to report suspicious behaviour is partly informed by the severity of the perceived terrorist-related activity.

- Vigilant behaviour, such as reporting suspicious objects, is informed by contextual factors including the form the suspicious object takes; the availability of authority figures to report to; the location of the item (e.g., a train station; plane in flight; etc.); and the type of action that is possible given the circumstances.

- There is no guarantee that individuals will report activities that they recognise as being potentially suspicious.

- Barriers to reporting include fear of what might happen if the suspicious item is confirmed to be a security threat and a bystander effect where responsibility is deferred to others who are nearby.

- Communications targeted towards members of the public in specific professional roles and contexts can help to increase their understanding of the threat from terrorism.

- Only allocating counter-terrorism responsibilities to specific positions within an organisation can contribute to a knowledge gap amongst other staff, or disengagement from wider security practices.

- Constraints that can limit employee reporting include adherence to a 'need-to-know' principle which discourages employees from enquiring about broader aspects of the organisation's work, and reticence due to a belief in a co-worker's trustworthiness because they hold security clearance.

- Public information campaigns can improve public preparedness. Programmes which involve greater participant engagement (e.g., a drill rather than written material) can improve short-term preparedness.

- Private organisations – particularly transport companies – have the potential to play a key role in communicating appropriate responses to members of the general public.

Many of the relevant studies identified in the literature searches for this section of this report were covered in two previous CREST guides: 'Behavioural-Focused Protective Security Programmes' (Copeland & Marsden, 2020) and 'Public Experiences of the UK Counter-Terrorism System' (Lewis & Marsden, 2020).

These two reports pointed to definitional concerns, where a lack of clarity surrounding definitions of suspicious behaviours related to terrorism can mean that the public come to understand these behaviours in the context of ordinary crime. Differences in public and official definitions of what constitutes suspicious behaviour can contribute to a knowledge gap in the public's ability to identify terroristic behaviours. Including specific example behaviours in public vigilance campaigns may mitigate this effect and increase reporting intentions.

Research on efforts to encourage the general public to be aware of, and report, suspicious activity (e.g., unattended items in public spaces or people acting suspiciously) tends to describe how message content affects future behaviour, such as intended reporting

to the police or those in positions of authority (for example at transport hubs) (Pearce et al., 2020; Haner et al., 2021; Gøtzsche-Astrup et al., 2021). A number of key insights can be drawn from this work, however, examination of communications campaigns attempting to elicit this behaviour remains limited (Copeland & Marsden, 2020; Lewis & Marsden, 2020) and poses an area for future research.

Relevant literature on securing critical infrastructure is found within assessments of chemical biological radioactive nuclear (CBRN) threats[12] (e.g., Carter et al., 2020; Havârneanu et al., 2022) as well as research into co-worker reporting of insider risk (Rice & Searle, 2022). While not focused on counter-terrorism explicitly, this research highlights differences in how members of the general public and individuals employed in jobs that may involve formalised, non-statutory counter-terrorism training perceive their expected roles in relation to counter-terrorism.

A number of barriers and incentives for employees and private organisations to adopt protective security measures have been identified in the research (Lewis & Marsden, 2020). These include a low awareness of the threat from terrorism and practical and financial constraints that render these measures as low priorities (e.g., Aplin & Rogers, 2020; Booth et al., 2020; McIlhatton et al., 2020; Atkinson et al., 2020).

These findings offer insights for Protect, as potential incentives to encourage the adoption of protective security measures include increasing awareness of terrorism threats, financial incentives, and/ or the introduction of supportive policy and legislation (e.g., McIlhatton et al., 2019; Aplin & Rogers, 2020).

4.4.2. REPORTING INTENTIONS

A reasonable body of research focuses on reporting intentions and what shapes people's motivation to report potential threats. The perceived severity of the threat is likely to influence whether someone states

they are likely to report something suspicious to the authorities. One survey (n=700) conducted by Haner et al. (2021) found that respondents' willingness to report suspicious behaviour varied according to the perceived severity of the terrorism-related threat. Respondents were asked how likely they would be to call the police in response to a set of six suspicious terrorism-related activities ranging from "distributing handouts that express support for terrorism", to "pledging allegiance to a terrorist group", and "talking about planting explosives in a public place". 86 per cent of respondents were likely to report people they learned were discussing planting explosives in a public place, while 73 per cent were likely to report the distribution of handouts. This pattern is similar to that found in survey research by LaFree & Adamczyk (2017) (n=3,192), supporting the idea that the more dangerous the activity, the more important reporting is perceived to be.

However there is no guarantee that individuals will report activities even when they recognise them as being potentially suspicious. An examination of the processes that bus and rail line commuters experience when 'seeing something' and 'saying something' in the USA (n=30) found that while the interviewees were 'primed to recognise certain object forms', namely unattended bags, this did not guarantee their 'saying something' (Emerson, 2022, p. 615). Most interviewees viewed unattended bags as a potential threat in a way that was consistent with the messages communicated by government communication campaigns. Cultural products such as films were also identified as influencing this perception.

However, emotional responses can inform the decision to 'say something' when confronted with an unattended object. Fear of what may happen once an unattended object has been noticed can be overwhelming, leading to passivity which can hinder reporting (Emerson, 2022, p. 627). A 'Bystander Effect' where an individual perceives that somebody else will take responsibility

---

12   Some literature includes the factor of 'explosives', abbreviated to CBRNe (e.g., Havârneanu et al., 2022).

for reporting, can also influence reporting decisions. One of Emerson's respondents described how this deferral of responsibility informed his decision to not report an unattended bag: 'If you're in a group of people there is always that assumption that someone else will do it, especially if there is [sic] a lot of people around you are witnessing the same thing.' (Emerson, 2022, p.628). From this, Emerson argues that vigilant behaviour 'operates amid multiple visual stimuli, and diverse calls for action' (2022, p. 629), supporting the interpretation of public responses to terrorist threats as a situational process.

Only two studies were identified that had been published (Emerson, 2022; Haner et al., 2021) since two previous syntheses reviewed the relevant literature (Copeland & Marsden, 2020; Lewis & Marsden, 2020). Both papers confirm and build upon conclusions drawn in previous research. Evidence gaps still remain with regards to empirical research evaluating public communications campaigns, but two areas have been developed in greater detail. Evidence suggests that the greater the severity of the behaviour, the higher likelihood the public will report it. The role of emotions was found to inform decision-making processes surrounding reporting unattended items. However, awareness of the need to report and the ability to identify potential threats does not necessarily manifest as actual reporting behaviour.

4.4.3. CHALLENGES IN MAKING STAFF RESPONSIBLE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM

Specific counter-terrorism roles tend to be allocated to certain positions within companies. Such roles are typically associated with positions which are either specialist security-focused roles or managerial roles that are mid-level or above.

Certain sectors, such as museums, have taken on the responsibility for delivering counter-terrorism training to staff. A respondent from Atkinson et al.'s study (n=20) referred to a 'realisation' that museum security 'needed to be professionalised' (2020, p.

115). Communication and preparedness within this sector is exemplified by regular staff briefings concerning terrorism and rehearsing emergency response procedures (Atkinson et al., 2020) suggesting the development of in-house expertise.

However, several studies discuss how allocating roles to a narrow section of the overall employee population can result in a security threat knowledge gap for 'regular' workers (e.g., Havârneanu et al., 2022) or disengagement from playing any role in supporting an organisation's wider security culture (e.g., Rice & Searle, 2022).

Research examining security knowledge within railway and transport companies identified a specific knowledge gap around CBRN threats. In a survey of security representatives from 21 countries (n=30), a little over a third (36.7%) believed all staff were aware of CBRNe threats (Havârneanu et al., 2022). Several companies reported that CBRNe awareness and training is only delivered to 'relevant staff' with specific roles, such as central operational room staff.

However, the public may perceive a broader range of staff as having a relevant role. For example, Pearce et al.'s (2020) research highlighted how members of the public saw retail staff at transport hubs as people with whom they might raise a counter-terrorism concern, suggesting that training should not be limited to operational staff.

A related challenge identified by Havârneanu et al. (2022) was that many respondents viewed public communication of CBRNe threats as the responsibility of governments and ministries, rather than being the job of private companies, pointing to some ambiguity around who is responsible for messaging.

Internal organisational communication around roles and responsibilities can both enable and constrain reporting of insider threats. Rice and Searle's (2022) study of 16 staff members working for a high-security organisation comprising part of the UK's critical national infrastructure (CNI) examined a number

of different models of communication – top-down, bottom-up, and lateral peer-to-peer – and identified a number of key findings related to (in)effective internal communication.[13]

Several non-managers emphasised the centrality of mid-level managers in monitoring, and subsequently reporting, team members' behaviours. For example, the absence of defined security responsibilities from their overall job description appeared to be understood by some non-managers as signalling that they did not have a role in the organisation's security culture. This was emphasised by one non-manager who argued that following the correct security procedures was 'not my problem' (Rice & Searle, 2022, p. 479).

The absence of effective reporting channels contributed to anxiety surrounding reporting. One respondent described attempts to report as a ''You either just get ignored or 'oh god, he's off again' kind of mentality …'' (Rice & Searle, 2022, p. 479). Such a dismissive response arguably discourages reporting.

Two organisational practices have the potential to act as unintended constraints on employee reporting. Employee vetting and adherence to a 'need-to-know' principle[14] contributed towards co-workers failing to challenge behaviours that may be indicative of an insider threat. Employees described how they assumed that when a co-worker had security clearance, this indicated their trustworthiness. This assumption of trustworthiness arguably relaxed attention and vigilance towards their co-workers' behaviour, increasing the risk it may go unchallenged. Whilst fear of over-stepping the 'need-to-know' principle unintentionally contributed to a hesitancy by non-managers to question co-workers' behaviours that may otherwise have raised

concerns, including those indicating a possible insider threat (Rice & Searle, 2022).

4.4.4. KNOWLEDGE AND AWARENESS AMONGST RELEVANT PROFESSIONALS

Knowledge and awareness of counter-terrorism advice can vary, even amongst professions that are expected to play a role in mitigating the risk from terrorism. This is demonstrated in the built environment sector. A series of studies interviewing professionals and stakeholders concerned with the planning, design, and development of real estate in crowded places[15] in the UK, US, and Australia,[16] identified varying levels of understanding of counter-terrorism security advice (Booth et al., 2020; McIlhatton et al., 2020; Christensen, 2021).

McIlhatton et al.'s work (2020) emphasises the complexity of including counter-terrorism protective security measures in real estate development, owing to the different variables that have to be taken into account, such as the project's scale, location and local authority restrictions.

All three studies found professionals working in these sectors lacked awareness of the threat posed by terrorism. This acted as a barrier across the US, UK and Australia to the inclusion, and even consideration, of counter-terrorism protective security measures in development projects (McIlhatton et al., 2020). In particular, Christensen (2020) reported that many Australian interviewees working in property development and related fields did not identify terrorism as a major consideration in planning, design and development processes. Respondents directly attributed this to a generally held cultural attitude that terrorist threats do not affect Australia. Participants in two of the studies felt counter-terrorism protective security measures would only be considered part of

---

13   As this section is concerned with 'regular' workers (e.g., non-managers; those who are unlikely to have received specific counter-terrorism training as part of their role in the organisation), the following discussion focuses on constraints on bottom-up communication.

14   This practice was defined by Rice and Searle (2022) as situations where employees were strongly discouraged from enquiring about, or discussing any aspect of work that they are not directly involved with (p. 480).

15   Booth et al.'s sample (2020) consisted of police Counter-Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs) (n=23) and built environment professionals (n=19), which comprised architects (n=10); developers (n=3) and local authority planners (n=6). Christensen (2021) interviewed stakeholders from a range of disciplines: property development (n=5); property investment (n=4); property management (n=4); security consultancy (n=4); design/engineering (n=8); city planning (n=5); and federal government/policy/strategy (n=3).

16   56 interviews were conducted in the US, 54 in the UK and 32 in Australia.

their remit (Booth et al., 2020) or included in risk assessments (Christensen, 2021) if this became a policy or legal requirement.

Complacency among built environment professionals (BEPs) in the UK during training was experienced by Counter-Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs) (n=23) responsible for conducting the training (Booth et al., 2020). Engagement with government-funded training/ guidance was found to be limited amongst BEPs, presenting further constraints to raising BEP awareness of counter-terrorism issues.

4.4.5. KNOWLEDGE AND AWARENESS AMONGST THE GENERAL PUBLIC

Public information campaigns can improve public preparedness. A systematic literature review of 44 studies[17] examining the efficacy of pre-incident information campaigns designed to improve public preparedness for CBRN incidents found that educational interventions concerning protective actions that encourage greater engagement in responding to a threat (e.g., a practice drill compared to a leaflet) appear more effective in improving public preparedness (Carter et al., 2020). Most of the studies focused on improving preparedness behaviour in the short term. The evidence was limited as to whether any improvement in preparedness was sustainable over a longer period of time using the same types of intervention.

Research also suggested that communication with the public around potential threats may be lacking in some sectors. Railway operators (n=30) surveyed by Havârneanu et al., (2022) found that there had been limited communication between the operators and the general public regarding CBRNe issues. Only a fifth of the railway operators surveyed confirmed they had a public communication plan prior to, during or following a CBRNe incident.

The study concluded that 'most railway companies … do not have a clear strategy for crisis communication with the public and do not communicate with passengers about the issue of CBRNe.' (p.8). A lack of communication was perceived as contributing to gaps in the public's understanding of CBRNe threats. Unclear expectations regarding appropriate responses for the public to take during a CBRNe incident were also considered likely to limit public preparedness.

4.4.6. CONCLUSION

While members of the public will generally play a limited role in supporting protective security measures related to counter-terrorism, individuals working in some professions are likely to play a more important function. Research relating to this type of professional role is limited but work to date suggests there are important barriers that might inhibit professionals from engaging with this area of counter-terrorism. More research is needed to examine how best to overcome these barriers.

4.5. SUMMARISING BARRIERS ACROSS DIFFERENT AREAS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM

4.5.1. INTRODUCTION

This section considers the factors with the potential to act as barriers inhibiting members of the public from performing counter-terrorism roles. It complements the previous sections which discussed the barriers relevant to specific roles by focusing on how two fundamental constraints – namely, unwillingness and uncertainty – are relevant to all areas of counter-terrorism.

---

17   Of the 44 studies including in the literature review, only two explicitly focused on terrorism. However, the conclusions drawn regarding what makes an effective public preparedness campaign are relevant to the context of preparing for terrorist attacks.

<div style="border:1px solid red">

Key Findings

- Whilst specific barriers vary depending on the type of counter-terrorism action being undertaken, they commonly relate to unwillingness or uncertainty.

- The perceived legitimacy of security policies and extent to which they are carried out in line with the principles of procedural justice influence public willingness to participate in counter-terrorism.

- Uncertainty appears to stem from gaps in public knowledge, such as the type of behaviour that should be reported as 'suspicious', or the consequences of reporting.

</div>

4.5.2. UNWILLINGNESS

A range of factors can influence public willingness to perform counter-terrorism functions. Research draws particular attention to the perceived severity of the threat and perceived legitimacy of policies and government.

In terms of threat severity, both the current level of terrorist threat, and the perceived severity of observed behaviour, can influence reporting intentions. Surveys (n=3,192) conducted by LaFree & Adamcyzk (2017) following the Boston marathon bombings indicated a significant increase in both public awareness of counter-terrorism programmes, and willingness amongst the public to 'report suspicious behaviour to police' (p. 459).

Respondents to another US-based survey (n=700) were far more likely to report some behaviours to the police than others (Haner et al., 2021). Half were either 'likely' or 'very likely' to report people reading terrorist material. A higher percentage (86%) indicated that sourcing weapons for a terrorist group or overhearing a discussion about planting explosives in a public place would be activities they were likely to report. However, there was little evidence to suggest that the ethnicity or sex of a terrorist suspect influences willingness to report.

The link between perceived legitimacy of policies and/ or the government, and willingness to report radicalisation risk discussed in Section 4.3. has been identified in other contexts. An association between perceptions of police legitimacy and self-reported willingness to cooperate with police in efforts to prevent terrorism was identified in an Australian study (n=800) (Madon et al., 2017). This paper found that perceptions of police legitimacy mediated the relationship between perceived procedural justice and willingness to cooperate with police.[18]

In the UK, a survey of British Muslims (n=1,742) concluded that[19] 'although a minority shows signs of alienation, most British Muslims are satisfied with and trust counter-terrorism policies as well as the government and the police' and identified a high willingness to respond to Islamist extremism (Shanaah, 2022, p. 71). Feelings of alienation were correlated with a lower motivation to counter Islamist extremism. However, this did not automatically result in 'passivity and disengagement' from counter-terrorism efforts.

4.5.3. UNCERTAINTY

Uncertainty linked to gaps in public knowledge is the second barrier to the public participation in efforts to mitigate the risk of terrorism. Consolidating findings from survey-based research indicates that individuals can be uncertain as to the type of behaviour that should be reported as suspicious and in relation to the implications of reporting behaviour and/or individuals.

---

18   Lewis and Marsden (2020) discuss Pearce et al.'s findings (n=3,005) where procedural justice and social identification with the police (2020) increased the likelihood of public reporting suspicious behaviour or objects on British and Danish railways to the police in response to 'See it. Say it. Sorted' advice.

19   The author draws this overall conclusion by combining the results from three surveys. 44 per cent of respondents demonstrated trust in the government, with 53 per cent trusting the government "to act in my best interest in the area of counter-terrorism". A further 44 per cent indicated satisfaction with the government's counter-terrorism policy. Trust in the police was measured by drawing on the UK Citizenship Survey 2010-11, where 83 per cent of Muslims surveyed indicated that they trusted the Police "a lot" or "a fair amount".

Pearce et al.'s (2020) survey examining reporting intentions on rail networks (n=3,005) found greater uncertainty with regards to reporting suspicious behaviour than for reporting unattended items.[20] A little under a third of UK (29.2%) and Danish participants (30.5%) indicated they were unsure if they would report suspicious behaviour. Those surveyed were more likely to report unattended items than behaviours such as hostile reconnaissance. This type of knowledge gap was also identified by practitioners in the UK and Denmark (n=30) interviewed by Parker et al. (2019).

New or adapted communications campaigns could be potential solutions to this knowledge gap. One interviewee from Denmark noted that they were often "met with a demand for a list of concrete signs of suspicious behaviour to report" from "non-security-focused partners" (Parker et al., 2019, p. 274). Giving the public more detail surrounding what constitutes 'terrorism' or 'terrorism-related crime' could increase bystander intervention. Carson and Politte infer this from experimentally exploring the effects of implicit bias (e.g., regarding suspect ethnicity and sex) on public reporting (2021, p. 2155).

Uncertainty regarding the implications of reporting behaviour and/or individuals is experienced by both intimates and members of the general public, although these concerns manifest in different ways. A number of studies describe the anxieties held by intimates about reporting radicalisation and concerns that it may damage their relationship with the individual of concern (Neo et al., 2018; Williams et al., 2020; Grossman, 2019).

A common barrier to reporting for intimates relates to concern about criminalising loved ones. In terms of barriers to non-intimates, or bystanders, there is a concern that reporting suspicious behaviour witnessed in public spaces may inadvertently get an innocent person in trouble (Pearce et al., 2020). These concerns are at least in part linked to uncertainty around reporting.

This issue is discussed in several studies which point to the negative impact on reporting due to knowledge gaps around what will happen to the information, and the individual of concern, once a report has been made (Grossman, 2019; Pearce et al., 2020).

4.5.4. CONCLUSION

Research has identified a number of barriers to mitigating the risk of terrorism through reporting activities. Specific barriers vary depending on the type of counter-terrorism action being undertaken, but commonly relate to unwillingness or uncertainty about reporting. Suggestions to counter these barriers range from increasing public trust in the authorities, to incorporating examples of 'suspicious' behaviour into public vigilance campaigns.

---

20   The sample consisted of respondents from the UK (n=1,505) and Denmark (n=1,500).

5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1. KEY FINDINGS

- Research typically discusses four different categories of public actors:

    1. Members of the general public.

    2. Intimates (i.e., family members and friends).

    3. Those working in professions that receive counter-terrorism training, but who are not subject to a specific legal duty mandating them to perform a counter-terrorism role.

    4. Those working in professions that are subject to a relevant statutory duty.

- Each category has different roles and responsibilities and differing potential to help mitigate the risk of terrorism.

- Different categories of the public have contrasting motivations, levels of knowledge and confidence and can be subject to different kinds of biases that might shape their potential to help mitigate the risk from terrorism. These issues are helpful to keep in mind when designing training or communication initiatives.

- Access to, and level of, training varies, as does societal and/or organisational expectations of how each category of public actor should contribute to countering terrorism.

- Training and communications campaigns shape how individuals are likely to respond to a perceived threat, ranging from concern someone is at risk of radicalisation, to suspicious behaviour, or an unattended item in a public space.

- Societal and/or professional expectations and the designation of counter-terrorism functions to specific people within a community or organisational setting shape the roles they may play.

- Research examining public conceptualisations of suspected terrorist actors is limited. However, several studies explore the impact of biases based on religion and ethnicity on public perception of terrorist suspects. Research has paid particular attention to the role of the media in shaping these biases.

PREVENT

- 'Intimates' and community members are generally willing to refer individuals to the authorities under the right circumstances. However, there is a preference for exploring other localised, intra-community actions prior to contacting the authorities.

- Reporting is perceived by community respondents as an ongoing social process. Prior to formally reporting concerns to the authorities, intimates may try to intervene themselves and will often consult with wider social networks or community leaders.

- The involvement of community members has been described as 'staging'. Staged decision-making and reporting emphasises the role of the community in responding to concerns of individual radicalisation.

- New research supports previous findings that uncertainty surrounding the outcome of reporting on the individual of concern and a lack of trust in authorities form key barriers to intimates' reporting.

- Perceptions of CVE policy legitimacy can also influence someone's willingness to formally report to the authorities.

PROTECT

- Willingness to report suspicious behaviour is partly informed by the severity of the perceived terrorist-related activity.

- Vigilant behaviour, such as reporting suspicious objects, is informed by contextual factors including the form the suspicious object takes; the availability of authority figures to report to; the location of the item (e.g., a train station; plane in flight, etc.), and the type of action that is possible given the circumstances.

- There is no guarantee that individuals will report activities that they recognise as being potentially suspicious.

- Barriers to reporting include fear of what might happen if the suspicious item is confirmed to be a security threat and a bystander effect where responsibility is deferred to others who are nearby.

- Communications targeted towards members of the public in specific professional roles and contexts can help to increase their understanding of the threat from terrorism.

- Only allocating counter-terrorism responsibilities to specific positions within an organisation can contribute to a knowledge gap amongst other staff, or disengagement from wider security practices.

- Constraints that can limit employee reporting include adherence to a 'need-to-know' principle which discourages employees from enquiring about broader aspects of the organisation's work, and reticence due to a belief in a co-worker's trustworthiness because they hold security clearance.

- Public information campaigns can improve public preparedness. Programmes which involve greater participant engagement (e.g. a drill rather than written material) can improve short-term preparedness.

- Private organisations – particularly transport companies – have the potential to play a key role in communicating appropriate responses to members of the general public.

Barriers to public engagement in counter-terrorism roles

- Whilst specific barriers vary depending on the type of counter-terrorism action being undertaken, two commonly reported constraints relate to unwillingness and uncertainty.

- The perceived legitimacy of security policies and extent to which they are carried out in line with the principles of procedural justice influence public willingness to participate in counter-terrorism.

- The potential severity of the threat shapes willingness to report. The more severe the perceived security issue, the greater the willingness to participate in counter-terrorism.

- Uncertainty appears to stem from gaps in public knowledge, such as the type of behaviour that should be reported as 'suspicious', or the consequences of reporting for the individual who is the subject of the report.

5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

- Communication campaigns will benefit from being tailored to recognise the heterogeneity of 'the public' and the differing levels of motivation, confidence, and biases different groups of people might hold.

- Initiatives to encourage the public to identify and report suspicious behaviours will be supported by reducing uncertainty by providing clear information about the specific types of behaviour that should be reported, and what will happen in the aftermath of a report.

- Reporting authorities can help family, friends and community members concerned about someone at risk of radicalisation by offering transparent

and sustained support including clear information about the reporting process. This can cover how to report, what to expect, and potential and actual outcomes for the individual of concern.

- Maximising opportunities to explain the reasons for counter-terrorism policies and practices to the public can help enhance their perceived legitimacy.

- Public communications campaigns are supported when delivered by trusted and credible messengers and when they can demonstrate that reports will be taken seriously.

- Organisations benefit from targeted advice and training that highlights the constraints and barriers that can act on reporting, for example, in relation to insider threats.

- Gaps in 'regular' workers' knowledge of security threats could be met by making basic information accessible to staff regardless of whether their professional role includes counter-terrorism responsibilities.

- Public preparedness to respond to a Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, Nuclear or explosives incident could be enhanced through education and communication campaigns that provide knowledge and enhance confidence about what to do in an emergency.

5.3. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

- More research to evaluate the effects of existing public communications campaigns and the factors that have influenced actual reports have the potential to help develop more effective campaigns.

- Barriers to reporting across the full range of counter-terrorism functions remain relatively poorly understood. Additional research to understand what, when, why, and how barriers shape behaviour and what helps to overcome them would help address this knowledge gap and could inform communication and training initiatives.

- Further research on what shapes community or intimates' willingness to report, and the circumstances under which barriers to reporting are overcome, would provide further insight into the public's role in relation to the Prevent strand of counter-terrorism.

- More work to understand the role procedural justice and perceived legitimacy of counter-terrorism policy play in shaping public willingness to support counter-terrorism efforts could inform a range of policy and practice contexts.

- Research to better understand what shapes public perceptions of terrorist actors, and what mitigates racial or religious prejudice in relation to violent extremists could help to tailor communication campaigns or other public outreach activities to different audiences.

5. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aplin, D., & Rogers, M. B. (2020). 'Alert not alarm': The UK experience of public counter-terrorism awareness and training, with explicit reference to Project ARGUS. *The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles*, 93(3), 167–182. *https://doi. org/10.1177/0032258X19851537*

Atkinson, C., Yates, D., & Brooke, N. (2020). 'Now that you mention it, museums probably are a target': museums, terrorism and security in the United Kingdom. *Museum Management and Curatorship*, 35(2), 109–124. *https://doi.org/10.1080/09647775.20 19.1683881*

Betus, A. E., Kearns, E. M., & Lemieux, A. F. (2020). How perpetrator identity (sometimes) influences media framing attacks as 'terrorism' or 'mental illness'. *Communication Research*, 48(8), 1133-1156. *https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650220971142*.

Bjørgo, T., & Ravndal, J. A. (2019). Extreme-Right Violence and Terrorism: Concepts, Patterns, and Responses. Policy Brief. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) *https://doi. org/10.19165/2019.1.08*

Booth, A., Chmutina, K., & Bosher, L. (2020). Protecting crowded places: Challenges and drivers to implementing protective security measures in the built environment. Cities, 107 (May), 102891, 1-10. *https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2020.102891*

Carson, J. V., & Politte, H. (2021). Implicit Bias Within Public Reporting: A Virtual Reality Experiment Examining 'Suspicious' Activity. Crime and Delinquency, 67(12), 2135–2162. *https://doi. org/10.1177/0011128720981897*

Carter, H., Drury, J., & Amlôt, R. (2020). Recommendations for improving public engagement with pre-incident information materials for initial response to a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) incident: A systematic review. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, 51 (July), 1-12. *https://doi.org/10.1016/j. ijdrr.2020.101796*

Clubb, G., Kobayashi, Y., & Davies, G. (2022). Public Attitudes to Prevent and the Desistance and Disengagement Programme: Preliminary Results. Leeds: University of Leeds. Unpublished Manuscript.

Copeland, S. & Marsden, S. (2020). 'Behavioural-Focused Protective Security Programmes: Full Report', Knowledge Management Across the Four Counter-Terrorism 'Ps'. Lancaster University, Lancaster: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST). Available at: *https://www. crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/behavioural-focused-protective-security-programmes/*

Christensen, P. H. (2021). Counterterrorism protective security as part of the planning, design and development of crowded places in Australia: where are we now? *Journal of European Real Estate Research*, 15(1), 112-129. *https://doi.org/10.1108/ JERER-06-2021-0034*

Dolliver, M. J., & Kearns, E. M. (2022). Is It Terrorism?: Public Perceptions, Media, and Labeling the Las Vegas Shooting. S*tudies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 45(1), 1–19. *https://doi.org/10.1080/10576 10X.2019.1647673*

D'Orazio, V., & Salehyan, I. (2018). Who is a Terrorist? Ethnicity, Group Affiliation, and Understandings of Political Violence. International Interactions, 44(6), 1017–1039. *https://doi.org/10.108 0/03050629.2018.1500911*

Emerson, R. G. (2022). Vigilant Subjects, Risky Objects: 'If You See Something, Say Something'

Theory & Event, 25(3), 614–638. *https://doi. org/10.1353/tae.2022.0030*

Gøtzsche-Astrup, O., Lindekilde, L., & Fjellman, A. M. (2021). Perceived Legitimacy of CVE Policies and the Willingness to Report Concerns of Radicalization to Authorities in the Nordic Countries. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 0(0), 1–17. *https://doi.org/10.1080 /09546553.2021.1972977*

Grossman, M., Stephenson, P., & Zhang, G. (2015). Community Reporting Thresholds: Sharing Information with Authorities Concerning Violent Extremist Activity and Involvement in Foreign Conflict. Canberra: Countering Violent Extremism Subcommittee, Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee. *https://doi.org/10.13140/ RG.2.2.19345.07520.*

Grossman, M. (2019). 'When the 'Right Thing to Do' Feels so Wrong: Australian Muslim Perspectives on 'Intimates' Reporting to Authorities about Violent Extremism.'In J. Esposito & D. Iner (eds.) Islamophobia and Radicalization: Breeding Intolerance and Violence. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 203–224. *https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95237-6*

Haner, M., Sloan, M. M., Pickett, J. T., & Cullen, F. T. (2021). When Do Americans 'See Something, Say Something'? Experimental Evidence on the Willingness to Report Terrorist Activity. *Justice Quarterly,* 0(0), 1–25. *https://doi.org/10.1080/074188 25.2021.1942162*

Havârneanu, G. M., Petersen, L., Arnold, A., Carbon, D., & Görgen, T. (2022). Preparing railway stakeholders against CBRNe threats through better cooperation with security practitioners. *Applied Ergonomics*, 10(2) (April), 1-11. *https://doi. org/10.1016/j.apergo.2022.103752*

HM Government (2018). 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism', 4th June; updated 20th August 2018. London. Available at: *https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ counter-terrorism-strategy-contest-2018*

Huff, C., & Kertzer, J. D. (2018). How the Public Defines Terrorism. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(1), 55–71. *https://doi.org/10.1111/ ajps.12329*

Kaleem, A. (2022). The hegemony of Prevent: turning counter-terrorism policing into common sense. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 15(2), 267–289. *https:// doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2021.2013016*

Kearns, E. M., Betus, A. E., & Lemieux, A. F. (2019). Why do some terrorist attacks receive more media attention than others? *Justice Quarterly*, 36(6), 985–1022. *https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2018.1524507*

Kumar, D. (2018). See something, say something: Security rituals, affect, and US nationalism from the cold war to the war on terror. *Public Culture,* 30(1), 143–171. *https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-4189203*

LaFree, G., & Adamczyk, A. (2017). The Impact of the Boston Marathon Bombings on Public Willingness to Cooperate with Police. *Justice Quarterly*, 34(3), 459–490. *https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2016.1181780*

Lewis, J., & Marsden, S. (2020). Public Experiences of the UK Counter-Terrorism System. Full Report. Lancaster University, Lancaster: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST). Available at: *https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/public-experiences-of-the-uk-counter-terrorism-system/*

Lewis, J., & Marsden, S. (2021). Countering Violent Extremism Interventions: Contemporary Research. Full Report. Lancaster University, Lancaster: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST). Available at: *https://crestresearch.ac.uk/ resources/countering-violent-extremism-interventions/*

Lewis, J., Hewitt, J., & Marsden, S. (2022). The Psychological Effects Of Criminal Justice Measures: A Review Of Evidence Related To Terrorist Offending.

Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST). Available at: *https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/the-psychological-effects-of-criminal-justice-measures/*

Lindekilde, L., Pearce, J., Parker, D., & Rogers, B. (2021). 'Run, Hide, Tell' or 'Run, Hide, Fight'? The impact of diverse public guidance about marauding terrorist firearms attacks on behavioral intentions during a scenario-based experiment in the United Kingdom and Denmark. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, 60 (February), 102278, 1–9. *https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2021.102278*

Madon, N. S., Murphy, K., & Cherney, A. (2017). Promoting Community Collaboration in Counterterrorism: Do Social Identities and Perceptions of Legitimacy Mediate Reactions to Procedural Justice Policing? *British Journal of Criminology*, 57(5), 1144–1164. *https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azw053*

McIlhatton, D., Monaghan, R., Berry, J., Cuddihy, J., Chapman, D., & Christensen, P. (2019). Protecting Commercial Real Estate and Crowded Places from Terrorism. *Journal of Real Estate Literature*, 27(1), 103–116. *https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2019.12090494*

McIlhatton, D., Berry, J., Chapman, D., Christensen, P. H., Cuddihy, J., Monaghan, R., & Range, D. (2020). Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism: An Analysis of the Current Considerations and Barriers Inhibiting the Adoption of Counterterrorism Protective Security Measures. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,* 43(9), 753–774. *https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1507311*

Mitnik, Z. S., Freilich, J. D., & Chermak, S. M. (2020). Post-9/11 coverage of terrorism in the New York Times. *Justice Quarterly*, 37(1), 161–185. *https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2018.1488985*

Neo, L.S., Pang, J. & Chin, J. (2018). 'Bystander intervention to prevent radicalisation'. In M. Khader, L.S. Neo, J. Tan, D.D. Cheong & J. Chin (eds.)

Learning from violent extremist attacks: Behavioural sciences insights for practitioners and policymakers. *Singapore: World Scientific*, pp. 175– 197. *https://doi.org/10.1142/11134*

Parker, D., Pearce, J. M., Lindekilde, L., & Rogers, M. B. (2019). Challenges for effective counterterrorism communication: Practitioner insights and policy implications for preventing radicalization, disrupting attack planning, and mitigating terrorist attacks. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 42(3), 264–291. *https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1373427*

Pearce, J. M., Parker, D., Lindekilde, L., Bouhana, N., & Rogers, M. B. (2020). Encouraging public reporting of suspicious behaviour on rail networks. *Policing and Society,* 30(7), 835–853. *https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2019.1607340*

Rice, C., & Searle, R. H. (2022). 'The Enabling Role of Internal Organizational Communication in Insider Threat Activity – Evidence From a High Security Organization.' *Management Communication Quarterly,* 36(3), 467-495. *https://doi.org/10.1177/08933189211062250*

Rodrigo Jusué, I. (2021). Counter-terrorism training 'at your kitchen table': the promotion of 'CT citizens' and the securitisation of everyday life in the UK. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 15(2), 290–310. *https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2021.2013014*

Rowe, M. (2018). Fostering Constructive Action by Peers and Bystanders in Organizations and Communities. *Negotiation Journal*, 34(2), 137–163. *https://doi.org/10.1111/nejo.12221*

Selod, S. (2018) Forever Suspect: Racialized Surveillance of Muslim Americans in the War on Terror. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. *https://doi.org/10.1111/soin.12358*

Shanaah, S. (2022). Alienation or Cooperation? British Muslims' Attitudes to and Engagement in Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Extremism. *Terrorism*

and Political Violence, 34(1), 71–92. *https://doi.org/1 0.1080/09546553.2019.1663829*

Silva, J. R., Duran, C., Freilich, J. D., & Chermak, S. M. (2020). Addressing the Myths of Terrorism in America. *International Criminal Justice Review*, 30(3), 302–324. *https://doi. org/10.1177/1057567719833139*

Sloan, M. M., Haner, M., Cullen, F. T., Graham, A., Aydin, E., Kulig, T. C., & Jonson, C. L. (2021). Using Behavioral Strategies to Cope With the Threat of Terrorism: A National-Level Study, *Crime and Delinquency*, 67(12), 2011-2042. *https://doi. org/10.1177/0011128720940984*

Tech Monitor. (2020). 'NaCTSO makes online counter terrorism training course easier to access for home users'. April 7. Available at: *https://techmonitor.ai/ government-computing/nactso-makes-online-counter- terrorism-training-course-easier-to-access-for-home- users*

Thomas, P. (2017). Changing experiences of responsibilisation and contestation within counter- terrorism policies: The British Prevent experience. *Policy & Politics*, 45(3), 305–321. *https://doi.org/10.1 332/030557317X14943145195580*

Thomas, P., Grossman, M., Miah, S., and Christmann, K. (2017). Community Reporting Thresholds: Sharing information with authorities concerning violent extremist activity and involvement in foreign conflict. A UK Replication Study. Lancaster University, Lancaster: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST). Available at: h*ttps:// crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/community-reporting- thresholds-full-report/*

Thomas, P., Grossman, M., Christmann, K., & Miah, S. (2020). Community reporting on violent extremism by 'intimates': emergent findings from international

evidence. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 13(4), 638– 659. *https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2020.1791389*

Williams, M. J., Bélanger, J. J., Horgan, J., & Evans, W. P. (2019). Experimental Effects of a Call-Center Disclaimer Regarding Confidentiality on Callers' Willingness to Make Disclosures Related to Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 31(6), 1327–1341. *https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1476347*

Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. G., Evans, W. P., & Bélanger, J. J. (2020). Expansion and replication of the theory of vicarious help-seeking. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 12(2), 89–117. *https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2018.1546217*

Williamson, H., & Murphy, K. (2022). Animus toward Muslims and its association with public support for punitive counter-terrorism policies: did the Christchurch terrorist attack mitigate this association? *Journal of Experimental Criminology,* 18(2), 343– 363. *https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-020-09450-x*